I must apologise; I am clearly explaining this very poorly. I am trying to indicate to your Lordships that it is not a matter of resource or of intent; it is a matter of whether or not the OBR would have sufficient information available to conduct its analysis and come forward with any conclusions. I have made clear that, under statute, the OBR has to produce at least two forecasts per financial year, and these must include the impact of government policy. What I am anxious to avoid is that this House puts the OBR in a different situation. I was going on to explain to the noble Baroness that, as the OBR has flagged at previous fiscal events, even once the outcome of negotiations are known, its forecast will be subject to considerable uncertainty. This is particularly the case around the associated economic and fiscal consequences of the withdrawal agreement. In addition, there is another body here, the reaction of which is extremely important: the Bank of England. Its reaction is difficult to forecast, yet that reaction will have a large impact on the analysis.
I have tried to explain why I totally understand the desire for transparency—that is understood and we sympathise—but I am pointing out that the amendment would impose an unacceptable statutory obligation on the OBR in terms of its current responsibilities and its capacity to discharge them in any meaningful fashion.