Before the noble Earl sits down, can he clarify something from his earlier remarks about the Human Rights Act? I ask with a certain amount of humility but also from the perspective of one of the people who wrote the Labour Party’s policy in 1996 on the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into what became the Human Rights Act in this country. When that Act was framed, the definition of a public function, or the nature of a public function, was one which did not to a great extent anticipate the move over the next 10 to 15 years in which public services would actually be undertaken and provided by private and voluntary bodies. It simply did not do that. However, the terminology was wide enough at the time to embrace an organisation like Channel 4, which had a mix of public and private functions. It was incorporated, as I recall, into that legislation on the basis of its partial role in performing public functions.
The noble Earl seems to accept that, over time, case law can change the definition of the nature of a public function. He seems to be saying that we have to plod through the courts, case by case, to change the definition. I rather lost him when he then tried to argue that you cannot do it by groups of cases, which is effectively what this amendment does. Is the noble Earl saying that the definition of the nature of a public function—in the law as it is—cannot be changed by cases and can only be changed by amending the primary legislation itself?