My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for these amendments and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for his views. We see the civil sanctions as a useful tool to take proportionate action against offenders. The Bill contains two levels of sanctions: prohibition and premises notices, and prohibition and premises orders. Orders are the most severe, being imposed by a court and attracting a criminal offence for non-compliance.
Amendments 55A and 60A relate to prohibition notices as provided for in Clause 12 and premises notices in Clause 13. The Government have deliberately created the notice regime to be light touch, allowing a senior police officer or local authority officer to impose such a notice where they reasonably believe that a person is carrying on, or is likely to carry on, a prohibited activity as defined by Clause 11. In the case of a premises notice, the test is that there is reasonable
belief that prohibited activity is being, or is likely to be, carried on at particular premises. There is no criminal sanction. The purpose of these notices is to try to stop further criminal behaviour occurring in the first instance. They are a form of final warning.
Amendment 55A seeks to remove the differentiation, so that the time limit will apply to all notices. Our starting point in relation to adults is that, as the primary aim of a prohibition notice is to stop an individual engaging in criminal conduct—something they should not be doing in any event—there was no need to impose a time limit. I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that other civil orders of this kind made against an adult—for example, anti-social behaviour injunctions—may also have an indefinite duration. I recognise that there are particular sensitivities about imposing civil sanctions on young people. For these reasons, we have restricted the duration of a notice issued to a person under 18 to a maximum of three years.
On Amendment 60A, a premises notice cannot be issued to an individual under the age of 18. Similar considerations apply here to those in Clause 12, so we feel that there is no need to put a time limit on premises notices.
Turning to Amendment 71A, we entirely agree that any prohibitions, restrictions or requirements contained in a prohibition order or premises order must be appropriate and proportionate. Proportionality will routinely be considered by a court as part of this decision. It is also important to remember that the court is bound by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1968 to act in accordance with the convention rights. Arguably, for the reasons I have given, it was not strictly necessary to include a proportionality test in Clauses 17 to 19 but we included it so that there was symmetry with the test applied by a senior officer or a local authority for the issuing of a prohibition notice or premises notice. I accept the spirit in which the amendment is intended but it is simply not necessary to amend Clause 21 to achieve this end. On the basis of this explanation, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.