My Lords, the Committee will be aware that the Government are preparing for all scenarios relating to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, including the scenario in which the UK leaves the EU without a deal at the end of this month. As part of these preparations, the Government are bringing forward a programme of secondary legislation intended to ensure that there is an effectively functioning statute book on exit day. The instrument forms part of that programme of secondary legislation. It addresses deficiencies in our domestic statute book that would arise if we leave the EU without a deal, focusing in particular on deficiencies in security, law enforcement, criminal justice and some security-related regulatory systems.
By way of context, the UK currently participates in a number of EU tools and measures that support security, law enforcement and judicial co-operation in criminal matters—some of which, like the European arrest warrant or Europol, will be familiar. We also participate in a number of security-related EU regulatory regimes relating to firearms, drug precursors and explosive precursors. Should the UK leave the EU without an agreement at the end of the month—the no-deal scenario—the UK’s access to those tools and measures would cease.
At the same time, the UK would cease to be bound by those security-related EU regulatory systems. This decoupling would occur as a result of the UK having withdrawn from the European Union after the Article 50 notification not as a result of the provisions found in this instrument. It is important to be clear that the regulations play no part in bringing about the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; rather, the purpose of the instrument is to make amendments to the UK’s domestic statute book, including retained EU legislation, to reflect a new situation. The changes we are making in the instrument are the ones we cannot, or should not, avoid in the event of no deal. The regulations do not contain significant policy choices.
Against this backdrop, the regulations will do three main things. First, they will revoke or amend retained, directly applicable EU legislation and domestic legislation in the areas of security, law enforcement, criminal justice and some security-related regulatory systems. This will ensure that the statute book continues to function effectively in a no-deal scenario. It is important to emphasise that where the regulations revoke retained EU law or connected domestic law, this is not expected to have a practical real-world effect because the underlying EU instruments would cease to be available to the UK
upon withdrawal from the EU in any event. For example, in a no-deal scenario, our membership of Europol will end on 29 March by virtue of the UK ceasing to be an EU member state rather than as a result of the retained Europol regulation being revoked by this instrument.
Secondly, where necessary, the instrument includes transitional or saving provisions to address live or in-flight cases—that is, provisions confirming how cases live on exit day should be dealt with or how data received before exit day should be treated. This will provide certainty for operational partners, such as the police and prosecutors, who currently operate the EU tools and measures and need to be clear on what activity can continue and on what terms at the point of exit. Thirdly, in the case of extradition, the instrument will ensure that the UK has the correct legal underpinning to operate the no-deal contingency arrangement for extradition—the Council of Europe Convention on Extradition 1957—with EU member states.
For the most part, the regulations make the same sort of changes over and over again in a series of related areas: revoking in whole or in part legislation on our domestic statute book that would be redundant in the event of a no-deal exit; fixing deficiencies, such as making sure that definitions in our domestic law reflect our new status outside the EU; and making sure that there is clarity over what happens to cases and requests that were live or in train at the point of exit.
Overall, the making of this instrument will provide legal and operational certainty for the public sector, including our law enforcement and criminal justice partners across the UK, such as the National Crime Agency, our police and our prosecution services. While it remains the Government’s position that exiting with a deal is in the UK’s best interests, this instrument makes important changes to ensure readiness on exit day in a no-deal scenario.
Having provided an overview of what the instrument does, I should also be clear on what it does not set out to do. For the most part, this instrument is not a vehicle for implementing the Government’s policy response to a no-deal exit. Our contingency arrangements for co-operation with EU partners on security, law enforcement and criminal justice involve making more use of Interpol, Council of Europe conventions and bilateral channels. These existing, alternative channels outside the EU are already in use between the UK and many other non-EU countries. Accordingly, they do not require domestic legislation to set them up, which is why those contingency arrangements are largely outside the scope of what these regulations set out to do. Even the Council of Europe convention on extradition, which this instrument links into our contingency arrangements, is already in place and in day-to-day use by the UK with non-EU countries. The instrument re-categorises EU member states for the purposes of our own domestic law, in the form of the Extradition Act 2003, so that we can administer requests from EU member states under Part 2 of that Act rather than under Part 1, as at present.
Finally, I should make it clear to the Committee that the instrument comes into force on exit day, as defined in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Should we enter an implementation period the entry
into force of these regulations, along with most other EU exit instruments, will be deferred to the end of that implementation period. I commend the regulations to the Committee and I beg to move.