My Lords, again in place of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, I move Amendment 6 on Clause 28. This amendment has been requested by not only the Joint Committee on Human Rights but also the Constitution Committee of this House. As drafted, Clause 28 prioritises compliance with Article 14 of the Hague convention over compliance with every other legal obligation that the United Kingdom may be under pursuant to EU or other international law. Under the amendment, if conflicting obligations do indeed arise under international law, it will be for the court to decide where, ultimately, the priorities should lie.
As your Lordships of course appreciate, Clause 28 deals with cultural property in the United Kingdom; it dictates that in certain circumstances, when it is protected it cannot be seized or forfeit. With this provision, there is, I respectfully suggest—contrary to the position under the matter I was discussing earlier—a useful and close analogy. As pointed out by the Joint Committee and the Constitution Committee, the analogy is with the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which, in order to facilitate loans of property to museums
and galleries in this country, provides assurances that objects which are normally kept outside the United Kingdom will not be seized or forfeit here. In other words, to encourage foreign galleries or owners to lend property for exhibition here, there is the assurance that those objects in the United Kingdom will not be seized or forfeit. But importantly—this is the crunch point—Section 135 of that Act is subject to the proviso that it has no effect where a court is required to make an order,
“under, or under a provision giving effect to, an EU obligation or any international treaty”.
Essentially, it is just that same proviso which we are seeking, by Amendment 6, to introduce into this legislation.
It is true, as the department has said in the Minister’s letter that it is “very unlikely in practice” that there will be any conflict between our obligations under the Hague convention and any other international treaty obligations. But what possible disadvantage is there in providing for such a conflict to give the discretion to the court in case the conflict arises? Surely it is better to provide for it than not and to leave matters prioritising it, as the Bill as drafted does.
I urge the House to consider how moderate, how measured, how sensible and how restrained our amendment is when one compares it to the altogether more radical amendment which I suspect is shortly to be spoken to and which would delete Clause 28 altogether. I beg to move.