My Lords, I reiterate my declaration of interest as chairman of LAPADA, the art and antiques dealers’ trade association. We have worked closely with BADA, the other major trade association.
On the face of it, Clause 12(2) provides protection against prosecution for those people who are not aware that the item they are handling contains elements of ivory. That they may be prosecuted only if it can be shown that they knew or suspected, or ought to have known or suspected, that an item was made from ivory appears to me to be reasonable. I suppose that I could see that the interaction between this subsection and Clause 35(4) could cause confusion and potentially prove unjust. As I understand it, Clause 35(4) means there is the presumption that, if a material can be proved to be ivory of any animal, it can be assumed to be the ivory of an elephant unless proved otherwise. If one takes the case of someone who genuinely believes an item to be made from the ivory of another species and not from elephant ivory, I am not sure whether they would receive the protection of Clause 12 because it does not refer specifically to elephant ivory. I wonder whether the Minister can shed any light on this point.