I thank both noble Lords for their explanation of these amendments. One of the things that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, challenged the Government on was the rationale behind our counter- terrorism work. Perhaps it would be useful to set out some of that for him.
As stated in Contest, government and academic research has consistently indicated that there is no single sociodemographic profile of a terrorist in the UK, and no single pathway or, indeed, “conveyor belt” leading to involvement in terrorism. Terrorists come from a broad range of backgrounds and appear to become involved in different ways and for differing reasons. Few of those who are drawn into Islamist terrorism, for example, have a deep knowledge of the faith.
While no single factor will cause someone to become involved in terrorism, several factors can converge to create certain conditions under which radicalisation can flourish. These include background factors such as aspects of someone’s personal circumstances that might make them vulnerable to radicalisers, such as being involved in criminal activity; initial influences such as people, ideas or experiences that influence an individual towards supporting a terrorist movement; and an ideological opening or receptiveness to extremist ideology.
Most individuals who experience this combination of factors will not go on to become involved in terrorism because there are protective factors that safeguard against their doing so. These range from having no opportunity to develop extremist contacts to having other, more important priorities in their lives, such as their family, career or community. A small number of people who lack these protective factors may become radicalised. In these circumstances, a range of social and ideological influences can combine to intensify commitment to a terrorist cause and provide opportunities for them to act.
The process of radicalisation is driven by universal psychological needs for identity and belonging—those words are very important in this context—meaning and purpose, and, of course, self-esteem. Where these are met by constructive sources radicalisation will not flourish, but we also know that as a person deepens their involvement in terrorism this process will typically include voracious consumption of online propaganda. When in a group, further engagement in terrorism is also likely to include the individual isolating themselves from non-extremists and participating in low-level activity such as the radicalisation of others, or facilitation, fundraising, et cetera. There is some research to indicate that lone-actor terrorists have a higher incidence of certain mental and developmental health conditions than the general population, but I must stress that no one should assume that a terrorist suffers from a mental health condition or that a person with a mental health condition is a terrorist.
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This model of radicalisation draws on research from within government but also on academic studies. In our experience, it holds true for radicalisation within both Islamist and extreme right-wing terrorism.
It should be clear from what I have said that ideology is an important, but absolutely not the sole, factor in radicalisation. The effect of terrorist ideology, spread through its propaganda and especially online, spans both those involved in groups and lone actors and across all forms of terrorism.
Daesh and al-Qaeda have a common ideological lineage. Their shared ideological anchor is Salafi jihadism, a violent hybrid ideology, cherry picking from a broad range of religious and political influences. Both groups hold in common an absolute rejection of democracy, personal liberty and human rights, as well as a commitment to restoring a self-proclaimed “caliphate” and establishing a brutal and literalist interpretation of sharia law. They hold the West and its allies responsible for the suppression of Islam and oppression of Sunni Muslims around the world.
Daesh’s media and propaganda capability has been significantly degraded, but its shift to a narrative of victimhood and seeking to weaponise people in their communities, rather than encouraging them to travel to the so-called caliphate, have led to a self-sustaining network of Daesh supporters who create and share unofficial motivational and instructional material online, and celebrate and encourage lone-actor attacks. This has increased the reach and potential threat that such groups pose.
We must not forget the extreme right wing. In the UK and Europe, those groups, including neo-Nazis, seek to exploit any anxieties that people might hold about globalisation, conflict and migration—including any that they are able to link to the Syria conflict—in an attempt to broaden their appeal. Such groups may vary considerably in their rhetoric, but they share the racist view that minority communities harm the interests of a “native” population. The ideologies and narratives perpetuated by Islamist and extreme right-wing groups have at times reinforced and even mutually benefited one other.
I could go on, but this is the basic background and rationale behind much of the Government’s efforts to counter terrorism. It should be clear from it that no conveyer-belt theory of radicalisation is in use in government. It should also be clear why our counter- terrorism efforts need to cover such a broad range of activity on top of the work of the intelligence agencies and police to investigate and disrupt terrorists and terrorist plots. It is vital that we do all we can to stifle the online propaganda which fuels engagement in terrorism, that we work to break the “social cocoons” which terrorists form to continue their radicalisation, and that our Prevent work and programmes such as Channel continue to identify vulnerable people and provide them with the support that they need to address the background vulnerabilities and lack of protective factors that can make them prey to terrorist recruiters. With that explanation of the Government’s rationale, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.