My Lords, I have been in this House long enough to have an expectation that this would be a high-quality debate. I can confirm that my expectations have been exceeded. This was a very good debate which showed that noble Lords have focused on the issues and is the precursor to a valuable process being undertaken as we go through Committee and subsequent stages of the Bill.
Clearly, the Bill deals with what I called a very damaging historic market failure. Various noble Lords, such as the noble Lords, Lord Avebury, Lord Alton and Lord Browne, implied that it might have been rather more than that. Indeed, it was implied that there might have been reckless behaviour. Observations have also been made about the way in which the paperwork was dealt with. To be blunt, many people in the insurance industry would admit that that was the case.
This is not the Bill I wanted to bring to the House. I will explain why that is the case because it is very important that noble Lords should understand that. I wanted to find a way of allocating responsibility to the companies that had engaged in the relevant business in the year in question so that we could levy a specific charge on those companies for the business for which they were responsible over the relevant period. We would thus have allocated the responsibility where it should lie. I spent a lot of time and, indeed, some of the DWP’s money, researching that proposition. However, I came to the conclusion that such a course of action was legally too risky in a most litigious environment. Therefore, we have moved to a second-best position, the implications of which are driving many of the shortfalls that noble Lords have pointed out vigorously tonight, because it is one thing to say that there is a moral imperative to look after the individuals suffering from this terrible disease and their dependants but it is another to pin the responsibility on companies which, frankly, had nothing to do with it. We are looking to insurers in the employers’ liability market to fund this provision through the levy and we are looking at the appropriate level of levy in that marketplace when direct blame cannot necessarily be attributed. That is why the scheme is designed in the way that it is and why various constraints are in place.
I think that I heard support for the principles of the scheme. We can get money to the sufferers regardless of whether the insurance records have been lost. In general terms it is right that we look to the insurance industry to provide this support, not least because this situation is a horrific blemish on its reputation which it will, and does, want to correct and mitigate.
We need to help the insurance industry to impose this levy. It cannot do it on a voluntary basis, which would have been the ideal position and the one which I would have preferred. It needs the legislative support because it is a disparate industry with very many different players in it.
We are clearly going to spend a lot of time going through the detailed questions raised. As I will be going through them in Committee, I do not intend to spend a lot of time going through everything now, but I will try to pick up the main themes. I need to add something that I admitted to earlier, my thanks—which several Lords have mentioned—to the victims’ groups and the trade unions for all the work they have done and for which I am personally most grateful.
Before I get into the drier stuff of this, I must add that many noble Lords talked about the human stories. Nearly all of us will know someone who has gone through this, and there is an awareness here that in many ways this is one of the worst diseases to get. I
acknowledge that. The noble Lords, Lord Giddens and Lord Monks, and many other noble Lords made that point and told us some stories to remind us.
One of the key issues raised by virtually all noble Lords—too many to mention individually—was about setting the figure at 70%. There was a real juggling act about what the right level of levy is, and that is something we can spend more time in Committee debating. If we set the levy too high, in practice what will happen is that it will just raise the amount to be paid and the insurers will pass on virtually all of it to British industry, which is something I was very keen not to see. There is a lot of economics around this, but if you set a small level in a reasonably competitive market, most of it will probably be absorbed by the insurance industry, which should do so, rather than by British industry, which should not be required to absorb it. There is a real balancing act in the amount of money that it is sensible to raise this way to get to the victims, and that is the main driver here. It is not, I want to emphasise, the behavioural incentives that have been floating around. That is not what we are doing here. We are trying to get a balance of funding.
The second issue is, because we went early—theoretically one can start doing a levy like this only at the time at which it becomes law—we have gone from the date of the formal announcement, from which point the insurance industry can start to reserve. However, one of the issues coming from that is that in the first year, we effectively have to make over three years’-worth of payments, and noble Lords will see the problem instantly. There is suddenly a very large levy in one year of the kind that is very difficult to absorb. That is the reason that we have worked to smooth that first year over four years, so that we do not get these sudden large amounts, but it is a constraint. I shall not go into the detail tonight of how difficult all this is to do, although perhaps in Committee I could be persuaded to open my heart a little about particular Treasury rules, levies that are treated like taxes and why the Treasury, which collects taxes, should give the DWP any money to make payments.