I accept some of the points that the hon. Gentleman made. That is why I said that the record of DOHL had been mixed. Sometimes there has been improvement in performance, but that is not the case for all the franchises it runs. That is my reason for not being confident that it is the right organisation to take on such a large increase in its workload, particularly without any further increase in its resources, including some operators that are performing better than the train companies that he mentioned.
We want every contract that is awarded to place a duty on DOHL to look at how to modernise our network and to ensure that passengers are at the forefront of all decision making—passengers not just in urban areas and around London but, crucially, in rural areas and places that have traditionally been under-served by the rail network. Time and again, the Secretary of State
has said that her No. 1 priority is passengers—that she will protect their interests above all else, and that it is for them that she is seeking this change. This is a chance to put her money where her mouth is and create a legal duty that promotes the needs of passengers in all future agreements with public sector operators. That will build in a layer of accountability on things that we all agree are important.
On amendment 8, public bodies marking their own homework is not something that Opposition Members believe leads to good results. I know from my time in government that independent scrutiny makes life harder for Ministers, but it also improves accountability, and with that outcomes. That is why we seek to introduce proper financial reporting and oversight for public sector operators. Under the franchise system, whatever its shortcomings, train operators are incentivised to increase passenger numbers and control costs. That has been an undeniable success of privatisation. Passenger numbers have doubled and costs have been controlled, increasing at a far slower rate than revenue.
In future, passengers and taxpayers will have to foot the bill for any loss of control on costs, any inefficiencies or any failures to innovate. That is a serious implication, and something we should do our best to protect people from. Creating, or recreating, some incentives is a good place to start. We will need to know how well the public train companies are performing—what they are doing to increase passenger numbers and drive growth in rail services, how reliable their services are, how well they are keeping costs under control, and how satisfied passengers are with the service they provide.
Our proposals will allow us to identify both good and bad performance, hold the managers of those companies to account and reward them accordingly, such as by linking managerial pay to performance. Those companies will no longer have shareholders to answer to, or the financial incentives that go with a senior role in the private sector. The Government have told us that part of their rationale for these changes is to better align the incentives of train operators with the interests of passengers, but the Bill currently provides no mechanism for that. We are not seeking to frustrate a change that this Government were elected to deliver; we simply wish to bring proper transparency and accountability to the process. That includes reporting on the costs involved in bringing operating companies into public ownership.
Government Members will no doubt point to the money that will be saved by removing management fees, but this equation is not one-sided. While the Secretary of State might be saving £150 million each year on fees, industry experts have predicted that the Bill could cost passengers and taxpayers up to £1 billion a year in lost productivity and growth—and that is before accounting for the Government’s taking on all the long-term liabilities of the companies. Pension obligations, rolling stock and long-term leases will all be transferred on to the Government balance sheet, and we have had alarmingly little information on what that figure will be.