Amendment 78A deals with the governance of the ONR. There is relatively little in all these pages about that governance; the amendment attempts to beef it up, in terms of who should be the independent members, or non-executive members or whatever you like to call them. It relates to two issues, which are separate and can be dealt with separately if the Government so wish, although they need to take both of them on board.
The first relates to the expertise of the members of the governing body, on nuclear safety and nuclear operations in particular. That point has been raised with us by the potential operating companies of nuclear installations. The second relates to expertise in the area of worker representation and attempts to carry over the provision that has always been there under the Health and Safety Executive and the shadow ONR.
The only reference to expertise in this section of Schedule 7 is to a non-executive member who has expertise in,
“matters relevant to the ONR’s nuclear security purposes”.
That is important; some would argue that it is very important. We know that it is different, and has different connotations, from somebody having expertise in the area of nuclear safety and operating systems for nuclear safety. We would be looking out for somebody who has industrial expertise in managing such systems and who was not a member of the ONR staff. That is, the post could not be filled by appointing the chief inspector, who would be, in any case, a member of the governing body. If I were to second-guess—although “second-guess” is probably the wrong expression—we would be looking
for somebody who can bring expertise to bear from a different perspective from that of somebody directly employed by the ONR.
The Government must have received representations—if I can put this in a subtle way—from those who very soon might be operating such a system. They want to see that those overseeing the ONR have expertise in the operation of the safety system and the general management of such sites, or at least that one of them does so.
Secondly, we have seen that the ONR is, essentially, a spin-off from the Health and Safety Executive. Since 1974, the Health and Safety Executive has operated on a tripartite basis. That has been reflected in its superstructure and, in a slightly informal way, in the oversight structure of the shadow ONR that operates under the HSE’s purposes. It has helped the engagement and co-operation of the workforce and has ensured that the worker side of operating complex plants and sites is fully taken into account. It is my contention that that needs to be reflected explicitly in the new structure. If it is not, a valuable part of the whole HSE experience will be lost; and it is unnecessary to lose it in a structure in which the ONR is responsible not only for nuclear safety but for health and safety generally on nuclear sites. It is important that we retain that structure and oversight.
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It is not just a question of not wanting to rock the boat. Worker engagement on nuclear sites is a particularly important issue. A complicated site such as Sellafield, which has huge potential hazards and where the workforce itself has huge expertise, will have to undergo a number of very difficult changes in the way in which it is operated. The co-operation and expertise of the workforce is vital; that needs to be reflected at the highest levels of the ONR. To provide confidence in the system among the several thousand people who work at Sellafield and the few hundred who work on nuclear sites elsewhere, we ought to retain the essentials of the HSE structure and the provisions of the 1974 Act.
There are two deficiencies, therefore, in the governance structure of the ONR. The first relates to expertise; the second relates to the way in which the workers themselves, or, at least, knowledge of their views, can be represented at the highest level. Unless we address both of those, the management structure underneath may not regard them as a priority to the degree that is essential if we are to make nuclear sites operate both effectively and at the highest levels of safety. I hope that the Government can take up one or both points—even if that is in a way different from the phrasing here—and will at least accept, on both fronts, the principle in these amendments. I beg to move.