My Lords, this Bill makes mainly technical changes to existing legislation which will facilitate the enactment and operation of the Law Commission’s sentencing code—a consolidation of legislation governing sentencing procedure in England and Wales. I emphasise that it is concerned with sentencing procedure; it is not concerned with sentencing policy.
It is not a controversial proposition, I suggest, that one pillar of the rule of law is that the law should be intelligible, accessible, clear and predictable. It is equally uncontroversial to say that, in our criminal law, the law governing sentencing procedure has grown incredibly complex and disparate. We have seen numerous examples of even the most experienced legal minds in the country spending too much time trying to disentangle which law applies to particular offenders. This is exacerbated by the need to deal with multiple changes to the statute book, which may determine what sorts of disposals are available in a particular case. As a result, too much time is taken up by the Court of Appeal in appeals against unlawful sentences. That is not good for the victims of crime, who want closure on their cases, and certainly not good for confidence in our justice system.
Against this background, it was agreed in 2014 that the Law Commission should undertake a project designed to consolidate the law relating to sentencing procedure. The resulting sentencing code brings together the procedural provisions which a sentencing court would need to rely upon during the sentencing process into one Act, and structures them in an order which follows the chronology of a sentencing hearing. The aim of these improvements is to assist legal professionals in identifying and applying the law, thereby reducing the risk of error, appeals and delay in the sentencing process. The sentencing code will also enhance the transparency of the process for the general public.
The Law Commission consulted extensively over the four years of the project and published a concluding report in November last year. The sentencing code project has received a broad consensus of support from across the judiciary and the wider legal profession. Alongside the report, the Law Commission also published a draft version of this Bill and a draft sentencing code Bill. The enactment of both pieces of legislation is the core recommendation of the report. This Bill has therefore been deemed suitable to be considered by your Lordships under the special procedure for Law Commission-recommended Bills. Before the sentencing code can be taken forward, changes to existing legislation are needed to facilitate the consolidation of sentencing procedural law in the code. This is a common feature where consolidations take place, and this Bill will make those necessary changes.
One of the reasons behind the complexity of current sentencing law is the layering of changes to sentencing legislation over time. We are concerned, among other statutory enactments, with the Justices of the Peace Act 1361. Different provisions apply to different offences and offenders, depending on when the offence was committed. Sentencing courts often have to refer to historic versions of sentencing law to ensure that the sentence passed is in accordance with the applicable law at the time of the offence. Identifying and applying historic versions of sentencing law can be difficult and, indeed, time-consuming. When an offence has occurred several years ago—which is not uncommon—and new disposals have been introduced, others have been updated and some discontinued, it is not always clear what types of disposals are available in the case before the courts. On top of that, the precise details of how those changes to the law have been commenced or saved may be scattered across the statute book.
Let me give some examples. In one recent case, the offender was sentenced to a community order with a three-year supervision requirement, following a conviction for an offence committed between March 1981 and March 1983. The Court of Appeal substituted a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, following an application by the Attorney-General. However, as the offence had been committed before 4 April 2005, a suspended sentence was not available to the court under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Instead, the court could only impose a suspended sentence in line with historical sentencing provisions under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. That meant that the court had to follow a different test concerning the availability of a suspended sentence, and no community requirements could be imposed as part of it.
Difficulties in identifying the applicable disposals available to the court can also lead to significant injustice. In another case, the offender was sentenced in August 2006 to a sentence of imprisonment for public protection under Section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 with a minimum term of six years, following a conviction for an offence committed between August 2004 and January 2005. However, Section 225 of the 2003 Act had been commenced prospectively, and only applied to offences committed on or after 4 April 2005. As a result, a sentence of imprisonment for public protection was not available for the offender.
The sentence imposed was therefore unlawful. Perhaps incredibly, it was only two and a half years after the expiry of the minimum term that the offender appealed against the sentence and the imprisonment for public protection sentence was quashed and replaced with a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment, with an extended licence of 10 years. This resulted in the offender’s immediate release.
Clause 1 seeks to remedy this sort of issue by giving effect to what the Law Commission calls a “clean sweep” of sentencing legislation. That will remove the need for sentencing courts to identify and apply historic versions of sentencing law. It does this by extending provisions which have been partially commenced and completely repealing provisions that have previously been repealed but partially saved. It deems that “transition time”—the point at which a given provision was commenced, repealed or amended—to have occurred at a notional point in time before what we might term a “trigger event”. The “trigger event” is the event which governs what sentencing procedure applies in a given case. The obvious example of that is the point when the offence was committed.
