My Lords, I think I am with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and others in having been sceptical of an opt-out system, not least when we came to discuss it at some length—I see the noble Lord, Lord Reid, there—during the passage of the Human Tissue Act back in 2003 or thereabouts. We looked at it at some length. That prompted the pursuit by subsequent Governments, including the coalition Government in which I served, of every available opportunity to try to increase donor rates, not least by improving the system of transplant co-ordination and the supply of specialist transplant nurses.
My first point, to which I hope my noble friend the Minister will respond positively, is that I do not share the view that under this Bill resources for information
and for the transplant system—in particular for an increase in specialist transplant nursing support—are in any sense in competition. We need to do both, and I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that we will seek wherever possible to have exactly that support through transplant nurses. It is really important that we do. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, was referring to that when she referred to Spain. At the time, we looked in some detail at the Spanish example. Spain said to us that probably the bigger element in its success was not that it was an opt-out system but that it had really effective transplant co-ordination and strong support for families through trained nursing and support staff. That is the most important thing.
However—not to rerun Second Reading, to which I contributed—we have an ethical obligation to secure the maximum availability of organs for those waiting for them, some of whom, sadly, continue not to get access to organs and to die while waiting. We have an ethical conflict, because it is right to say that the state does not own our bodies. We have a right to determine what happens. My noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy was absolutely correct in pointing out that the Bill offers an opportunity for those who wish to control what happens to their organs and bodies after death to make that explicit.
This brings me to my final point, which is to further thank my noble friend Lord McColl for raising these issues. If we are to go down this path, it is absolutely essential that the families of everyone who may be—sadly after death—a donor must be aware that they had an opportunity to consider this. Whether they took any action is a matter for them. We must be confident that the information, not only in the first instance but subsequently, is such that nobody could reasonably be expected not to have been presented with this as an issue they should consider. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked what happens if the family disagree. They may, but the law is then very clear that the transplant co-ordinator, nurse or whoever must take the decision must do so seeking to determine what the loved one who has died would have thought. The evidence is not: what do you think, as the person in a qualifying relationship? It is: what can you say about what the view would have been of the person who has died and whose organs are potentially to be donated? That is the issue and the judgment that has to be made, and of course that is where the ethical issue really bites. It is not what we might think about our loved ones, but what we know about what they themselves thought about what should happen to their own organs. For those reasons, my noble friend’s amendments—I know he will not press them, and I think that is absolutely right—have very helpfully given an opportunity for the Minister to give us reassurance on both those points.