My Lords, I hear the noble Earl, but I hope he will understand that I am not wholly convinced by the case he has deployed for continuing the order in respect of the two Russians. Indeed, I question whether it serves any useful purpose. We are dealing with a freezing order in respect of those two people, prohibiting persons from making funds available for their benefit. In my judgment, it is unlikely that the pair are dreading the result of this debate.
I ask three key questions. My first question is: why now? The short answer is of course that this is the second order made against the two men following the Owen report in January 2016. The order has expired and must now be renewed. The question must arise: at what point will this two-year cycle end? What criteria did the Treasury use in looking at the case for its continuation? Are we to anticipate that this two-year continuation will go on ad infinitum?
The Government have clearly put much effort into the order’s renewal, as shown by the timetable I just mentioned and some of the many committees that have looked into it. The instrument was made on 17 January. It was laid before both Houses. A Motion to approve has been made. It has been before several similar committees. There are also the English votes for English laws certification, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, the Delegated Legislation Committee and so forth. It is a pretty formidable series of consideration. I wonder whether it smacks a little of a job creation exercise and whether the Treasury is doing its job properly in asking whether there is value for money in what we are doing. For example, before or after the order made on 19 January, was any effort made—if we consider this so important—to persuade other countries to follow suit in respect of these two Russian gentlemen?
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The second question I pose is this: why are we here at all? Has anyone in the Treasury, for example, asked the basic question on behalf of law and on taxpayers’ behalf: is this expenditure worth while? Is it worth the effort of time and finance? I put this question to the noble Earl: is there a scintilla of evidence that the two men have any assets in the UK on to which the Treasury might latch? Is there any possible way in which any financial institution within this country’s jurisdiction is likely to offer any loans or any form of financial help to these two men, who are GRU operatives? Are they likely either to seek or be given any such help, given their lack of creditworthiness? Otherwise, surely this is a pointless exercise. As we know, Russia will not extradite any of its nationals, let alone those like these two gentlemen—that is, operatives of the Russian secret state engaged in a clandestine mission.
The only explanation offered in the Explanatory Memorandum is in paragraphs 6.2 and 7.3. Paragraph 6.2 states:
“The Treasury believe that this Order will be an effective deterrent to prevent similar activities being undertaken again.”
Paragraph 7.3 states that
“Parliament will not tolerate activities of this sort, and constitutes a deterrent to these persons and others from undertaking similar activities in the future.”
Do the Government seriously suggest that the GRU or the other elements of the Russian secret service will be deterred by an order of this sort? The facts clearly suggest otherwise.
I cite the Salisbury outrage, when the GRU sent two men in the hope of murdering Mr Skripal. In effect, they murdered an ordinary British citizen through their negligence in discarding that vial. Remember, those GRU agents purported to have an interest in medieval ecclesiastical architecture. They said that they thought that Salisbury cathedral was an appropriate place for them to visit in this country, so they visited it to continue their interest in such architecture. It was absolute nonsense. They came here with a firm purpose. There was clearly no deterrent in that case. It was Mr Putin who, in his press conferences and elsewhere, tried to laugh off—almost—the evidence, saying in effect that all traitors may well suffer the same fate. We also know that a number of Chechen opposition people have been killed in France in the same way. Where is this deterrent effect that the Treasury found so convincing? To be fair, in paragraph 12.1, the Treasury concedes that:
“The continued listing of these two names is likely to have negligible impact.”
The use of “negligible impact” probably overstates the effect.
So, why are we here? Could not someone in the Treasury have looked at the facts of the case and what happened afterwards and have said, “Look, stop. This order is no longer justified”? Are we going to consider the charade of extending these two years indefinitely?
Finally, I want to ask about the Magnitsky clauses in the 2018 Act. Why are they not now put into effect? The clauses relate to asset freezes and visa bans. Had they been in effect, they could have been used in this case. I accept that the Government say that an SI will be put down to bring forward the Magnitsky clauses. They argue that they were restrained by EU membership. That is nonsense on stilts. There is no such restraint by EU membership. If there were, why have the Baltic countries—also EU members—had Magnitsky clauses of this sort, on the same lines as legislation in Canada and the USA and that being considered in Australia? The EU did not in any way restrain this. The Government’s argument is wholly without merit. I pay tribute to all those who, on a cross-party basis, led by Andrew Mitchell MP, persuaded the Government, rather against their will, to put forward those Magnitsky clauses. The Government’s best argument is that they are doing this because they are doing it. I only wish that someone had the nous and courage to say, “Enough is enough. We should stop at this point”.