Thank you, Mr Speaker.
This legislation is needed to clarify the sanction measures for which HMRC is solely responsible for enforcing on those it would investigate on referral from OTSI. It will therefore establish a consistent approach to the enforcement of trade sanctions. It will facilitate HMRC and OTSI working in close partnership so that they can robustly enforce all trade sanctions against Russia and other target countries using civil and criminal powers.
On the financial sanctions side, the statutory instrument also includes new obligations for persons designated under the Belarus regime to report any assets they own, hold or control in the UK or worldwide as a UK person to the relevant authorities. The measure is another step in improving the transparency of assets owned, held or controlled in the UK by designated persons and will strengthen the ability of HM Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation—OFSI—to implement and enforce UK financial sanctions.
Importantly, the measure will act as a dual verification by enabling the comparison of disclosures by designated persons against existing reporting requirements that bite on firms such as financial institutions. Under the new requirement, the Government will be able to penalise those who make deliberate attempts to conceal assets to escape the effects of sanctions. An equivalent reporting obligation was placed on designated persons under the Russia regime in December 2023. The extension of this requirement to Belarus ensures alignment between the Russia and Belarus regimes, which is particularly vital given the frequent overlap of the Belarus and Russia sanctions regimes and the co-operation between the two states in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
We have also included several sanctions on Belarus on the export of so-called battlefield goods, which include goods such as electronic equipment, integrated circuits and firearms and aerospace technology. These new measures prohibit the import of Belarusian aluminium into the UK—both the metal itself and aluminium products. Aluminium products are a sector of strategic importance to Belarus and have been its top export to the UK. Although the UK nexus with the Belarusian economy is limited, the signalling impact of our sanctions on Belarus is, and will remain, important. We keep these sanctions under constant review and reserve the right to introduce further measures so that the Lukashenko regime continues to feel the consequences of its lack of respect for human rights and its support for Putin’s war.
Finally, we are also revoking the Burundi sanctions regime. That will remove an empty regime from the statute books. The decision in 2019 not to transpose
into UK law designations under the original 2015 EU sanctions regime reflected the improved political situation in Burundi. We do not have the same level of concern about the widespread political violence in Burundi that led to the original decision to impose the regime, so we have made no designations under it. As we set out in the recent UK sanctions strategy, the Government keep their regimes under review and respond to changing circumstances. We are committed to lifting a regime out of a specific measure or revoking a designation when the original objective is no longer served by its continuance.
To conclude, sanctions continue to play an important part in the UK, which continues to build on its already impressive sanctions capability. In the years since the landmark Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, our approach to sanctions has evolved considerably to respond to the changes in the world. We will continue to work on sanctions to meet any new challenges. I commend the regulations to the House.
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