For example, let us say that an old rule about sentencing currently applies to offences committed before 1 January 2010. The Bill will deem that provision to have been repealed completely at a point in time before any pre-2010 offence was committed. Likewise, any successor provision will be deemed to have commenced before the offence was committed. As a result, the current law as enacted in the sentencing code will apply to all sentencing decisions when an offender is convicted after its commencement, irrespective of the date the offence was committed. The two important terms here, I suggest, are “transition time” and “trigger event”.
Importantly, the clean sweep is subject to exceptions to ensure that no offender is subject to a greater maximum penalty than was available, or to a minimum or mandatory sentence that did not apply at the time the offence was committed. Those exceptions ensure that the clean sweep does not contravene the general common law presumption against retroactivity, and accords with human rights protections against retroactive criminalisation and retroactive punishment, as provided for by Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That is an important step, and a very neatly designed legal tool, which will help to minimise the risk of error caused by having to look through various historic layers of sentencing legislation, and one which the Law Commission considered very carefully during its considered and lengthy consultation.
Since a consolidation must operate on the current law, Clause 2 refers to the amendments and modifications of sentencing legislation contained in Schedule 2. Making changes to facilitate consolidation in this way is a standard measure that precedes consolidation Bills. These pre-consolidation amendments are generally limited to correcting minor errors and streamlining sentencing procedural law—for example, changing language to avoid inconsistency or updating existing statutory references, such as omitting references to local probation boards, which were abolished by Section 11 of the Offender Management Act 2007, or where there
are amendments replacing references to the education and library boards, which were abolished by the Education Act (Northern Ireland) 2014, with references to their replacement, the Education Authority.
Other amendments come about as the process of consolidation itself creates the potential for anomalies that otherwise might not matter. For example, there are amendments in Schedule 2 that repeal provisions of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which provide express powers of appeal against restitution orders and parenting orders. These orders may be appealed anyway under the general powers available in Section 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 and Section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. So removing the specific appeal rights provided for does not alter the legal position, but keeping them in the consolidation could put appeal rights against other sorts of disposal in some doubt.
Other amendments resolve unnecessary ambiguity. For example, Section 110 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 governs the minimum sentences for repeat drug trafficking offences, but in defining what is an “appropriate sentence” for those aged 18 to 20 the provision does not currently refer to the power of the courts to impose a sentence of custody for life. It is clearly not the intention that, where a minimum sentence applies to an offender aged 18 to 20, the courts cannot impose a sentence of custody for life where they consider that the seriousness of the offence and the danger the offender poses to the public justify it. The Bill therefore amends the 2000 Act so that it is clear that the court may impose a sentence of custody for life where the minimum sentence applies, the offender is aged 18 to 20 and the offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. All this applies already in current law, but the Bill simply makes the statute book clearer and, we hope, easier to use.
Finally, some amendments look to continue to give effect to the clean sweep approach relating to future amendments to the law. These amendments alter the Secretary of State’s power to amend things such as the maximum period of a conditional discharge, the limits for unpaid work requirements and alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirements, or the list of offences considered to have a terrorist connection for purposes of sentencing. The changes in the Bill mean that, if changes are made by order in the future, those can apply to any offender convicted after the change comes into force, not only for any offender whose offence was committed after that time. It should be emphasised that none of the amendments in the Bill makes changes to existing offences or penalties, nor do they introduce any new substantive law or sentencing disposals.
In summary, the Bill has two main objectives: first, to remove historic layers of legislation; and, secondly, to make changes to the existing law of sentencing procedure to facilitate the consolidation in the sentencing code. The sentencing code will be introduced to Parliament at a later date under the special procedure reserved for Law Commission consolidation Bills. I finish by acknowledging that the Government are very grateful indeed to the Law Commission, in particular the Law Commissioner for criminal law, Professor David Ormerod,
and his staff for the work they have undertaken over the last few years. Indeed, I express my personal appreciation for the work he has done more recently to try to inform me as to the details of this proposed legislation. I beg to move.
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