My Lords, Clause 3 already provides for the publication of regular reports on progress towards the formation of an Executive in
Northern Ireland, and for those reports to be laid before Parliament—one by 4 September and another by 9 October, with further reports at intervals of no more than 14 days. Amendments 6 and 7, which have support from all parts of the House, require those reports to be debated in both Houses, pursuant to Motions to be moved within five calendar days of each report being laid. I hope that there will be as few of those reports as possible, because when they stop it will be because the Executive have finally been formed. I hope also that the debates that these amendments provide will help to keep up the pressure for that long-overdue development.
However, let there be no doubt about the main purpose of the amendments. They are defensive fortifications against the possibility—unlikely, no doubt, but pointedly not disavowed by the leading candidate—that the next Prime Minister will advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for the express purpose of achieving a no-deal Brexit to which Parliament is opposed. I am no enthusiast for procedural gambits—today of all days, we should be wary of anything that is not cricket—but to my mind these amendments are abundantly justified by the extraordinary gravity of what is apparently being contemplated.
This would not be a standard prorogation of Parliament. The purpose of the prorogation extending beyond 31 October would be to bring about an irreversible change not just to our trade relations but to our central political and economic alliance, without putting anything in its place. If the House of Commons were to give its democratic approval to such a momentous step, of course it must happen—nothing in these amendments would impede, or is intended to impede, that—but for Parliament to have its voice removed precisely because of its anticipated opposition would be astonishing, unconstitutional and without precedent in recent times.
I accept of course that prorogation has attracted controversy in the past. A technical use of it was made in 1948 to fulfil the requirement in the Parliament Act 1911 that a Parliament Bill be approved by the Commons in three successive Sessions. In that case, though, a clear majority of MPs desired the legislation to pass and were in favour of prorogation for that purpose. That episode pales into insignificance when compared to what it seems is now so casually contemplated: a direct assault on the sovereignty of Parliament itself, aimed at circumventing its will irrevocably on one of the central questions of our time.