My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for bringing this amendment and for the opportunity to talk about the intentions of the Bill. He is quite right to highlight that the reason for bringing the Bill forward is to stop the behaviour of switching between schemes in order to reduce liabilities. That has characterised behaviour in the past few years and has had an impact on the successful operation of the PPRS. I will discuss the PPRS towards the end of my speech.
Amendment 4 is about the relationship between the voluntary and statutory schemes. I thank noble Lords for their views in this area. This amendment would require us to secure that, for any given product, the voluntary and statutory schemes would have an equivalent impact. It presents a slightly different approach to securing equivalence between the voluntary and statutory schemes, but I understand that, fundamentally, equivalence is what the amendment is seeking to achieve. I gave my views on this matter in Committee and I am happy to respond in similar terms on this occasion.
The Government’s intention is for the two schemes to deliver a broadly equivalent level of savings as a proportion of the total sales covered by each scheme. However, to require the terms of each scheme to be the same, in so far as possible, is inappropriate and would restrict the scope of the two schemes to operate
in a complementary manner. Requiring equivalence to operate at product level, as the amendment suggests, would be even more restrictive.
The voluntary scheme is a matter for negotiation with industry. As such, there is scope to have a range of measures included that reflect the priorities of both sides at any point. It may be helpful to the House if I reiterate some of the examples I set out in Committee. The current voluntary scheme, the PPRS, includes a range of provisions, developed through negotiation with industry, that sit alongside the payment mechanism. This includes price modulation, which enables companies to put prices up and down as long as the overall effect across their portfolio is neutral. This has commercial value to companies, which may be willing to accept a higher payment percentage as a result.
In another example, while new medicines in the PPRS are excluded from PPRS payments, the PPRS payment percentage level itself is set at a level to achieve the agreed level of savings across both new and older medicines. This means that each company’s share of the income due to Government will vary depending on the balance of new and old products in their portfolio, with companies that have mainly new products paying less than companies with mainly old products. However, it would be very challenging to replicate this model in the statutory scheme, as many fewer companies are affected by the statutory scheme regulations than are members of the PPRS. As a result, there is a much smaller pool of companies with older products. To achieve the same level of savings overall from the statutory scheme as from the PPRS while exempting newer products would require an extremely high payment percentage. This provides an example of where minor differences in terms may be required in order to deliver an equivalent level of savings across the two schemes overall. As noble Lords know, as we discussed in Committee and as I now repeat, the detail of how any future statutory scheme will work will be subject to further consultation.
As was discussed here and in the Commons, the freedom to negotiate the voluntary scheme has been valued greatly by both industry and government. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, reminded us, I said as much in Committee. Our intention for the future of the PPRS is to work collaboratively and constructively with industry on future medicines pricing arrangements when the current PPRS comes to an end.