My Lords, in general I welcome the Bill as it applies to the Bank of England, but in the second part of my speech I will say a few words about overregulation. As other speakers have stated, the Bill is split into three main parts. The first sets out the proposed changes to the Bank of England’s governance and procedures connected to its accountability. The second includes a number of provisions linked to the regulation of financial services, in particular the introduction of the SM&CR regime. The third contains provisions on the issuing of bank notes in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
What I like is that many of the Bill’s provisions linked to the governance and accountability of the Bank of England build on changes and suggestions announced by the Bank in 2014. The announcement was accompanied by two reports containing further details on the proposed changes—the Warsh review and the Bank of England’s own report. The Bill was in the Queen’s Speech, when the Government said that this would ensure that,
“the Bank is well positioned to fulfil its … role of overseeing monetary policy and financial stability”.
It will also ensure that the UK’s regulatory framework remains at the forefront of internationally agreed best practice standards.
Clauses 1 to 15 contain the proposed changes to the Bank of England’s governance, financial arrangements and prudential regulation. The Bill changes the membership of the court—it adds an additional deputy governor post. This has not been mentioned by other
speakers, so I ask the Minister: what is the rationale behind that? As other speakers have said, the Bill also assigns the oversight functions to the whole court to operate more like a unitary board. The Financial Policy Committee becomes a committee of the Bank, rather than a sub-committee of the court.
The Bill also intends to clarify the Bank’s responsibilities for prudential regulation by ending the status of the PRA as a subsidiary of the Bank. I note the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord McFall, on that front. Instead, the Bill provides that the PRA is the Bank of England and creates a new Prudential Regulation Committee with responsibility for the Bank’s functions as the PRA.
The Monetary Policy Committee is also subject to change in the Bill. Generally, the MPC has worked pretty well in recent years, judged by the low level of inflation and of interest rates. The big move is in the timing of publication of the MPC’s minutes. It is proposed that they are now published as soon as is reasonably practical following a meeting. The MPC will meet fewer times in the year, changing from at least once a month to at least eight times a year. I do not really know what effect that will have, but it may be less or more valuable in these circumstances.
As other noble Lords mentioned, the Bill gives the National Audit Office the power to carry out examinations of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which the Bank uses its resources in discharging its functions. It also gives the Treasury power to carry out value for money reviews of the prudential regulation functions of the Bank. I disagree with other speakers; it seems to me that that is a sensible role for the NAO. Also, I like new Section 7D(3), in Clause 11, which says:
“An examination under this section is not to be concerned with the merits of the Bank’s general policy in pursuing the Bank’s objectives”.
Clause 3 gives the oversight functions previously delegated to the oversight sub-committee of the court to the full court. I note the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on this. I am slightly concerned about the reduction of the oversight committee’s role, although the Government say that it will simplify the way the Bank’s oversight functions operate.
Part 2 of the Bill makes a welcome change. Here I disagree with most other speakers. I think that the reverse burden of proof in situations of regulatory breach was a very bad idea: that you should be presumed guilty until proved innocent does not seem to go down well in many other areas of the law. The original regime meant that a senior manager responsible for certain areas of a firm’s business would be presumed accountable when regulatory requirements were contravened in that area. Now it will be necessary, quite rightly, for the regulators to prove that a senior manager has not taken reasonable steps to prevent that contravention to avoid being found guilty of misconduct.
SM&CR is due to come into force in March next year for financial services firms, defined as banks, other deposit-takers and those investment firms which are regulated by the PRA. The Bill extends the operation of SM&CR to cover all firms carrying out regulated activities under the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000. Part 2 also extends—which I welcome—the remit of the Government’s Pension Wise service to holders of annuities specified by the Treasury, so that it can deliver guidance to pensioners who will be eligible to sell their annuity income stream in 2017. I also welcome the duty that Part 2 imposes on the Bank to give the Treasury information about what action the Bank proposes to take if a particular bank fails, such as what impact the failure will have on the financial system and on public funds.
In the rest of my speech I have a few words to say about a paper produced by an organisation called New City Initiative, which supplies an independent expert voice in the debate on financial reform. Its intention is to restore society’s trust in the financial sector. I worked in the investment management sector until 2005.
The UK investment management industry generates about 1% of GDP and remains Europe’s leading centre for fund management. It earns an estimated £12 billion a year for the UK, and London is the hub of specialist boutique firms. The financial crash of 2008 was especially damaging. The serious long-term cost was, perhaps, the death of trust.
Extra regulation was clearly necessary, but the extent is open to debate. The UK SME asset management sector has traditionally been vibrant and grown strongly, but is now stagnating, because start-ups cannot afford the cost of increased regulation. A chart from the FCA shows how the number of new firms—approvals—declined from 230 in 2004 to between 150 and 170 in 2014.
Boutique asset and wealth management firms find compliance increasingly onerous. New financial regulations from the EU and UK are applied equally to the very biggest and smallest asset management firms, disregarding their ability to shoulder the consequent financial and legal burdens. If financial regulation is not imposed more proportionately on large and small asset management firms, New City Initiative is convinced that many fewer start-up firms will come to market. This arrest of competition will damage all, but especially the consumer, because choice will become more limited. The complexity of new regulations, and the potential punishment for infringement of them, pose massive obstacles to the growth of competition in the sector.
A new priesthood, called compliance officers, has emerged from the financial crash. Extra regulation is necessary, but as the regulatory regime continually evolves, becoming ever more complex, and the scale of potential punishments becomes so damaging to small firms, the temptation is for compliance officers to engage in gold-plating, to avoid any possibility of failure to comply. Their numbers—again according to the FCA—have more than doubled in the last 14 years.
I make a final point on banking regulation generally. Can the Minister say whether it is true—as I have read—that retail banks are going to be allowed to pay dividends to their investment banking operations?
Overall I welcome the Bill and wish it safe passage through the House.
9.19 pm