My Lords, I am going to deal with my concerns about how the Bill might affect journalism and free speech. I declare my interest as a series producer at ITN Productions.
In the fast-changing world of the digital revolution, it is beholden on noble Lords to be vigilant about the way in which our personal data is now so readily available to so many people to be processed in so many ways, more than many of us ever conceived. I am glad that the GDPR has been brought forward and that this Bill protects further the availability and use of personal information. However, I am concerned that these new privacy rights will be balanced with further limitations on the freedom of the press and the ability of journalists to carry out investigative journalism in the public interest, which I believe was one of the original aims of the Data Protection Act 1998.
At the moment, data protection legislation is being used to control unwelcome exposure of incriminating personal information by journalists. We have seen
cases such as that of Prince Moulay v Elaph Publishing, in which the original case for defamation was thrown out as not libellous, only for the Prince to instigate proceedings for the incriminating information against him to be removed from the public sphere using data protection law, despite the intention of the original Act being that there should be an exemption for journalism.
I understand the sentiment behind the “right to be forgotten” clause. Of course, many people want their youthful indiscretions to be forgotten and, for most, it is important that they should be. This concept is based on the Costeja v Google Spain case, which stopped links being made to personal information in search results. However, the courts are now being tested to see whether the original information itself can be suppressed.
In the age of fake news, it has never been more important to be able to go back to source material to check original data against more recent updates and deletions. Noble Lords will have heard of click bait, where sites are specifically set up to shock with false information to attract eyeballs—as they call them in the industry—and make money from the resultant advertising. Noble Lords must not suppress the means to refute such fake news and ascertain the truth.
So I am very pleased that GDPR article 17 has an exemption for publication of data for free speech and the holding of archives in the public interest, further safeguarded in article 89. However, Clause 18, which indeed provides welcome protection for many archives held in the public interest—for instance, those for historical, scientific and statistical purposes—does give protection to cover media archives.
My concern is that past media articles are an important source for verifying information. They might hold reports of criminal convictions of the person or information about a politician’s past which, years later, when they are trying to stand for office, might prove embarrassing but informative for voters. Surely business people, voters and many others should have full access to the information in those archives, whether it is embarrassing or not. This information helps them to shape a fuller profile of the person whose reputation they are trying to assess.
In the digital age, there are millions of opinions, but refuting falsehoods or discovering the truth has never been more difficult. The only way to do that is through source material on trusted websites or archives, where the information has been mediated and checked. I suggest that websites holding archives of trusted media organisations should be protected by and covered in the Bill. The inherent public interest in such archives should be explicitly recognised, as provided in the GDPR.
I am pleased that there is an exemption for data processing for journalism in Schedule 2, part 5, paragraph 24. However, in sub-paragraph (2), there is concern that the exemption applies only when the processing of data is used for journalism. If this information, once it has been gathered for journalism, is subsequently used by the regulators or the police, the use of the word “only” will negate that exemption. I ask the Minister to look at that again.
I am also concerned about the extension of the powers of the ICO prior to publication to examine whether information is exempt from data protection provisions because it is being processed for journalism. GDPR article 6 contains an obligation to consult the Information Commissioner, but Clause 164 goes much further. It enhances the power of the ICO to examine the application of the exemptions for journalism prior to publication and unilaterally second-guess editorial decisions made in respect of the provisions in the Bill.
This means that if a journalist is investigating, for instance, people smugglers, involving undercover filming or subterfuge which is deemed to create a high risk to data subjects, the ICO can intervene prior to publication. The commissioner has the power to apply their objective view to the claim, which might overwrite and disregard the reasonable view of an editor. The ICO might, for example, call for the individual being investigated to be notified in advance that their data is being used, or that they should be given access to additional data being held about them as part of the journalistic investigation.
In my view, this is not even consistent with the terms of journalistic exemption. It would result in investigative journalism being delayed or even stopped until the ICO has examined it for compliance with part of the Act prior to publication. The provision could act as a form of censorship. The existing right of the editor to decide whether the story should go ahead in the public interest will therefore be eroded. I suggest that Clause 164 should be amended to ensure that investigative journalism is not chilled by the extension of powers of intervention by the ICO prior to publication.
Finally, I am concerned that there is no time limit on the right to sue in respect of information processed for special purposes, which continues to be retained or published in the media archive. Under the Defamation Act, that limitation was one year from the date of publication. Under this Bill, there is no limitation. Surely, if information is inaccurate, the complainant should sue within a specific period. The longer the case is delayed from the original publication date, the more difficult it is to refute the allegations. The journalist could move on, contact with the original source material might be lost, memories blurred and notes, even those held digitally, mislaid. Complainants must have the right to complain, but there must be a balance with the time period when that can be done. A failure to have a period of limitation will surely be a chilling effect on the publication of information.
I welcome this Bill as an important advance in protecting privacy in the digital age, but I am concerned that some of its provisions do not yet strike the right balance between privacy and free speech. I ask the Minister to take my concerns seriously.
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