My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lady Miller, the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for tabling the two amendments in this group. It has enabled us to have a useful and interesting debate about a number of important issues. The Defence Reform Bill deals with the future arrangements for defence procurement and the Reserve Forces, and I think it is fair to say that the debate on these amendments has drifted some way from those issues—a point made by my noble friend. In responding to them, I will try to address the specific effect of the amendments on Part 1 of the Bill, but I shall also set out more widely our position on some of the other issues that have been raised.
Before turning to the detail of the amendments, it might be helpful if I set out the UK Government’s policy on unmanned aircraft systems. I think it is important to use the correct terminology when discussing unmanned aircraft systems, or UASs. The term “drone” is often used, but the word evokes thoughts and images of computer-controlled machines free from human oversight, which is simply not the case. The term “unmanned air vehicle” had previously been used extensively in the UK, but it is no longer aligned with NATO or international thinking, and in the interests of interoperability we have now moved away from using it. Often, the actual level of human involvement is unclear when discussing unmanned aircraft systems and hence it is entirely appropriate that the term “remotely piloted aircraft system”, or RPAS, is also used as it emphasises the reality that a trained professional pilot is in control of the system. UAS and RPAS are the generic terms that define the totality of the components of an unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft together with the other necessary components, including all equipment networks and, most important, personnel.
The UK operates a range of these human-controlled systems principally for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes. There is often a misconception that remotely piloted aircraft systems are autonomous. Again, we have to be careful with the terminology as the word “autonomous” can mean different things to different people and organisations. The Government consider an autonomous system as being capable of understanding high-level intent, a system that is capable of deciding a course of action from a number of alternatives without depending on human oversight or control. Our current
and future RPAS will not be autonomous. A military pilot will continue to remain in control of our armed systems, just as they are now. In fact, our current armed RPASs have greater human involvement than our other armed aircraft types. Our Reaper RPAS crews comprise highly-trained pilots, sensor operators and analysts who all make decisions in real time.
The UK currently deploys unmanned aircraft systems in support of operations in Afghanistan and of Royal Navy ships. These systems are predominantly used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks, providing vital intelligence in support of our troops on the ground and our sailors at sea. They provide persistent video imagery for the development of situational awareness in order to conduct planning and to protect our forces. While the sensors are broadly similar to those onboard conventionally manned aircraft, unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft systems have the ability to loiter for longer, building an intelligence picture that significantly enhances the situational awareness of our commanders.
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The British Army currently operates four unarmed unmanned aircraft systems. Hermes 450 is the largest system, followed by the hand-launched Desert Hawk III and then the Tarantula Hawk, which operates solely as part of an improvised explosive device route-clearing capability. Finally, it operates the Black Hornet, which is a palm-launched nano-system used directly by infantry units.
The Hermes 450, which has flown around 85,000 hours for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, will be replaced by the more modern Watchkeeper, which is due to come into service this year. This system will provide operational commanders with a day/night, all-weather capability to detect and track targets of interest without the need to deploy troops into potentially dangerous areas.
This brings me on to our larger system, the Reaper RPAS which is operated by the RAF. Reaper is the UK’s only armed remotely piloted aircraft system which, again, is predominantly used for surveillance tasks. It has also been armed with precision-guided weapons since 2008, providing an offensive capability if needed by our ground commanders.
As I mentioned previously, a UK Reaper does not have the capability to fire weapons autonomously and can fire its weapons only when commanded to do so by the very highly trained and qualified flight crew. When tasked to attack a target, qualified Reaper pilots can select from two types of precision-guided weapons, the weapon with the smallest warhead appropriate to the target being selected. To reassure my noble friend Lord Palmer, every effort is made to avoid civilian casualties, aborting attacks when necessary, as is the case with manned aircraft pilots. I thought the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, set that out very clearly.
The UK policy relating to use of and targeting by remotely piloted aircraft systems is exactly the same as that for manned aircraft. It is entirely compliant with international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. The rules of engagement used by Reaper
pilots are no different from those used by manned aircraft pilots. Targets are always positively identified as legitimate military objectives following the principles of distinction, humanity, proportionality and military necessity. The noble and gallant Lord mentioned the role of lawyers in this.
In more than 55,000 hours of Reaper operations, there has been only one known incident that resulted in the deaths of civilians. On 25 March 2011, an attack on two pick-up trucks resulted in the destruction of a significant quantity of explosives and the death of two insurgents but, sadly, four Afghanistan civilians were also killed. In line with current ISAF procedures, an ISAF investigation was conducted to establish whether any lessons could be learnt or if any errors in operational procedures could be identified. In that case, the report concluded that the actions of the Reaper crew had been in accordance with extant procedures and rules of engagement.
