With the greatest respect, I did not interfere in the writing of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and I will crack on a bit further to answer the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, as I too think this bit is very interesting. We are talking about these additional countries because we are obviously going to have to set up NCAS with them, too, for trade to continue. I assure noble Lords that discussions on the four priority NCAs started a while back and are progressing well. They are on track to be completed before the UK leaves the EU. I can also assure noble Lords that this Government, as part of their planning process, have factored in the time necessary to seek parliamentary ratification of the agreements both in the UK and in third countries. This will enable the NCAs to come into force from the moment that Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the UK.
I turn now to the UK’s discussions with the IAEA. Noble Lords will be aware that the UK began formal discussions with it some months ago to conclude new safeguards agreements that would replace those between the UK, IAEA and Euratom when the Euratom arrangements are no longer applicable. These discussions, which began some months ago, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe mentioned, have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. I can be a little more specific: formal negotiations started last September and there were several rounds of preliminary meetings before that. There have been two rounds of negotiations so far, which have made substantial progress. I hope that that is helpful.
The amendment asks that the IAEA should recognise the ONR as the approved safeguards authority in the UK, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I will make it clear that the IAEA’s focus in respect of the UK’s safeguards lies with the voluntary offer agreement and additional protocols rather than with the domestic legislation underpinning the domestic regime or the
UK Government’s arrangements for fulfilling their commitments. However, as I have set out, the Government have already held productive and fruitful discussions with the IAEA on the UK’s future safeguards agreements and understand what the IAEA requires of us in setting up the system. It is not necessary to consult on the detail of legislation or on the ONR’s readiness to implement the new regime with the IAEA.
As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy set out in his Statement to the House in September last year, the Government are seeking new agreements with the IAEA that follow exactly the same principles as the existing ones. This will ensure that the IAEA retains its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and to receive all current safeguards reporting, ensuring that international verification of our safeguards activity continues to be robust.
In addition to this, the Secretary of State set out on 11 January the Government’s intention to update the House on our overall progress with Euratom, including on the EU negotiations and other important matters such as international agreements. I trust that these reports, the first of which we expect to provide in a few weeks’ time—indeed, just before the Easter Recess—will reassure noble Lords that significant and substantial progress is being made. Indeed, noble Lords will be able to see it for themselves and will no doubt bring it back to the House to discuss, should they wish.
Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, inserts two new subsections and seeks to require that, by 29 March 2019, the Secretary of State must present to Parliament a substantially detailed report, along with draft regulations implementing any agreements reached with Euratom relating to safeguards, and have such regulations approved by both Houses. Amendment 14 seeks to prevent the substantive provisions of the Bill coming into force until regulations under Amendment 15 to implement safeguards agreements with Euratom have been approved. While I have sympathy with the noble Lord’s aim of ensuring robust parliamentary scrutiny, the process set out in Amendment 15 would not be appropriate. As we have already discussed in our deliberations on this Bill, I am confident that there are appropriate processes in place to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny of the substantive powers in the Bill. Noble Lords can be assured that the regulations establishing a UK safeguards regime under the powers in the Bill will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
I turn now to the report proposed in this amendment. We have been open about our strategy for withdrawal and our future relationship with Euratom. In the Written Ministerial Statement on 11 January, we outlined a twofold approach under which we are seeking a close association with Euratom through our negotiations with the European Union. I refer noble Lords to the Written Ministerial Statement. It goes into some detail about our specific objectives in relation to a close association with research and training, continuity of open trade arrangements and close and effective co-operation on nuclear safety. This is a very broad ambition of ours, and it goes much further than the nuclear safeguards that we are specifically talking about today. Simultaneously with these discussions
about our broader relationship with Euratom, on which we will report to your Lordships’ House every three months, we are putting in place measures to ensure that we can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one.
As noble Lords will be aware, we are planning negotiations on a possible implementation period. The Government have confirmed that they intend to include Euratom matters. This implementation period will start after the date that we leave the European Union. This must be taken into account. We are being open with our plans for a domestic regime, and we have been clear on our intentions for the new domestic regime. As made clear in the Written Ministerial Statement, the Government intend to be able to put in place a robust regime equivalent in coverage and effectiveness to that currently provided by Euratom. To put this more clearly, and for the avoidance of doubt, we would be meeting IAEA standards on day one and working our way to Euratom standards as soon as possible thereafter. A key but inevitable difference will be that reporting and assurance activities would be carried out by the ONR rather than Euratom.
The approach of using a domestic body rather than a supranational one to operate a domestic safeguards regime is common among other non-Euratom countries, such as the US and Canada, whose safeguards regimes consist of a state regulator, with the IAEA providing independent international verification. This approach necessitates some differences in the approach of the regime but we do not consider it to necessitate a reduction in standards. To be absolutely clear about independence, it is the international oversight provided by the IAEA and the inspections carried out by its inspectors that underpin the independence of nuclear safeguards around the world. As I have already mentioned, we have committed to providing Parliament with quarterly reports on progress from across the Euratom programme. These reports will include a section on ONR capacity and readiness as well as on research, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Before I close, I want to return to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the meeting that he attended with officials. I want to flesh out the Government’s consultation strategy on this because I fear he thinks it is narrower than is truly the case. The Government continue to have discussions with the nuclear industry on the future of the nuclear safeguards regime. In addition to official-level engagement, Richard Harrington, the Minister for Energy and Industry, held a representative industry stakeholder forum in September. There have been further forums since then and the next one will take place on 5 March. The Government have provided the industry with pre-consultation drafts of regulations that we propose to make, and in late February we held a technical workshop on the draft regulations with key nuclear operators.
I hope my explanations have provided sufficient reassurances to noble Lords, and that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment.