This amendment is about the future structure of the Regulatory Decisions Committee. This is avowedly a placeholder amendment to allow further discussion. The commission originally proposed that the RDC should be given statutory autonomy within the FCA and that that new regulatory structure should be reviewed by 2018. On further reflection, my commission colleagues and I put forward a rather different proposition, which is that there should be a wider review but there is no reason why it should not start as soon as maybe.
There are a number of reasons why a wider review is justified. The first is obvious. Although we now have two regulators rather than one—the PRA and the FCA—events where enforcement is justified can arise from either of these domains and enforcement action taken by one could help or hinder the work of the other. The enforcement division and the RDC are embedded in the FCA, and it raises the question of whether the RDC should be placed, in a sense, more equidistant between the two.
The second reason for raising this question is that, in banking at least, enforcement decisions could be taking on a greater significance than in the past. Indeed, the past has been characterised by a surprising absence of enforcement, at least in relation to the events of the financial crisis. There have been some major enforcement decisions and some colossal fines around conduct, but virtually none in relation to events leading up to the financial crash. This therefore raises the question as to whether the RDC needs to be upgraded in terms of its chairmanship and membership so that it is capable of handling bigger and more important cases.
The third reason is that, in response to a regulatory infraction or lapse, there is a balance to be struck between using enforcement as an instrument and the supervisory instrument. We should not get into the mode of thinking that enforcement is always the first and best recourse. Supervisors may take the view that a case is better handled by what elsewhere might be called “special measures”, such as seeing that the people who are responsible for the poor behaviour and decisions are moved on, and possibly even sacked; or by getting new people in; or by securing undertakings from management about future conduct. Often, this can produce a quicker and more effective result, whereas recourse to enforcement can cut across this so that instead of a bank immediately getting into a constructive dialogue about what to do next, it begins to dig in and wait for a long, drawn-out litigation.
We therefore need to ensure that, in any particular case, the full range of options has been considered and that the interests of other regulators have been taken into account. In other words, the RDC should only receive a case
after that balancing process has taken place. It would be helpful if the RDC was able to question whether all the options and possible responses have been explored.
The fourth reason is that, in many walks of life, there has been a trend which continues to this day of greater separation between those investigating a case, those who decide whether a prosecution should be undertaken and those who reach a verdict. You could go back to the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service more than two decades ago, and you can see this in a number of professional bodies covering medicine, solicitors and accounting. The hot topic of the moment is the Independent Police Complaints Commission. There is a perception that the RDC is not as independent of enforcement as it could be. It is co-located. It is part of the FCA. Would we be able to achieve both actual enhancement of its independence and, certainly, the perception of that independence if it stood in a more independent position?
Finally, the RDC has to ensure that before any accusation is made in a decision notice that enforcement has been properly researched, the accused has been given a proper chance to put their case, and the case has been gone into thoroughly. This is of particular relevance to smaller practitioners who can be severely damaged by accusations and are not able to clear their name until maybe years later. Unlike big firms, such businesses, such as IFAs, can find that they clear their name but there is no business left to go back to. All this indicates to me that there is more than enough material on which to base a review and no reason to delay that until 2018, which was included in the earlier amendment. Rather than attempt to legislate now in a process that does not allow proper consultation with practitioners, and which would be confined only to banks, I argue that we should have a wider review. I hope that between now and Third Reading we can have further discussions on this idea. I beg to move.
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