My Lords, the parents of this amendment are the members of the House of Commons Defence Committee, the majority of whom are government MPs. At the beginning of this month the Defence Committee published a report, Future Army 2020, and its conclusions were hardly a ringing endorsement of either government policy or government competence on this issue. Referring to the Government’s Army 2020 plan, the report pointed out quite fairly that it departed significantly from the announcements made in the 2010 strategic defence and security review. It went on to say that the Defence Committee had,
“considerable doubts about how the plan was developed and tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the UK’s national security”.
It expressed surprise that such a radical change to the Army’s structure, reflecting a reduction of 12,000 personnel from that announced in the 2010 SDSR, had not been discussed at the National Security Council and added:
“Even if the overall strategic vision had not changed, as the Government claims, the military ways and means of that strategy were considerably altered under Army 2020”.
The committee said that its principal concerns were twofold. The first was that the Ministry of Defence,
“has failed to communicate the rationale and strategy behind the plan to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament or the public”.
The second concern was that,
“the financially driven reduction in the numbers of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel particularly in key supporting capabilities until sufficient additional Reserves are recruited and trained”.
The committee pointed out in its report that the Secretary of State for Defence accepted that,
“Army 2020 was designed to fit a financial envelope”,
and expressed its concern,
“that this consideration took primacy over the country’s abilities to respond to the threats, risks and uncertainties contained in the National Security Strategy”.
It expressed concern, too, at being told that it was the,
“Ministry of Defence’s Permanent Secretary who told the Chief of the General Staff the future size of the Army under the Army 2020 plan”,
and called for an explanation of the,
“apparent lack of consultation and involvement of the Chief of the General Staff in the decision-making process that has affected his Service so fundamentally”.
Such was the committee’s concern, including over lack of,
“evidence of an active experimentation programme in the development and implementation of Army 2020”,
that it has called for the Ministry of Defence to provide,
“an assessment of how the Army 2020 plans will affect the ‘Fighting Power’ of the Army providing comparable assessments of both current fighting power and projected fighting power following the completion of the Army 2020 plans”.
On top of that, the committee came out with this conclusion:
“We remain to be convinced that the Army 2020 plan represents a fully thought-through and tested concept which will allow the Army to counter emerging and uncertain threats and develop a contingent capability to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The MoD needs to justify how the conclusion was reached that the Army 2020 plan of 82,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves represented the best way of countering these threats”.
The Defence Committee has said other things, also stating in its report that it remains,
“to be convinced by, the Secretary of State’s explanation as to why the reduction in the Regular Army should not be dependent on the recruitment of the necessary number of Reservists. The financially driven reduction in the number of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel in key supporting capabilities until sufficient Reserves are recruited and trained”.
That concern is borne out by the trained strength and recruitment targets for the reserves contained in the report.
Continuing, the committee expressed concern,
“that the Army 2020 plan would unravel in the face of any further MoD budget reductions or further reductions in Army personnel”,
and concern that,
“the Defence Planning Assumptions are adequate to ensure the UK’s national security”.
It went on to express,
“little confidence in the Government’s capacity to rapidly expand Army numbers should the need arise”.
Since the Government said that Army 2020 had to work and that there was no plan B, the committee continued by saying that the Government,
“owe it to the Army to ensure it does work, but, crucially, if the situation changes, then the Government must be prepared to respond decisively by providing additional resources in order to guarantee the nation’s security”.
The committee was still not finished, but went on to comment on the Government’s amendment taken in Committee in this House:
“While we welcome the Government’s commitment to publish more data on the Reserves and to put into statute a requirement on the Reserves Forces and Cadets Association to produce an annual report on the state of the Reserve Forces, we believe the Government should go further and give a commitment to provide regular updates to Parliament on progress on all aspects of the Army 2020 plan. Oral and written statements while helpful are not sufficient; a detailed annual report on the Army’s Fighting Power should be laid before Parliament setting out progress and setbacks in implementing the Army 2020 plan. The first of these reports should be laid before Parliament in January 2015 … before the 2015 General Election and to inform the 2015 SDSR”.
The purpose of this amendment is to give effect to this conclusion reached by the House of Commons Defence Committee.
There can be no doubt about the magnitude of the changes under the Army 2020 plan. The Army 2020 document itself described the Army 2020 construct as representing,
“a fundamental and imaginative break from the way in which the British Army is currently structured”,
and said that the change was,
“as significant as any seen over the last fifty years”.
Neither did General Wall, Chief of the General Staff, dispute that the plans were radical: indeed, he agreed that they were when he appeared before the Defence Committee.
The government amendment which was introduced in Committee is now Clause 47 of this Bill. The Government had no problems agreeing to annual reports by each reserves force and cadets association on the capabilities of the volunteer Reserve Forces in relation to the enhanced duties that are being placed on the members of those forces being prepared and sent to the Secretary of State and for the Secretary of State to be required by law to place a copy of each report before Parliament.
Therefore, there ought to be no reason why the Government, as now called for by the Defence Select Committee following careful scrutiny of the future Army 2020 plan, should not also agree to provide Parliament with a similar annual report on progress on all aspects of the Army 2020 plan, with its significant changes in the future role and structure of the British Army. The report, of course, would be about the Regular Army as well as the integration of the Reserves with the Regular Army. It seems rather odd that Parliament should be provided with annual reports about the Reserve Forces and their capabilities but not receive an annual report covering the position and progress of the Regular Army which, under Army 2020, is undergoing significant change, about which the Defence Select Committee has expressed real concerns and doubts in respect both of its implementation and its implications. I beg to move.