First, one has to decide upon the reliability of the intelligence, because intelligence is not knowledge—there is no certainty about it. What degree of assuredness can we attach to the intelligence? What sort of cross-referencing is there? Then, everything else about the target—its structure, the things around it, the possibilities of collateral damage and all the issues properly raised under the law of armed conflict; that is, the military utility of attacking the target versus the possible risks of doing so—is gone into at great length. Certainly as far as the United Kingdom—and, in my experience, the United States—is concerned, it is done with a lawyer looking over one’s shoulder the whole time. When I was responsible for these sorts of targeting decisions in the five months after 9/11 when I was at United States Central Command, my lawyer and I were essentially joined at the hip. It had to be so and I welcomed it.
Defence Reform Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Lord Stirrup
(Crossbench)
in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 5 February 2014.
It occurred during Debate on bills
and
Committee proceeding on Defence Reform Bill.
About this proceeding contribution
Reference
752 c90GC Session
2013-14Chamber / Committee
House of Lords Grand CommitteeSubjects
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2021-10-12 15:55:49 +0100
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