My Lords, as I should have done at the beginning of the first group, I thank the Minister for her help and courtesy in discussing this Bill and in engaging with Peers across the House to see how we should proceed with it. I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, including his tribute to the Blackwood amendment in respect of Henry VIII powers. As the Minister will have appreciated and has recognised by her actions, there is a real concern about the use of delegated legislation to amend or revoke primary legislation and EU legislation.
Amendment 3 is intended to bring a constitutionally acceptable structure to the Bill. It will ensure that the powers of the Secretary of State can be exercised only within the context of regulations. I will start with a word or two about the other amendments in this group: Amendment 5, on the words “for example”, and government Amendments 6, 7 and 8, which limit the delegation of powers to public authorities.
As we have heard, Clause 2 contains the principal regulation-making powers. We had considerable debate, both at Second Reading and in Committee, about how unacceptably wide those powers are. The use of “for example” at the beginning of Clause 2(2) speaks volumes as to the disrespect shown in the Bill for the proper restriction of ministerial powers. The Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee have exposed how outrageously broad these powers are.
My amendment is directed at the absence of anything in the Bill that would limit the Secretary of State to exercising his Clause 1 powers only in accordance with regulations. One does not have to read far into the Bill to appreciate that, under Clause 1:
“The Secretary of State may make payments, and arrange for payments to be made, in respect of the cost of healthcare provided outside the United Kingdom”.
This is wholly without restriction. It is this glaring deficiency—the failure to tie the Secretary of State to the exercise of powers in accordance with limitations either in the statute or contained in regulations—that my amendment is intended to cure.
The Minister frankly and commendably, if I may say so, recognised on our first day in Committee that the effect of Clause 1, if not amended in the way I suggest, would be to enable the Secretary of State to make or arrange payments without any regulatory limitation. She justified this untrammelled power—which, frankly, I find frightening—on the basis of urgency. She said that the Bill was unlikely to secure Royal Assent before March, so regulations would not be laid before the summer. If there were no deal, she explained, Ministers might need to use the powers before then. She mentioned—again, frighteningly—sharing data as well as making healthcare payments before the Government had a chance to get regulations passed to deal with these matters “more transparently”, as she put it.
This clause alone, unamended, would justify this country ruling out a no-deal exit and ensuring that our leaving date is delayed. It is an extraordinary travesty of the notion of the United Kingdom Parliament taking back control that we are asked to pass a Bill which involves ceding to Ministers an entirely unconstrained power to pay money out across the world on the sole professed ground that the Government failed to introduce legislation in a timely way, and to permit Ministers to spend public money and make arrangements of great public importance without any parliamentary scrutiny or authorisation.
I turn briefly to the other amendments in the group. Many of us still take the view that their scope is breathtakingly and unacceptably wide. The Government’s proposal to limit possible delegation of the Secretary of State’s powers so that such powers may be conferred only on a public authority is of course welcome; so is the limited five-year sunsetting provision, to which we shall return later, but, taken together, they barely scratch the surface of the massive transfer of unrestrained power from the legislature to the Executive set out in Clause 2. Of course, the sunsetting clause should be more restrictive—at least as restrictive as proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Again, we will come to that later.
It goes without saying that the ridiculous and offensive restriction-busting words “for example” should be removed, as proposed in Amendment 5. However, the only satisfactory way to restrict the Government’s power to what is necessary and acceptable is for the House of Commons to now accept the amendment we just passed restricting the use of the Bill to replicating the arrangements we have with the EU, the EEA and Switzerland. We hope that it does that.
This Government and future Governments must show more restraint and respect for the proper limits to the scope of delegated legislation. In the Bill, as in others to do with Brexit, they have not done that. It is to be hoped that they return to a wiser path in future.