My Lords, we now come to Part 2 of the Bill and particularly to Clauses 74 to 77, which may be described as a failure regime for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts. Clause 74 makes amendments to the powers of CQC to issue warning notices to those bodies. Where it appears to CQC that the quality of healthcare services provided by a trust requires significant improvement, CQC will be able to highlight those areas in a new form of warning notice. This will state the reasons for CQC’s view, and it will require improvements in the quality of services to be delivered within a specified time. At the end of that period, CQC must review whether the requirements specified in the notice have been met.
Where CQC is not satisfied, it must decide what further action needs to be taken. In the case of a foundation trust, CQC’s review must include use of its power to require Monitor to put the trust into special administration. Clause 75 extends Monitor’s powers to be able to issue additional license conditions on foundation trusts when CQC has issued a warning notice. At present, Monitor can make use of these powers only if there is a failure in the governance of a foundation trust.
In the event of healthcare services provided by the trust requiring significant improvement, Monitor will as a result be able to take timely action to make changes to leadership or governance with the intention of securing improvements to those services. Clause 76 will enable Monitor to make an audit to authorise the appointment of a trust special administrator in cases where it or CQC is satisfied that there is a serious failure by an NHS foundation trust to provide healthcare services of sufficient quality and that it is appropriate to make the order. At present, Monitor is able to authorise the appointment of a trust special administrator only in cases of insolvency. Monitor may make an order when it is so satisfied, but must make the order when required to do so by CQC.
Let me say at once that the Opposition support the intention of giving greater emphasis to safety and quality and enhancing CQC’s powers in this area. Of course, we are very much influenced by the report of Robert Francis on Mid Staffordshire. We also welcome the introduction of a single failure regime, focused on quality as well as financial failure. However, I suspect that I am not the only noble Lord to have been confused by the respective roles of CQC and Monitor when reading this Bill. Indeed, I was surprised that the
Department of Health boldly claimed in its factsheet that the new failure regime will give regulators clear roles in tackling failure. I must say that I found it anything but clear. The factsheet says:
“The Care Quality Commission … will focus on exposing problems and requiring action while Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority … will focus on intervening if a poor-performing provider is unable to resolve the situation working with commissioners”.
To confuse matters further, CQC retains enforcement powers for social care, general practice and independent sector providers. That is going to be very confusing. I also pose the question as to whether there are not going to be significant risks associated with these changes. As Robert Francis made clear, regulatory complexity can contribute to system failings. It is important that we get this right, so there are a number of matters which I would like to put to the noble Earl, Lord Howe.
Does the Minister consider that with this level of complexity, there is a risk of slowdown in the action required to address failures? How will Monitor, CQC and the NHS Trust Development Authority work together to ensure that problems are acted upon? Will Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority be able to question CQC’s findings and recommendations? What happens if those three august bodies disagree about whether action is needed? Will Monitor and the NHSTDA be equipped to come to their own views on quality, or do they have to take the view of CQC on trust?
The noble Earl will know that the potential confusion has been examined recently by the Health Select Committee. Indeed, the Secretary of State explained to the Commons Health Committee that the change in the arrangements so that CQC in essence has to refer concerns to Monitor, which then takes enforcement action, is devoid, as he put it, of conflict of interest when an inspector identifies a fault then later feels obliged to say that there is no longer a fault, simply to avoid the enforcement action appearing ineffective. However, that does not apply to the other sectors. It does not apply to social care provision, general practice or the independent sector. I do not understand why there is deemed to be a conflict of interest in relation to NHS foundation trusts and NHS trusts but not the other bodies. Nor does it apply to other sector regulators, such as the Health and Safety Executive or the Civil Aviation Authority. There are plenty of examples of regulators that monitor and also take the enforcement action.
