My Lords, I apologise for my non-attendance in Committee. This was due to a clash with sittings of a number of domestic committees which I needed to attend.
This is a subject I have raised on a number of occasions over the years both at Question Time and in the form of amendments to previous legislation. Since last raising it in 2008 I have had the opportunity to further refine and simplify the scheme. RBT— rising block tariff—arises from what appears to the public to be an anomaly in energy pricing which defies all logic. The rising block tariff applies to domestic suppliers of gas and electricity.
If we examine our gas or electricity bills, we will note that initial units of electricity and gas are charged at a higher rate than subsequent units. Low-use consumers are penalised by the pricing structure, not only because of the early units penalty but by the levying of standing charges. The present system is regressive in its financial impact by penalising poorer sections of society. The system also lacks any incentive to conserve energy. If we are serious about energy conservation, we should use the pricing structure for units of energy to influence investment in conservation.
The problem is that, although a relatively free market in domestic energy prices can influence conservation investment as prices increase, the effect is limited due to a lack of real incentives. We need a penalty built into cost to the domestic consumer, whereby the higher the consumption of units, the higher the price—in other words, a reversal of the present arrangement. Furthermore, introducing such incentives would provide an opportunity to affect the position of people on low incomes without necessarily drawing them into means-testing.
Why cannot domestic energy prices be set at a discount for the first block of units, with subsequent blocks priced at increasing rates? It would be perfectly possible for the first block, what we might call block A, to be set at a discount from block B, the standard tariff, which itself could be priced at less than block C, the premium tariff: discount tariff over standard tariff over premium tariff. The block A tariff would be universally available to all consumers and set at a level that maximised the benefit to low-income households in blocks A and B. A fixed allocation of units would be available to all domestic customers. The Government would set the number of units in each of those blocks and the percentage difference in cost per unit in between blocks A, B and C.
However, it is critical that the block A price, the discounted tariff, is set in the free market by the energy suppliers. The Government would play no part in setting the block A discounted tariff unit price, but would leave suppliers free to set their prices, which
would need to be at a rate to ensure that their block B and C prices were viable, competitive and affordable for consumers.
What would be the advantages? The system would induce investment in conservation, and there would be more careful management of energy use by householders, as consumers sought to avoid moving into higher blocks, particularly into block C. There would be an element of redistribution. It would reduce the growing shift towards means-testing. It would reduce CO2 emissions. Suppliers would retain control of the price by, crucially, being responsible for setting the block A discount price.
I recognise that it would be difficult to set the volume of units to be applied to each block—in particular, block A. It would be necessary to calculate and agree a reasonable number of units to be allocated to block A for a core usage of electricity—I call that the CUE. The CUE would be set taking into account multiple occupancy, disability and basic energy requirements per household. As I said, the RBT would be available to all, but set at a level that provided for basic energy needs. It could be calculated on the basis of an agreed square footage space energy requirement. In particular, pensioner households’ space requirements would need to be fully considered, but it is likely that many pensioners would move into block B areas of consumption; certainly in heating fuel requirements. The RPT does not do away with state support for low-income pensioner households but, as I said, it would reduce dependency on the state for heating support and transfer responsibility for that support to “heavy users” in the process of redistribution.
Some households are single fuel, and would lose out compared with dual-fuel households. The answer is to provide every domestic hereditament with two energy entitlements: one for gas and the other for electricity. Single-fuel households would be entitled to two electricity entitlements. The need to provide two entitlements for single-fuel households stems from problems with heating requirements. It may seem complicated as I put it to the House, but when you analyse it, the system I am advocating is quite simple.
It might be possible to have a separate RBT for certain separately defined disability groups with prescribed greater heating requirements. They could be assessed on a different basis. In their case, it might be possible to have either fewer blocks with greater spread in terms of volume of units, or a greater number of blocks with a narrower spread. Regarding seasonal temperature differentials, householders invariably consume more energy in the winter months, when there are greater heating requirements. It would be necessary to ensure the transfer on of units between quarters at the end of each quarter, as is currently done with free minute allocations for some mobile phones.
Differentials in regional temperature are not fully considered under present domestic energy pricing arrangements. It has been argued that a national pooling arrangement should be in place to compensate consumers in colder regions for their higher energy costs. Privatisation of the industry and competition in the market place have made this difficult to introduce. Under RBT, any
such pooling arrangements, if required, would need to be based on block A volumes of units allocated, rather than on price.
A problem could arise over the timing of the introduction of RBT. It could be constrained by limited public understanding of the value of investing in conservation measures. The answer is to introduce a rising block tariff system over an extended period, perhaps as long as 10 years. Such a period would enable power suppliers, consumers and the energy conservation industry to adjust. In particular it would enable suppliers of energy to refocus their efforts on further developing and refining their conservation packages, which will be of greatest interest to domestic energy users.
In October 2008 in an article in the Guardian, Ed Miliband referred to the principle behind the amendment when he said he was,
“looking at the structure of tariffs so that people might no longer have to pay the highest price for the first tranche of gas and electricity they used”.
Unfortunately my party has not been exactly sympathetic to following up the original idea, primarily put off by large family energy requirements, which I have now set out to address through the core usage of electricity, the CUE. The larger the CUE, the steeper the subsequent block increases.
There is much support for the idea in Europe as countries increasingly find themselves struggling with higher energy prices. Arguments over climate change and the more efficient use of resources will inevitably take us down this route. The noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, came to my rescue during the closing moments of the debate in 2008, when he advised the House that,
“in eastern Australia this rising block tariff is used on domestic water”,—[Official Report, 28/10/08; col. 1510.]
to help conserve water supplies. I also understand that Ofgem was supposed to have had a look at my and other proposals for RBT during a recent review of energy prices. Perhaps the Minister might give an update on what happened to the Ofgem inquiry.
This system, or one based on the same principles, is utterly inevitable. The public understand what this discussion is about. Just as everybody understands the arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, in his amendment, this equally is an argument that the public understand. The public are interested as to why the energy companies insist on charging the highest prices for the lowest volume consumers. Perhaps the Minister will explain whether she thinks there is a way out of this conundrum. I beg to move.
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