My Lords, we had a considerable discussion about the creation of the rather unfortunately named oversight committee, given the dual meaning of the word “oversight”, during the passage of the Financial Services Bill, now an Act. I am broadly in sympathy with the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, has made, which carries through the logic from the ICB or the Treasury Committee—I cannot remember which had the initial discussions—through the banking commission, looking at the overall problem of Bank of England governance in the 21st century, particularly now, given its greater responsibilities.
I should like to make only one major point, which the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, and his colleagues, including the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, might like to consider, and that is the business of expertise. I entirely agree that the chairman should be a non-executive with considerable experience of prudential or financial matters. That is fine. However, Amendment 84 then says:
“The persons appointed to be non-executive members of the Bank must have—
(a) experience in the running of large organisations and financial institutions”.
That would exclude a lot of people who would be highly desirable. It would exclude Sir John Vickers, for example, and that seems to me to be undesirable. I am very much in favour of academics being in these organisations, such as Sir John Vickers, and I would not like that area of expertise to be ruled out.
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Similarly, other distinguished people who have worked for the Bank for International Settlements, or other central banks without actually running them would be appropriate in this case. While the notion of having financial expertise and expertise in prudential regulation
is entirely appropriate, the issue of running large organisations as an exclusive characteristic of those non-executive members is probably undesirable.