In considering maritime UASs, the ScanEagle surveillance system is operated by the Royal Navy and is expected to become fully operational in the coming weeks. The system is launched from a pneumatic catapult, from either a Royal Navy or Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel, and is fitted with a high-resolution camera which can see in the dark and poor visibility. It has a wingspan of just over three metres and can stay airborne for up to 10 hours, providing real-time intelligence which is invaluable in protecting our troops. Once again I would like to point out that ScanEagle is not armed and has no offensive capability.
In the years to come, technological advances and improving capability are likely to increase the level of automation in some systems, making the remote pilot or operator’s job easier, just as in other non-military equipment. However, I stress that the Government have no intention to develop systems that operate without human intervention in the weapon command and control chain. I am not going to comment on the operations of our allies, and it is long-standing government policy, for reasons of operational security, that the Government do not comment on their intelligence-sharing arrangements with coalition partners. I would also like to emphasise the point that the UK complies fully with its obligations under international law, as set out in Article 36 of additional protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions, to review all new weapons, and means and methods of warfare.
Finally, I am aware that the noble Lords who tabled this amendment have some concerns regarding the activity that takes place at visiting forces’ bases in the UK. I would like to take this opportunity to point out that the US Air Force does not operate remotely piloted aircraft systems from the United Kingdom, and neither does the UK provide remotely piloted aircraft systems support to bases of the United States’ visiting forces.
I welcome this opportunity to once again put on the record the Government’s clear views of the benefits of unmanned aerial systems and remotely piloted aircraft systems, which provide vital intelligence to our forces on the ground, while minimising the risk to civilians as well as our own service personnel and other coalition forces. I can see their importance only
increasing and find it difficult to imagine a future campaign in which such technology will not have a role to play.
I turn now to the detail of the amendments. They would amend the definition of the places at which the Ministry of Defence Police have jurisdiction under Clause 5(1). That clause would amend the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 to make it clear that the MDP has jurisdiction over any land, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and hovercraft that are in the possession of, under the control of, or used for the purposes of, a contractor and used for the purposes of providing defence procurement services to the Ministry of Defence under Clause 1. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the MDP have jurisdiction over any property or vehicles owned or used by the GOCO for providing defence procurement services.
The amendment seeks to add unmanned aerial systems, distributed common ground systems, ground control and other stations used to support the operation of unmanned aerial systems to the things that the MDP will have jurisdiction over, where these are in the possession etc of the GOCO. The amendment is unnecessary because where the GOCO controls or uses ground control stations, they would already fall within MDP jurisdiction under Clause 5(1) because they are covered by “land”. In any event, the MDP already have jurisdiction under the 1987 Act over any land that is owned or under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Unmanned aerial systems are already covered by the words “vehicles” and “aircraft”. Therefore, again the MDP would have jurisdiction over any UAVs in the possession of or used by the GOCO by virtue of Clause 5(1) of the Bill, and over any UAVs that are in the possession of or used by the Ministry of Defence under the existing Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. Therefore, these amendments are unnecessary because the items would be under the jurisdiction of the MDP in the case of the GOCO by virtue of Clause 5(1) or, so far as concerns the Ministry of Defence, under the 1987 Act.
The second amendment amends Clause 5(1)(a) by adding at the end,
“or any person who provides defence procurement services to a contractor”.
A contractor under Part 1 of the Bill is someone who provides defence procurement services to the Ministry of Defence under the arrangements set out in Clause 1—in effect, the GOCO. I assume that the intention behind this amendment is to bring subcontractors who might have a contract with the GOCO, rather than the Ministry of Defence, within the jurisdiction of the MDP, which already has jurisdiction over any contractors who provide defence procurement services to the Ministry of Defence. We believe that extending MDP jurisdiction to subcontractors of the GOCO would be a step too far and unnecessary.
My noble friend Lord Roper mentioned the report of Mr Ben Emmerson QC, which stated:
“If used in strict compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law, remotely piloted aircraft are capable of reducing the risk of civilian casualties in armed conflict by significantly improving the situational awareness of military commanders”.
In the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Judd, said, the MoD takes the psychological and physical health of our personnel seriously. Robust trauma-risk management strategies are in place and Royal Air Force medical services have not detected any adverse trends.
In summary, the current wording in Clause 5 of the Defence Reform Bill fully provides the Ministry of Defence Police with the jurisdiction they need to carry out their duties in relation to any future GOCO and the changes proposed are unnecessary. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.