I notice the Minister is listening very carefully indeed.
Why is there a “compelling evidence” requirement? More importantly, is that not totally inconsistent with the test of real risk? That is the point of amendment 83. The danger is that even a probability of “serious and
irreversible harm” will not be enough because of the type of evidence that can realistically be provided in the ludicrously tight timescale provided for.
On timeframes, we have various amendments to challenge the time periods that have been formally set out by the Government. The notion that eight days is enough time for an application is for the birds, as we know from the chaotic processes used during previous attempts to remove people to Rwanda, when many who were served notice barely understood what was happening. Language barriers, difficulties in access to solicitors and legal aid, the requirements of prescribed forms and demands for compelling evidence in the application mean that eight days will never happen. Those processes give rise to the risk that even those who could in theory make a challenge will miss out unjustly.
On that very important point, can the Minister provide clarity on how he will ensure that legal advice is accessible and, importantly, what his Government’s position is on the availability of legal aid? Those are hugely important issues that are not really touched on in the Bill.
Given the ludicrously restricted timeframes, the restrictions on “out of time” claims in clause 44 are frightening. Our amendments from amendment 101 onward seek to challenge that. This time “compelling evidence” of a “compelling reason” for missing the eight-day deadline is required. What on earth does that mean? Is an inability to understand the notice, language difficulties or the impossibility of finding a solicitor sufficient? More fundamentally, are the Government saying it is okay to remove someone who is certainly going to face “serious and irreversible harm” just because they were a few hours late with the paperwork and did not have a decent excuse for that? It makes absolutely no sense.
The seven-day timeframe for appeals to be lodged in clause 47 is equally absurd for all those reasons. Again, how will access to legal advice and legal aid be ensured? Who did the Government consult when putting together that challenging timeframe? Why have the Government chosen to bypass the first-tier tribunal? Why are the Government suggesting using first-tier employment law judges to assess difficult issues of removal and serious harm?
Some will have an even more difficult route to challenge a refusal if the Home Secretary decides that a claim is “clearly unfounded”. The clauses do not seem to make any sense. If, as seems to be the case, to make a valid application someone needs to provide compelling evidence of harm, it is difficult to see how any valid application containing such compelling evidence can be deemed clearly unfounded. Going beyond that, the grounds for appeal to the upper-tier tribunal are, again, objectionably difficult. Just to get permission to appeal, compelling evidence of serious or irreversible harm is required, assessed on the papers with no further right of appeal. Our amendments to clause 43 seek to rectify that.
We object to the Bill instructing the tribunal how to do its work, in particular how to make assessments of fact. Judges—not the Secretary of State—should determine what new matters can be considered, and what evidence and facts are relevant to their decisions. Our amendments to clauses 46 and 47 and various other clauses seek to protect the independence of the tribunal. We object
strongly to the ouster clause in clause 48, in particular the restrictions on the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session.
Amendments 100 and 108 seek to challenge restrictions on onward rights of appeal. These are serious and significant issues of profound importance. Removing the oversight of the courts is unacceptable and unconstitutional. We had a well-developed and functioning system of appeals and judicial oversight. The Government should stop dismantling it. Instead, the Bill will leave most people seeking to assert their rights able to do so only after they have been removed. The notion that such challenges can be successfully undertaken from thousands of miles away is absurd.
The fundamental question is, what happens if someone is successful in making a suspensive case? All that clause 45 states is that they cannot be removed; it does not allow them access to the asylum process or any other assessment of their case. They, like tens of thousands of others who cannot be removed simply because there is nowhere to remove them to, will be left in limbo—a limbo that is disastrous for the taxpayer but life-destroying for the individuals involved. A desperate outcome from a desperate Bill.
Finally, although we support almost all the other amendments and new clauses tabled by Opposition Members, we have concerns about new clauses 23 and 25. New clause 23 would require the Secretary of State to use her broad discretion to put in place a fast-track asylum procedure for so-called “low grant-rate countries”. It contains an amazingly wide definition of a low grant-rate country, which would include nationalities where 49% of applicants had successfully sought asylum.
New clause 25 has aspects that are fine, but crucial to what it tries to do are co-operation agreements for the removal of people who have had claims declared inadmissible. However, there is no definition of “inadmissible” separate from the definition in clauses 2 and 4. That goes to the heart of all of the problems with the Bill. We will continue to listen carefully to what is said about those new clauses, but we are concerned that they need further work.
In short, we oppose every aspect of the Bill. We object to the outrageous timeframe for its consideration and to the lack of impact assessment before we debate it. Our amendments try to mitigate some of its worst aspects but, ultimately, it remains an unlawful Bill completely and utterly beyond repair.