I take the hon. and learned Lady’s point. We are obviously adhering to that, but as a rule of the Court.
Moving on, I was glad to read recently, whether in a press release or in a tweet—I cannot recall—the Home Secretary saying she was glad that constructive talks were now taking place between representatives of the British Government and members of the European Court of Human Rights, focused on resolving that issue. I say that is good because I think it should be possible to resolve that issue, since it is a rule of the Court rather than a principle of human rights. I hope we can move on from there.
If I may say so, with great respect, I do not accept that that decision in itself justifies these two amendments. I think both are weak for legal and constitutional reasons, and I will set out why. First, on amendment 131, my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Mr Clarke) said that he had relied on a paper written for Policy Exchange by Richard Ekins and Sir Stephen Laws. I challenge the expertise of both those people—I question it. One of them has contacted me in the past, but neither are practitioners, and it shows in their writing that they are not regularly in court.