My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these statutory instruments extremely briefly—more briefly than his right honourable friend in the Commons.
We all agree that sanctions can play a key role in the implementation of the rule of international law and we support all four of the SIs. Clearly, no one wants our sanctions regime to lapse if we leave the EU. As the Minister said, the UK has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years and we have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach. Indeed we have—but we risk losing that influence. I am sure that the Minister will agree that sanctions carry greater weight as part of an EU-level arrangement, rather than going it alone. The Minister said:
“We are committed to maintaining our … leadership role after we leave the EU”.
Can he say how this is supposed to happen?
I note that in response to a Written Question on 8 October 2018 on the UK’s sanctions policies, Sir Alan Duncan stated:
“In future it will be in the UK’s and the EU’s mutual interest to discuss sanctions policy and decide where and how to combine efforts to the greatest effect”.
In light of that, are there any differences in the arrangements here or do they completely mirror what we have in the EU? What exploration has there been on how alignment will be assured in future?
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The Explanatory Memorandum says that these regulations have “substantially” the same effect. Why have the Government chosen this word? Is it a “just in case” word, or does it mean that there are some differences, even if slight? Will the Minister clarify that?
If we diverge in future, can the Minister indicate what the future direction might be? Will we respond when we come under pressure to align with the US or some other ally? In one area, during the passage of the original Bill, Parliament added in our own version of the Magnitsky provisions, which I very much welcomed. Can the Minister explain why that appears not to have been carried over in these provisions? If they are only to mirror what we have in the EU, when does he think that such provisions will be brought forward? We have quite a lot of parliamentary time on our hands.
I turn to the specific sanctions regime, although my noble friend Lord Chidgey will deal with Guinea-Bissau. The sanctions on Burma aim to encourage the Myanmar security forces to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. Additional sanctions were introduced in April 2018 in response to the recent appalling human rights violations by security forces. As we know, an EU-wide arms embargo has been in place against Myanmar in some form since 1991. Will the Minister confirm that the UK will continue to adhere to this?
On 26 April 2018, the European Council also sanctioned the export of any equipment to Myanmar that could be used for internal repression. Similarly, it prohibited the export of dual-use goods to the military and border guard police that could be used for internal repression or monitoring. There is also a ban on all military training and co-operation with the army. These provisions were recently extended until April 2020. Will we adhere to this?
Myanmar also currently benefits from the EU’s Everything But Arms scheme. The EU has considered temporarily removing Myanmar from the scheme on the grounds of possible violations of UN and ILO conventions. Myanmar’s textile industry benefits the most from the EBA scheme. The European Commission and European External Action Service have conducted a fact-finding mission and will now analyse the results. How will the UK respond to any findings? Are we likely to align with the EU?
Human rights campaigners such as Burma Campaign UK have referred to the possible removal of the EBA scheme as a misdirected sanction, likely to impact workers rather than officials. It has instead argued that imposing economic sanctions on the two largest military conglomerates would better target the military. Will the Minister comment?
The European Burma Network has requested that the EU fundamentally reviews its position on Myanmar. It notes that some member states have favoured a stronger approach on human rights, while others favour
a policy led by trade and strategic interests. In its view, these divisions undermine EU and international efforts to promote human rights and democracy. How does the UK plan to navigate its way through this effectively? Is it at all likely, for example, that it would impose targeted sanctions, banning European companies doing any form of business with military-owned and controlled companies?
On Venezuela, the EU agreed a sanctions regime on 13 November 2017, given the concern about human rights violations and the repression in civil society and domestic opposition. Thus far, the sanctions include an arms embargo and a ban on exporting any equipment to Venezuela that could be used for internal repression. Will the Minister comment on whether either the EU or the UK alone is considering further sanctions, possibly involving funds held by the Bank of England or the City of London, in the light of current events in Venezuela? Some have argued that oil and financial sanctions are more likely to be effective, while others have warned that such sanctions could have a devastating effect on the people of Venezuela—a position that the EU has taken. The US and the EU have increasingly diverged on Venezuelan sanctions, with President Trump imposing sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm. What is the UK’s position? Is it likely to align in future with the EU or the US?
On Iran, the regulations relate to its human rights record rather than the development of nuclear weapons, which will be dealt with in a separate set of regulations. The Explanatory Memorandum states:
“This sanctions regime is aimed at encouraging the government of Iran to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights”.
In terms of human rights sanctions, the EU has adopted restrictive measures since 2011. These include a ban on exports to Iran of any equipment that may be used for internal repression or monitoring tele-communications. There are also currently 82 individuals, including judges and prosecutors, and one entity—the Iranian cyber police—on the sanctions list. They are subject to a travel ban and asset freeze in the EU. The Council has just extended the sanctions regime until 13 April 2020, when it will next be up for evaluation. How will the Government engage with this evaluation, and are they minded to stay in line? What is their view on how it would best help those dual nationals held in Iran, such as Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe? Can the Minister tell us what her situation is in light of the proposed prisoner swap that could involve her?
The Minister will know that the US takes a harsher view of Iran than we do, with draconian trade sanctions that may affect many of our companies trading in Iran. Is the Government’s current plan to stay in line with the EU on this, as we have on the nuclear side? How are they seeking to protect those companies that could be affected by US sanctions? Can they do so or are they in effect fairly powerless in this respect?
If, indeed, the UK leaves the EU, clearly we need to have in place an effective sanctions regime. I am glad that the Government seem currently to be seeking to align themselves with the EU on this matter, but that does not map out the future. Although some may see opportunities here to strengthen what we might do,
there has to be a greater risk that we will be tempted to soften our approach as a competitive advantage—and that clearly would not be leading by example.