I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for tabling Amendments 20 to 24. Taking time to consider the definition of social investment used in the Bill has been a valuable exercise and I have no doubt that we are all much the wiser for it.
I will deal with the amendments in turn, but I should make it clear that the Law Commission recommended these powers, the Law Commission drafted these clauses, and the Law Commission has been consulted on the amendments. So I am not sure that I totally agree that the Bill does not accurately reflect the Law Commission’s recommendations.
Amendments 20 and 21 would change the definition of social investment such that directly furthering the charity’s purposes must be the primary consideration over achieving financial return. The range of social investments covered by the Bill would be restricted only to those where directly furthering the charity’s purposes is the primary aim. It would thus exclude those investments where achieving a financial return is the primary aim, as well as introduce a definitional issue around how to determine which of the two purposes is primary.
This is contrary to the intention of the Bill, which deliberately aims for a wide definition of social investment where neither the furtherance of the charity’s purposes nor the financial return should be required to take precedence. Some social investments place emphasis on charitable purpose, some on financial return; in other cases, the trustees will be motivated by financial return and furtherance of purposes in equal measure. None of these cases should be excluded from the statutory definition of social investment and from the scope of the new power; all investments right along the spectrum should be included. To hold one above the other would potentially restrict the breadth of investments that fall under the power thereby making it less likely to be used. In order to maintain as wide a scope as possible for the power’s use, so that the power may have the largest possible impact, it is important that the definition of social investment remains suitably inclusive.
As to Amendments 22 and 23, let me state for the sake of clarity that the definition of social investment used in the Bill covers anything short of a total loss of funds. It includes both a neutral and a negative return, short of such total loss. In this way, repayment of any part of the capital invested would be a “financial return” within the definition. The amendments seek to include cases where the expected financial return may be equal to, rather than greater than, a total loss of the investment. This would move us firmly into grant-making territory and mean that grants and other spending, where there is no expected financial return, would fall
under the category of social investment. I do not think that this would be a desirable change to the Bill.
The third and final amendment in this group would delete new Section 292A(6), which is a necessary counterpart to the definition of an act of charity used in new Section 292A(4)(b). These parts of the clause are, I recognise, a little cumbersome, but they are necessary to deal with the so-called Rosemary Simmons problem, a case which was raised during the Law Commission consultation. It makes clear that giving a guarantee can count as a social investment despite the fact that money is only put at risk and not actually paid over. As such, it is a necessary inclusion to cover the full breadth of potential social investments. Deleting this subsection would leave the Bill deficient.
The noble Baroness will be aware that the Government have put proper time and effort into getting a definition of social investment that is fit for purpose. As she said, we have been dancing on the head of a pin for some time. I will address this at greater length when I cover government Amendments 25 and 29, referred to by my noble friend Lord Hodgson. I hope on this basis that the noble Baroness will be content not to press her amendments.
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