Noble Lords will recall that I updated the House last week, during the first sitting of this Committee, on the progress the Government have made in discussions on our new agreements with the IAEA and key NCA partners. These discussions provide important context for the amendments as, despite having made significant progress, we do not expect all of them to have been concluded by the time of the Bill’s passage through Parliament.
Amendment 13 would apply a two-year sunset provision to Clause 2, which contains the power to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It can amend these pieces of legislation only in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement.
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This is a narrowly drawn power to amend references in that legislation to provisions of safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Those references enable the IAEA to carry out its activities in the UK, including by providing the IAEA with legal cover for the UK activities of its inspectors. It is essential that the legislation specified in Clause 2(1) of the Bill can be amended to make correct reference to new safeguards agreements that the UK enters into with the IAEA.
The 1978 Act and the 2000 Act are extremely unusual in that they make detailed references to specific provisions of existing international agreements. As such, these references are likely to change—the numbering may change to specific articles—as a result of any amendment of or change to these agreements. The power in the Bill is therefore necessary to make the changes to the relevant Acts to update those references when the new agreements are in place.
The proposed sunset clause recognises the necessity of retaining the power in Clause 2 while seeking to limit the period of time for which it can be used. In its report on the Bill, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said that there was a good case for the Government,
“to have powers to amend both primary and secondary legislation to ensure that the UK will comply with its international obligations upon withdrawal from Euratom”.
However, the report highlights that the power is currently indefinite and recommends a two-year sunset. As I have mentioned, we very much welcome the Committee’s view of the powers in the Bill. We are still in the
process of considering its recommendations and expect to be able to respond positively on this particular recommendation shortly.
This very narrow power cannot be used outside a very narrow range of purposes and circumstances. It is not a power we are taking just in case; it is absolutely essential and underpins the entire regime. The matter of negotiations means that we are tied to timing uncertainties, and this power constitutes the only way we can address that uncertainty. However, we are considering carefully how we might set a time limit on this provision, and we hope—we expect—to be able to give a definitive response on this by Report.
In relation to Amendment 8, the Government also note that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report made a similar recommendation to sunset the power to give effect to relevant international agreements. I cannot accept this amendment, as the need for this power goes beyond the immediate impact of withdrawing from Euratom. I think it is important to emphasise that the very nature of safeguards—a critical non-proliferation measure—is international by design. The power this amendment relates to therefore goes beyond “fixing” issues arising from Brexit. At its core is the need for the new safeguards regime to be able to adapt to the inevitable international changes that are made—for example, IAEA recommendations that the UK adopts, or new NCAs.
Even the current regime, which is heavily reliant on Euratom’s international role, provides for this type of flexibility through Section 93(2)(d) of the Energy Act 2013. The Bill repeals Section 93, reflecting the change in the regime, and the flexibility to incorporate international safeguards commitments in the new legislation is indeed drawn more narrowly. I shall give an example of the type of international change we might see in the future: we expect to agree NCAs beyond those with the four countries in the first tranche. Where such NCAs require particular nuclear safeguard reporting measures, it is vital that our regime can accommodate that—both in the scope of the ONR’s purposes, and in the scope of the relevant regulations—without significant uncertainty or delay. I stress that the power to which the “relevant international agreements” relates is specific to nuclear safeguards. The power is there to ensure that we can incorporate additional reporting obligations resulting from international commitments into our safeguards regime: I do not think we could claim to have an effective, future-proofed safeguards regime if new primary legislation were required every time we entered into a new agreement that included new safeguards obligations.