My Lords, I shall speak on the convention in Brussels to which the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan of Rogart, referred, on which he served with distinction. It consisted of 200 individuals from every member state in the European Union and every candidate member state, from every Government and every Parliament. Some came wanting greater centralisation of power; some came wanting repatriation of powers. In practice, like the previous Government in their balance of competencies review, it could not identify any that it would be in the national interest to repatriate.
The convention worked for 18 months and reached its conclusions by consensus. We neither repatriated powers, nor recentralised them. We aimed at stability, entrenching the definitions of powers, making it more difficult to have creeping extensions of competence. We reached conclusions by consensus. For the first six months we did none of the above; we addressed conceptual papers prepared by the secretariat, which I was privileged to lead. The discussion of those papers led the conventionnel to come to understand each other better: to understand where they were coming from, to appreciate what might and what would not be possible. In the second six months, we addressed particular issues. Only in the third six months—although the thing wound up in 17 months—did we look at particular solutions and drafting issues. We reached consensus.
This is what worries me about this Bill. I support the idea of a convention but find the terms of reference in Clause 2 very hard to understand. I think you have to start from the conceptual and the general, and hone in on the particular when you have reached conclusions on the general. But these terms of reference seem to me to go the other way. I greatly admire the Liberal Democrat enthusiasm for localism, but to start with devolution is wrong. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Soley, is quite right: you need to consider the countervailing force.
I would like to see us, in the spirit of John Stuart Mill, considering the basic issue of the bargain between state and citizen. What is the relationship between the United Kingdom and its citizens? What is the balance of rights and responsibilities? You need to ensure that a balance is struck between empowering the citizen, ensuring that decisions are taken at the closest possible level to him and involving him to the extent that is possible, and not disabling the state so that it remains able to provide the essential state functions which it is in the citizen’s interest are provided centrally, and the democratic control over their provision.
This would be for the convention to explore but I see three categories of state function. I would like to see a narrative develop on the role of the state. What are the functions of the central United Kingdom
state? The first is the state’s responsibility for security and stability. We all agree that disaggregated defence makes no sense. The same goes for foreign relations, law and order, monetary stability and the currency. I argue that there needs to be some sort of fiscal flywheel to deal with exogenous external shock. When the oil price halves, the national economy greatly benefits but the economy of north-east Scotland does not. The SNP should be careful what it asks for. Had it now got the full fiscal autonomy it sought, and ostensibly still seeks, it would be in dire fiscal straits.
The second category of central state responsibility must be to ensure, although not necessarily to provide, adequate access to education, healthcare, maternity care, care for the elderly and care for the disabled, to which the citizen of every modern state is entitled.
Thirdly, I believe the citizen has the right to expect that the central state will ensure, although not necessarily itself provide, that, wherever he lives, he enjoys equal access to adequate transport links, energy supply and internet connectivity—a sort of public service obligation provision.
If I am right, a fourth point follows. The per capita cost of providing my second and third categories of state services obviously varies with geography and is highest where population density is lowest. Maintaining roads is costlier in the Grampians than in Godalming. If citizens all have equal rights to such services—and I suggest that they do—the need for a central redistributive fiscal mechanism is clear. In all the countries where I have lived, the centre has supported the periphery. But equally clearly, this redistributive mechanism must operate to empirically determined and weighted criteria. It must not be a historical irrelevance like the Barnett formula.
We need a clear rationale and a system that reflects it. All my four categories of function need discussion from first principles. That, in my view, is where a convention should start. What is the union for and how can the services the union exists to provide for the citizen best be provided? The present situation, where the extent of devolution is determined solely by demand, which can never be fully satisfied without abandoning the union of these islands, is profoundly unsatisfactory. We must stop changing the constitution in sudden lurches, like last September’s extraordinary “vow”, penned by a columnist in the Daily Record, which is not normally seen even as a journal of record; or the Prime Minister’s extraordinary 7 am broadcast: the EVEL broadcast—I spell it with an “e” in this case in deference to the Prime Minister—or the back-of-the envelope solution to the Prime Minister’s question produced by Mr Grayling in the House of Commons this week, which, as a constitutional aberration, is extraordinary in my view. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton, and with what the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said yesterday. This is no way to handle the constitution.
I hope that this House will look very closely at the drafting of the Bill. The principle is absolutely correct but the stability of a planetary system rests on the balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces. As it stands, the Bill suggests that the convention would be about centrifugal forces. I think it also needs to address centripetal forces. The terms of reference should
be to find the point of balance and entrench it. When it has been found, the proper handling of issues of devolution—in Clause 2(a) and (b)—will follow; it can be derived from it. Similarly, the parliamentary reform agenda can be derived from it. One needs to start at the beginning. I would drop Clause 2(e), the idea that the convention should draft agendas for future conventions. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that the idea of a perpetual Maoist revolution, with perpetual conventions—let alone referenda—is not what we want. What we want is stability. Let us stop endless improvisation. Let us pause and reflect. Let us get it right. By all means, let us have a convention. I strongly support the principle of the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis.
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