My Lords, I would like to say a few words in support of Amendment 19 and make a brief comment on Amendment 20.
Amendment 19 is an issue of principle, rather than detail. Most of what I want to say has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. The only point I add is this: when one is considering imposing a criminal sanction on an individual, you have to have regard to the effect of the sanction on the individual in question. For many people, to have a criminal conviction against them is a major disadvantage in future life, particularly for people seeking further employment who have to provide references to their criminal background, if any. It may also affect travel, particularly in countries which deny travel to people who have criminal convictions. Although it may be easy to say that a sentence of not more than two years is not much to trouble about, it is actually something to trouble a great deal about.
That is why the way in which these offences are created, and the extent to which the wording of the offence can be scrutinised, is so very important. It is not a light matter; it is a matter of great importance to the individual. For that reason, there is an issue of principle, which I think lies behind the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.
I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will forgive me for saying that the framing of Amendment 20 creates a rather strange situation for the devolved institutions, and the legislatures in particular. The way in which Clause 2 defines the “appropriate national authority” is simple, so far as England and Wales are concerned, because it is simply the Secretary of State. But when you come to Scotland and to Northern Ireland, there is a choice: in Scotland, it is either the Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State for Scotland; and in the case of Northern Ireland, it is the Northern Ireland department or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
I raised the point at our first sitting that there is some doubt as to what exactly the function is of each of these two people. Take Scotland as an example. In what situations is it appropriate for Scottish Ministers to act alone, and when is it right for the Secretary of State for Scotland to act alone? If one is contemplating the use of the super-affirmative procedure, that is available only to the Secretary of State, because anything done by Scottish Ministers can only be the subject of an instrument laid before the Scottish Parliament. The same is true for the Northern Ireland department: it cannot use the UK procedure because its instruments have to be laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly.
I make this point in case, by any chance, this amendment is to go further. I am not sure how far the noble and learned Lord wants to do that, but just in case he does, a bit more thought is required as to how exactly one is to relate this amendment to the position in the devolved Administrations. The way I left it at the first sitting was that I would much prefer that the Secretary of State for Scotland was not involved, and that the question of implementation—a devolved matter anyway—was left with Scottish Ministers. But one way or another, the situation will need to be clarified. The presence of this amendment gives me a chance to
reiterate my point that there is a lack of clarity in the way that the Bill is framed, as far as the relevant authority is concerned.