My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, in particularly my noble friend Lord Marks for highlighting in his contribution the importance of both family matters and, of course, sensitive issues of faith, which is also relevant to a fair percentage of our prison population.
This group of amendments would place an additional duty on responsible officers instructing offenders under the new rehabilitation activity requirement created by Clause 13, and would also place a new duty on the courts when imposing community orders and suspended orders more generally. To address first the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about organisations’ or providers’ commercial interests right away, it would be wrong and totally inappropriate for those to supersede any other offender requirements. The whole point of rehabilitation is putting the offender at the centre.
I do not agree with the noble Lord’s three cohorts—the groups he put together. Even the no-hopers are worth a try. We need to ensure, in all the reforms we put forward, that anyone—even people whom society at large perceives as no-hopers—is worth a try. We should seek to assist them to become productive citizens of society.
Noble Lords may also find it helpful if I briefly explain what Clause 13 provides. It creates a new rehabilitation activity requirement that will combine key elements of the existing supervision and activity requirements available under community orders and suspended sentence orders. At present Section 213 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for a supervision requirement that may be imposed as part of either order. The requirement involves attending appointments during the period of the order with either the responsible officer or another person determined by the responsible officer. Section 201 of the 2003 Act provides for an activity requirement as part of either order. Under an activity requirement, an offender must first, present himself to a person specified in the order for a specified number of days, and secondly, participate in activities specified in the order for a specified number of days.
Clause 13 repeals both those requirements and merges them into a single rehabilitation activity requirement. Under the new requirement, offenders must comply with any instructions given by their responsible officer to attend appointments, participate
in activities, or both. These instructions must be given with a view to promoting the offender’s rehabilitation, although they can serve other purposes as well. The effect of the clause is to allow the probation provider who is the responsible officer, rather than the court, to decide the exact details of what appointments or activities the offender should take part in to maximise their chances of turning away from crime.
Amendment 26 would require a responsible officer who is instructing an offender to attend appointments or participate in activities under this new requirement to take account of the offender’s family circumstances and, of course, any caring responsibilities that the offender might have. That would mean ensuring that appointments were suitable, that activities were compatible with the offender’s family circumstances, and that any place to which the offender was sent to take part in activities was suitable if the offender needed to take a child with them.
Amendment 30, although inserted into the clause about programme requirements, would apply to all requirements under any community order or suspended sentence order. It adds to the provision in Section 217 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that already requires a court to avoid, as far as possible, any conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs and any interference with his or her work or education. The amendment would add to Section 217 a new duty requiring the court to avoid—again as far as is practicable—any interference with the offender’s ability to carry out any caring responsibilities that he or she might have.
As I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate, the criminal justice system at all points endeavours to accommodate the personal circumstances of an offender. Courts will always sentence an offender in the light of their individual circumstances, together with the circumstances of the offence. Indeed, the law requires, where a court imposes a community order, that the requirements chosen must be, in the court’s opinion, the most suitable for the offender.
In addition to these general requirements, I can assure all noble Lords that there are already important safeguards in place to address childcare and other caring responsibilities where an offender is sentenced by the courts. These issues are covered in the assessments carried out when compiling pre-sentence and other reports that are considered by the courts before sentencing.
Probation staff will also respond to requests by the courts for specific information about family circumstances and courts will sometimes adjourn briefly so that such issues can be considered. If an offender is reluctant to divulge information about their children for fear that they may be taken into care, a post-sentence interview will often elicit the necessary information or the offender might tell their lawyer. If necessary, liaison will take place with local authority safeguarding authorities, or social security emergency duty teams, to safeguard the child or vulnerable person in question. In addition, the Sentencing Council has made it clear in its guidelines that:
“Where the offender is the sole or primary carer of the victim or other dependants, this potentially should be taken into account for sentencing purposes, regardless of whether the offender is male or female”.
Both courts and responsible officers are public authorities within the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998. This means that they are required to balance the need for the offender to attend appointments and take part in activities in order to secure his rehabilitation against his right under the Human Rights Act to respect for his private and family life. This point was well made by my noble friend Lord Marks.
What this adds up to is a clear indication that the courts already take all possible steps to avoid, as far as is practicable, any interference with the offender’s ability to discharge any caring responsibilities that he or she may have. For this reason, I argue that Amendment 30 is unnecessary. With these assurances and clarifications, I hope that my noble friend will be minded to withdraw his amendment.