My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Donaghy and congratulate her on some excellent amendments, which naturally I strongly support. I also support the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt.
This group of amendments focuses on the practicalities of the proposed changes to the Certification Officer and their staff. They would further secure the impartiality of the Certification Officer in maintaining an approach by staff to investigations that is free from bias and undue influence. In order to give trade union members assurances over the security of any personal information supplied, it is vital that the power to require the production of documents remains solely that of the Certification Officer and his or her staff. That is what Amendment 101 seeks to achieve. Contracting out investigatory powers and the handling of sensitive information may not only jeopardise the independent standing of the Certification Officer but leave trade unions vulnerable to the misuse of their data.
That potential problem relates directly to the issues raised in the following amendments. There must be a requirement for a person investigating a breach of an obligation by a union to be a member of the staff of the Certification Officer, not simply “other persons” as the Bill currently states. Amendments 103 and 104 would add yet further safety measures for occasions when the Certification Officer appointed as an inspector someone who was not a member of his or her staff. The Certification Officer must have proper regard to the proportionality of making such an appointment, the cost of the appointment and, importantly, the impartiality of the person, which is naturally a matter of deep concern given the political nature of all the issues involved in the appointment.
There is nothing in the Bill to stop the Certification Officer hiring what is vaguely described as “other persons” to take part in an investigation. That leaves us without any safeguards against the hiring of a person who may have a particular political leaning or history of working against trade unions. Without appointees being directly employed by and accountable to the Certification Officer, how can the Government ensure that the investigations will be consistently impartial? This point is critical to the accountability and independence of the Certification Officer.
Reflecting the threat of malicious complaints, as mentioned in discussion on the previous group, standards must also be set to gauge the validity of any complaints. Not only should complaints be made by a union member but the Certification Officer must have reason to believe that there is adequate evidence of a breach of an obligation before they initiate an investigation. Again, this would protect everyone involved from wasting time on deliberately unfounded complaints.
In an effort genuinely to increase openness and transparency, the Certification Officer or the person
investigating any breach of an obligation by a union should be required to produce an interim report, which would be sent to the union concerned. This allows for a truly open process and for communication from the Certification Officer to the union concerned, which ultimately would pave the way for a quicker and smoother resolution.
5.30 pm
Due to the sensitivity of the Certification Officer’s work, maintaining their independence and impartiality is crucial. Their investigations should be of the highest quality, able to withstand the most rigorous scrutiny. We must ensure that the Certification Officer’s staff are able to maintain their independence and continue to be free from inappropriate influences. This is what these amendments seek to achieve. We have a duty not just to protect the millions of trade union members who will be subjected to these new investigatory powers but to protect the very people being handed the responsibility to carry out these new powers.