My Lords, I share one point with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on this issue: many of the various systems for investor and trade dispute resolution are broken. A search is on for new, more effective mechanisms to deliver much more satisfactory resolution, particularly as trade arrangements become far more complex and encompassing, and disputes have much greater significance for the global economy.
The Committee will be aware that the WTO’s arbitration system is on the verge of collapse. It relies on a panel that includes a minimum of three judges and a maximum of seven. The panel, through death and retirement, is now down to three. The United States has made it clear that one further death or retirement will mean the end of the WTO’s arbitration mechanism—it will not agree to replace any retired or dying judges. That mechanism is now effectively teetering on the verge.
Many will also have been involved in the debates around TTIP when that was active in this House and will understand that the resolution methods contemplated under it created a great deal of concern that private companies—specifically American companies—would be able to use the mechanism to wade in and counter local law and local decisions. The structure under TTIP relied on arbitration panels chosen specially for the purpose, against which there was no appeal. They were not part of a traditional judicial system.
We do, however, have an example of a system that works exceptionally well for trade resolution: the European Court of Justice, working for the currently 28 members of the European Union. As Trade Minister, when I talked with the Chinese, the Japanese and a number of other countries with which we were trying to build trade relationships, it was very often in the casual relationships that the issue of dispute resolution would come up. They all spoke, with sad envy, of the system we had in the European Union, known to be incorruptible, fair and efficient, and to have judging panels of real intelligence that were then supported by the collective Governments. They kept wistfully saying what a pity it was that, on a global level, there is nothing that mirrors that.
This is why I differ from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, who is basically saying that a British company with a complaint will go to the British courts, an American company will go to the American courts and a Japanese company will go to the Japanese courts. It would be hard to persuade anybody that they would be justly treated under those circumstances and that there would not be national bias. I can see this becoming an inhibitor to trade. I also believe that on trade issues generally we need to look to international co-operation and shared sovereignty solutions. We need to recognise that, frankly, the best example we have of trade resolution is the ECJ, and see what lessons and mechanisms we
can pick out of that. This is relevant in discussing the continuity agreements as well as future agreements. As this House and the Minister will know, the European Union is now making dramatic changes to the way it structures dispute resolution, recognising the problems and criticisms around the existing system.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, referred to the investor-state dispute settlement system. That is largely an ad hoc arbitration system, but it is in many of the EU’s various trade agreements. He will know, or certainly the Minister will know, that the EU is now migrating from that. In CETA, we have an example of the first new version of the European system: the investment court system. It is a permanent standing court with a panel of judges; it is not ad hoc; and it is two-tier, so there is an appeal mechanism. Interestingly, under CETA, the EU and Canada will collectively appoint 15 judges—five from the EU, five from Canada and five third-country nationals—who will hear cases on a rotational basis. It is therefore bringing in a much more multilateral dispute resolution system with a great deal of independence and the opportunity to create a much more broad template. There is an intention to migrate many of the existing EU trade agreements on to this system over the coming years, which is why the continuity arrangements pose real questions that has to be answered. In the continuity arrangements, are we copying over the rather unsatisfactory investor-state dispute settlement system? Are we going to try to migrate? It is going to be difficult. Look at the EU and Canada. You can see that the capacity to create a panel of 15 judges might be a little tricky if you were trying to do it simply between the UK and Canada. I do not know what sort of system the UK is looking at as it tries to establish a continuity agreement with CETA, but we need some answers on all of this.