My Lords, those are very interesting words and most certainly worth reflecting on. I thank the noble Lord. I rise to speak to Amendment 58D, tabled in my name. It concerns the Prime Minister’s prerogative. In my Peers in Schools programme visits, we inevitably and rightly discuss the composition of
the House and the routes of entry. Three issues are raised consistently by the pupils: obviously the hereditaries, the Bishops and the Prime Minister’s prerogative. In respect of the prerogative, it seems that the relevant set textbook makes the point that there is no other country in the developed democratic world where one person has so much power over the membership of the legislature. Indeed, as the discussion generally continues, the view seems to develop in all the classes that I can recall that the Prime Minister’s prerogative is by far the largest constitutional issue of the three.
This House considered the matter recently as part of the annual Burns committee initiative, and last December more than 90 Members spoke. As we will all well recall, the overwhelming mood was one of great support for the Burns committee, and accordingly of curbing the Prime Minister’s prerogative. Indeed, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee of the other place reported on 19 November on the matter. In a powerful analysis of the Prime Minister’s prerogative, it concluded at paragraph 35 of its report:
“It is important that the Prime Minister commits to the proposed cap and to limiting appointments in line with the proposed appointment formula”.
There are 791 Members of the House, of whom 178 do not owe their membership to a Prime Minister. That number is comprised of 26 bishops, 89 hereditaries and 63 Members who have come in through the House of Lords Appointments Commission. Some 613 Peers have therefore been appointed under the prerogative power, which is around 80%. I strongly believe that this dynamic represents a constitutional risk in that the prerogative is so concentrated in one person. That risk should be managed, and this Bill clearly represents a route whereby one might attempt that. However, as currently drafted, the Bill would increase the risk over time by removing half of the non-prime ministerially appointed buffer, although other dynamics are also in play to exacerbate matters.
I very much admire HOLAC. Its chairmen have crafted a first-class institution. It is, however, being somewhat smothered. In its first period under Labour Administrations between 2001 and 2010, 52 Peers were appointed in just over 10 years. That is an average of pretty well exactly five per year. In its current period under Conservative-led Administrations there have been 15 appointments, including three last June. That is an average of just under 1.8 per year. Actuarially, one would need three to four a year to maintain the current number of 63 HOLAC Peers. Accordingly, the HOLAC part of the buffer that is not appointed by the Prime Minister is shrinking. As I said, this Bill would see other parts of the buffer shrink further.
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Amendment 58D is designed to cope with this dynamic and the recently expressed and strong desire of not only this House but the other House—or at least a committee of the other House—to curb the Prime Minister’s prerogative. The amendment accepts the elegant way of dealing with the end of the hereditary era while delaying its implementation until the prerogative is curbed. The wording is designed to promote debate only. It does not specify how such a cap would operate.
The Burns committee has already expressed views on this. The other place’s constitutional affairs committee builds on it in its report of this week. It is heading in wholly the right direction. It makes no sense to have half a reform of our composition and routes of entry. A full reform process is needed. I thus urge the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, to accept at least the principle of the amendment. I naturally would be very happy to discuss matters with him.