My Lords, the measures in this part of the Bill and Part 5 mark the Government’s commitment to tackle rogue landlords and agents as well as poor practice and standards in the private rented sector.
The amendments in this group respond to issues raised in Committee when we debated Part 2 of the Bill. They clarify issues that were of concern to your Lordships. Later this evening I will be moving further government amendments to address electrical safety in the private rented sector, which has also been of concern to your Lordships, as the House debates property standards in the sector.
Although he is not in his place, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for raising in Committee issues around companies being subject to banning orders. To clarify matters, Amendments 14 and 16 to 19 replace the word “company” with “body corporate”, which has a wider meaning and includes bodies that are incorporated legal entities, such as an association, non-government organisation or corporation—but also includes a company.
The amendments ensure consistency in the terminology used in this part of the Bill and that any incorporated body, not just a company, which commits a banning order offence can be subject to a banning order. Now that he has returned to his place, I will repeat my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for raising the issue that the amendments are trying to address.
Amendment 31 to Clause 54, which is concerned with definitions in Part 2 of the Bill, explains that a body corporate includes a company or other body incorporated outside England and Wales. This clarifies that the banning order provisions extend to companies and other bodies registered abroad. During Committee we had a useful debate about the nature of banning
order offences and the degree to which such offences should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. As was explained, we have not included the specific offences on the face of the Bill because we want the flexibility to add further, or remove existing, offences as the new law beds in, and beyond, to ensure that the offences are relevant and up to date.
However, Clause 13(4) explains what matters may be taken into consideration when setting out in regulations what are banning order offences. The banning order offences will all be existing offences which already have serious consequences for those convicted, such as those involving fraud or violence as well as offences under the Housing Act 2004. We will consult on the proposed offences to be included in the regulations. We have noted the concerns of the DPRRC and the strong feelings expressed by Members of this House about the need for parliamentary scrutiny of those offences. While we do not think that it is appropriate to include such offences on the face of the Bill, for the reasons I have just explained, we see force in the argument that before the offences become law they should be laid and debated in both Houses of Parliament. Amendment 133, therefore, provides that regulations under Clause 13(3) describing banning order offences will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
The Committee also debated the standard of proof that should apply where a local housing authority imposed a financial penalty for the breach of a banning order or for certain offences under the Housing Act 2004, as an alternative to initiating a criminal prosecution for those offences. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was concerned that it was unclear whether the authority could apply the civil standard and, therefore, effectively act as prosecutor, judge and jury in its own case. I can confirm that the local housing authority will need to apply the criminal standard of proof.
Amendment 20 makes the standard of proof to be applied absolutely clear on the face of the Bill. A local housing authority which intends to impose a financial penalty must serve a notice of intent setting out both the reason for imposing the penalty and the amount. The reason must reflect that the local housing authority is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence complained of has been committed. The department will issue guidance to local housing authorities on financial penalties, including the circumstances in which a local authority should consider imposing such a penalty.
Amendment 21 clarifies how the First-tier Tribunal will deal with an appeal against the imposition of a financial penalty, in relation to both penalties imposed for a breach of a banning order and those imposed for offences under the Housing Act 2004. On appeal, the tribunal must consider the local housing authority’s financial penalty decision afresh and in reaching its own decision may take account of matters which the local authority was not aware of when it made its decision. The tribunal, therefore, does not review the authority’s decision and decide whether it is reasonable but must instead re-determine the case itself, applying the criminal standard of proof on the facts known to it.
Amendment 29 is concerned with appeals under Part 2 of the Bill from the First-tier Tribunal. Essentially the new clause provides that an appeal to the Upper Tribunal cannot be made unless permission is granted by either the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal, but any such appeal is not limited to a point of law only. This mirrors the situation in other housing legislation involving appeals to the Upper Tribunal, such as the Housing Act 2004 and the Mobile Homes Act 1983. I beg to move.