Whatever one’s views on wind farms—I confess I am not an enthusiast for them—it is absolutely essential that the process by
which permissions are given and projects are undertaken are seen to be fair and take account of all objections and environmental and other interests. This example is about a particular wind farm development in some respects, but it is also about the rule of law and our attitudes to the rule of law.
The fact of the matter is that this whole saga arose because of the Viking project in Shetland, with over 100 turbines, where there was considerable local opposition. The project is being promoted by the Shetland Islands trust, which has got the oil money—and a large number of the trustees are councillors in Shetland—together with Scottish and Southern Energy. They are the people who are promoting this project. There was very considerable local opposition to this project, but the council decided that it was not conflicted, even though the Shetland trust was a party to the development. As a result, there was no public inquiry. The Scottish Ministers in the Scottish Government gave the project the go-ahead. Some local opposition sought judicial review of that decision, which went to the Court of Session, which is the equivalent of the High Court in England.
Former law officer, Lynda Clark, after three months of deliberation and a well argued and clearly very considered opinion, which I have read and is freely available, concluded that this proposal was unlawful because it did not meet, as my noble friend has said, the requirements of Schedule 9 of the Electricity Act 1989, which makes it clear that anyone who is planning on producing a power plant which includes a wind farm should have a licence from Ofgem before planning approval can be granted. When the judge asked the parties to the development who had the necessary consent, none of them had, and the project had to go back to square one.
When I was a Secretary of State—and for as long as I have known—the principle has been that when a judge reaches a conclusion as to the state of the law, that is the law until such time as it is subject to an appeal. What happened next is an absolute scandal. The Scottish Government then decided that they disagreed with the judge in her opinion and that they would go ahead anyway. In a letter signed by Catherine Cacace to John Campbell QC, the Energy Consents and Deployment Unit said:
“Scottish Ministers note that the Court has found that an application for consent under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 can only be made (and so granted) where the applicant at the time of making the application either holds a licence to generate electricity or is exempt from that requirement”.
It goes on—wait for it:
“Scottish Ministers’ position is that they disagree with, and have appealed, the decision … The decision on the legislative interpretation runs contrary to the established practice relating to the handling of applications for consent which has been in place both north and south of the border for many years … Our intention is therefore to continue to operate in accordance with the practice … and to deal with current applications on that basis”.
In other words, “We will ignore the law”. It goes on to say:
“Scottish Ministers consider that the balance of public and national interest is in favour of continuing with the current approach until the appeal has been determined, in particular because of the need to continue to support the economy and our renewable energy ambitions”.
So their renewable energy ambitions trounce the law of the land. That is very undesirable and unprecedented —as far as I know; I see a noble Lord sitting on the Front Bench who is familiar with both the law and Shetland. I can think of no other case. The normal practice would be to stay any development until such time as an appeal had been considered. What I very strongly object to about the amendment is that it would take away the legal position that has been established for many years, and which has been confirmed by the court, in a retrospective manner. It would create a situation in which any Tom, Dick or Harry could apply for permission to establish a wind farm—or, I guess, any other form of generation. Those tests about their ability to meet environmental and other requirements under the legislation would then be applied to them.
This is an undesirable development, by both the Scottish Government and my noble friends. The proper procedure here would be to at least wait for the appeal. It is certainly quite wrong for the Scottish Government to continue in this way. If you look at it from the point of view of the objectors, they have gone to a judicial review, won their case—and everyone knows how difficult it is to win a case on judicial review—and the Scottish Government are just saying that they are going to ignore that. Should this House to seek to overturn the effect of that judgment, when people are talking in terms of the need to support “our renewable energy ambitions”? Our renewable energy ambitions must carry public consent. This is no way in which to proceed. I have strong objections to the amendment, and I hope that my noble friend will reject it.