I also do not understand why, when it comes to healthcare, the NHS has a different regulatory regime from that of the private sector. Surely, there ought to be consistency in approach. The noble Earl will know that we have had the fair playing field work undertaken by Monitor, as a result of discussions on the previous Bill. It does not seem that there is a fair playing field when it comes to regulatory machinery in relation to, say, the independent sector and to the NHS, even though they are both providing services under NHS contracts. I very much welcome Amendments 65, 66 and 67, tabled by my noble friend Lord Warner, and I would add to them my Amendment 66ZA, which would ensure that the NHS is dealt with equivalently.
On the NHSTDA and the NHS trusts, there is a puzzle regarding what appears from the architecture. I think it is generally accepted that those trusts which have not yet reached foundation trust status are generally considered to be the weaker organisations, given that NHS foundation trusts were introduced quite a number of years ago now. What is puzzling is that the weaker organisations seem to come under a weaker regulatory system. I will be interested to hear my noble friend Lord Warner’s remarks concerning his amendments, but it appears to be a puzzle and an inconsistent approach.
This also takes us back to the recommendations of Robert Francis concerning the merger of regulatory functions, which he suggested in his report that the Government should consider. On the fact that the Government have got themselves into such a tangle on the respective roles of CQC and Monitor, while I can well understand nervousness about having yet another restructuring in relation, for instance, to CQC—given the number of changes that have occurred to the care regulator over the years—I worry that they have come up with such a complex solution that I wonder whether merger might not come to be seen as the easier option.
I would also like to raise some issues about the process under which the failure regime takes place. I start with my Amendment 64A, in relation to the Section 29A warning notice under Clause 74(3). Can the noble Earl give some indication of how the significant improvement required is to be defined and assessed? Can he also say how proportionate CQC will be? Under proposed new Section 29A(2)(a) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, which is introduced in Clause 74(3), a warning notice will state,
“that the Commission has formed the view that the quality of health care provided by the trust requires significant improvement”.
Is there not a need to clarify either in the Bill or in secondary legislation how “significant improvement” is to be defined and assessed and, specifically, how and where the warning notice applies given the number of multisite trusts offering a wide range of services?
In Clause 75, reference is made to Monitor’s imposition of licence conditions. What criteria will impact on Monitor’s decision to impose those licence conditions? Should they not be subject to statutory guidance, given the serious impact of their imposition? In view of the service implications for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts of CQC and Monitor interventions, ought there not to be a clear appeals process for providers, given the potential serious consequences for an individual trust or a local health economy of a warning notice or a “failure to comply” administration, both for the provider concerned and the other providers that may be affected by that decision?
My Amendment 66ZB deals with the multisite issue by requiring CQC to define how this is to be assessed. My Amendments 66ZD and 66ZE seek to have published the Monitor criteria under which a licence condition is issued following a warning notice. When such a warning notice is issued, a foundation trust should have the right to appeal under my Amendment 66ZC, which is consequential on Amendment 66ZE. The same principles apply to Clause 76 in relation to the regulator. CQC must surely publish criteria on following a transparent
process in making judgments on trust special administration, where there also ought to be an appeals procedure.
It seems that there is a lot of work to be done to make sure that the health service and other providers fully understand the new regulatory apparatus that is to be brought into being. I remain concerned that there could be confusion between the two roles of Monitor and CQC and that the NHS Trust Development Authority’s role is rather mysterious. It is hard to understand why NHS trusts are not in fact subject to a much more robust process than other providers because, as far as I can see, apart from a number of community trusts which are likely to get foundation trust status, the intention is that we simply roll on for years to come with these unviable organisations. Money is clearly top-sliced in order to keep them going, and we know that the real issue is, in many cases, a failure to tackle reconfiguration. It is a worry that almost a limbo situation is being created in which no progress at all is going to be made. There is also a very clear need for due process as to how these licensing provisions are to operate and an appeal process for any organisation that is affected by them.
If the noble Earl, Lord Howe, would agree to the principle of that, I think he could look forward to general support within the health service and outside and, of course, public confidence. The overriding principle of making sure that quality and safety are considered at the same level, or even a higher level, than that of financial viability is one that we certainly support from these Benches. I beg to move.
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