My Lords, I will speak also to the Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
Noble Lords will be familiar with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which passed through this House last year. It provides the UK with the legislative framework to continue to meet our international obligations, to implement autonomous sanctions regimes and to update our anti-money laundering framework after we leave the European Union—although the last of these is not under consideration today.
Noble Lords will be aware of the importance of sanctions. They are a key element of our approach to our most important international priorities. They help defend our national interests, support our foreign policy and protect national security. They also demonstrate our support for the rules-based international order. The United Kingdom has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years. We have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach and that is why, when we transition the EU sanctions regimes into UK law, we intend to carry over their policy effect. I shall say more about that in a moment.
The principal interests and threats facing the UK and the other EU member states will not fundamentally change when the UK leaves the EU. The Government recognise sanctions as a multilateral foreign policy tool and intend to continue to work in close partnership with the EU and other international partners after EU exit to address those threats, including through sanctions. The SAMLA 2018 was the first major legislative step in creating an independent UK sanctions framework. However, while the Act set out the framework needed to impose our own independent sanctions, we still require statutory instruments to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within that framework.
Such statutory instruments set out the purposes of our regimes, the criteria under which the Secretary of State may designate individuals and entities, and the types of restrictive measures imposed. They do not specify which individuals or entities will be sanctioned. The Government will publish the list of those we are sanctioning under UK legislation when those prohibitions come into force. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but these decisions will be subject to the legal tests in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests would not be implemented.
One important feature of the sanctions Act, which I am sure noble Lords recall, was passed in your Lordships’ House and discussed in detail during its passage: the right given to individuals to challenge their designation. Anyone designated under these instruments will be able to request that the Minister carry out an administrative review of their designation. The procedure applicable to such requests for reviews is set out in the Sanctions Review Procedure (EU Exit) Regulations, which were made in November last year and which are now in force. If, following the review, the Minister’s decision is to uphold the designation, the designated person then has the right to apply to the High Court, or, in Scotland, the Court of Session, to challenge that designation decision. The court will apply judicial review principles to determine whether the designation decision should be set aside. It will also apply the procedure set out in the amended Civil Procedure Rules for England and Wales, the Rules of the Court of Judicature for Northern Ireland, and the Rules of the Court of Session for Scotland, which allow in particular for closed material proceedings to take place in relation to such challenges.
The sanctions Act requires a review of all UK sanctions listings at least every three years. In addition to this triannual review, the UK will review all sanctions regimes, such as those being debated today, on an annual basis and present the results in a written report to Parliament. These governance arrangements provide protection for designated persons, especially when coupled with the wider safeguards in the sanctions Act. We have published reports on the purposes of each of the sanctions regimes under consideration today and the penalties contained within them alongside the statutory instrument. These reports, plus an Explanatory Memorandum for each SI, are available in the Vote Office should noble Lords wish to see them. As I have done on previous occasions, I once again thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments for their close and helpful scrutiny of these SIs.
Before closing my opening remarks, I draw it to your Lordships’ attention that while the majority of the substantive provisions in the regulations come into force only on exit day, the provisions enabling sanctions designation decisions to be taken were commenced so that decisions could be taken in good order in advance of exit day. Due to the extension of Article 50, the provisions that have been commenced have not had any practical effect as no designations have been made under these powers. In the case of the Russia sanctions regulations, the provisions in Regulation 1(3) to allow designation decisions to be taken were commenced on 11 April, the day after the regulations were made. The regulations were laid before Parliament at midday on 11 April. As no time was specified for when the regulations came into force on 11 April, there was a period during that day in which the regulations were in force but had not been laid.
I regret that due to an administrative oversight, we failed to follow the correct procedure to inform the Lord Speaker and the Speaker of the other place of this pre-laying commencement. This matter was addressed as soon as the error was found but I regret that the
Easter break led to the Lord Speaker not being notified until eight working days after the instrument was laid. We take seriously the procedural and legal requirement to notify the Speakers, in accordance with Section 4(1) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Europe and the Americas, Sir Alan Duncan, has already written to the Speakers of both Houses, and to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. A copy of his letter has been placed in the Library. Although this is an unusual situation, we have also reviewed our processes and taken steps to ensure that it does not happen again.
I will say a brief word, if I may, on the SIs in front of us. As I said earlier, these instruments seek to substantively mirror the policy effects and mutually reinforce the measures in the corresponding EU sanctions regime. Noble Lords will note that human rights are a significant focus of the sanctions regimes being debated. I know that many are keen for the UK to develop our own, stand-alone human rights sanctions regime and may therefore query why we are simply transferring existing EU sanctions regimes. I assure noble Lords, as I have done previously, that the sanctions Act does give us the necessary powers in UK law to develop our own such regime. However, the SIs we are debating were laid on the contingent basis to provide for the continuation of some existing sanctions regimes should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures by laying SIs such as these. We will give consideration to new regimes as circumstances suggest and parliamentary time allows.
I turn briefly to each of the SIs in front of us. The Syria sanctions regulations aim to deter the Syrian regime from actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population, and to encourage a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict. They include: asset freezes and travel bans on designated persons, together with financial, sectoral and aircraft sanctions; and wide-ranging trade restrictions, including on goods and technology which may be used for internal repression and in intercepting and monitoring telecommunications, but also in respect of other goods and technology such as crude oil, jet fuel, luxury goods and items that could contribute to chemical and biological weapons.
Noble Lords will have noted that the JCSI has reported on the drafting of these regulations. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 6 to the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations permits the Secretary of State to issue licences for financial transactions involving the Central Bank of Syria or the Commercial Bank of Syria. The JCSI’s concern is that this paragraph could be seen to prejudge the question of whether those banks are to be designated under the regulations. We take these concerns seriously and recognise that the drafting could have been clearer. However, from the outset, I reassure your Lordships’ House that the Secretary of State’s discretion has not been fettered, and any decision to designate will be taken in the proper way.
6.15 pm
The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations aim to deter the use and proliferation of chemical weapons and encourage the effective
implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention by imposing immigration and financial sanctions on those involved in their use and proliferation.
The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations seek to deliver a cost to Russia for its actions in Ukraine to pressure Russia into changing its Ukraine policy. The continuation of sanctions since 2014 sends a strong unified international message that Russia’s actions in Ukraine will not be tolerated. The three corresponding EU sanctions regimes—including asset freezes, travel bans on individuals and entities, sectoral measures restricting parts of the Russian finance, energy and defence industry sectors, and trade and investment restrictions on Crimea—were introduced in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and continued destabilisation of Ukraine. These regulations combine all three existing EU Russia sanctions regimes on Russian actions in Ukraine into a single sanctions regime, which will replace existing EU Russia sanctions legislation on EU exit day. They are designed to deliver the same effect as existing EU regulations.
The Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations aim to address human rights abuses and threats to the rule of law, and to encourage the proper investigation and institution of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearance of four individuals. Measures include an arms embargo, financial and immigration sanctions, and restrictions on goods or technology that may be used for internal repression.
The Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations aim to encourage the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights, and to deter the repression of civil society. The regulations impose an arms embargo and other financial, immigration and trade restrictions, including on the trade in goods and technology that may be used for internal repression.
To conclude, these statutory instruments transfer into UK law well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. They will encourage respect for human rights, the rule of law, and security and stability in difficult environments. Approving these SIs will allow the UK to continue to implement sanctions from the moment we leave the EU. It will send a strong signal of our intention to continue to play a leading role in the development of sanctions in the future. I welcome this opportunity to debate the SIs in front of us. I beg to move.