The right hon. Gentleman is right, and it is also true that we found out about Binyam Mohamed only because of extended legal cases in the courts,
which were resisted by the agencies at every turn. We know about Rangzieb Ahmed only because I got access to the in-camera papers. So this is a general problem and I will come back to that. A most recent example is Jagtar Singh Johal, who alleges that he was tortured by Indian authorities and was detained, we believe, as a result of British intelligence. Again, we know about that only because we could spot the case inside one of the commissioner’s reports. Accordingly, exactly because of that, this is literally the tip of the iceberg.
The Intelligence and Security Committee report on detainee mistreatment found 232 cases where UK personnel
“continued to supply questions or intelligence”
to other intelligence services, after they
“knew or suspected that the detainee had been or was being mistreated.”
As I said, I have seen in-camera evidence that showed quite how deliberate some of those decisions were—absolutely in the knowledge that they would be used in the process of torture. That was done rather more broadly, even when the intelligence services did not know at all where the detainee was being held, or even whether they were being held legally or not. Those are the consequences of vague legislation that awarded too much power to the authorities.
We might therefore expect clause 27 to tighten up over-loose legislation to make Ministers, officials and agents more conscious of their responsibilities, not less. Instead, it does the exact opposite. Clause 27 would provide an exemption to schedule 4 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Schedule 4 sets out the circumstances in which assisting and encouraging a crime that occurs overseas is still a criminal offence. Clause 27 means that it would no longer be an offence to assist a crime overseas where someone’s behaviour is necessary for
“the proper exercise of any function of the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ or...the armed forces.”
In plain English, that would effectively insulate Ministers and officials from responsibility for assisting or encouraging heinous overseas crimes.
To see the potential impact of that, consider the case of Abdel Hakim Belhaj. Mr Belhaj, a Libyan dissident living in exile, was detained and subsequently tortured in both Thailand and Libya. It later emerged that UK information sharing had contributed to his detention and rendition. After years of litigation and wrangling, the Prime Minister wrote a letter of apology to Mr Belhaj, and the Government admitted responsibility for the role that UK intelligence played in his rendition. That was a civil rather than a criminal case, but if officials are certain that they will not face any criminal liability for assisting torture and other serious crimes abroad, reckless information sharing of the kind seen in Mr Belhaj’s case will occur more frequently and with more impunity.
I understand that one reason for the change in the clause is apparently to allow the easier transfer of bulk data. That is an especially risky activity to which to give legal cover. The transfer of bulk data is a euphemism for saying that we give the Americans—principally—so much data that we do not have time to check it all. That is it in a nutshell. As Edward Snowden revealed, that has historically amounted to unimaginably vast quantities of data, of course about suspects, but also about innocent
people. Because of the high level of secrecy that applies to current bulk data issues, I have no current UK example to hand, but I can exemplify this by outlining the behaviour of our closest ally, and the principal recipient of bulk data, the United States.
The greatly respected President of the USA, Mr Barack Obama, used to go to the White House Situation Room on a Tuesday once a month to authorise a kill list—20 people who were going to be assassinated by the United States and who were perceived to be its enemies; typically, al-Qaeda officials and the like. President Obama talked proudly of how the best technology—artificial intelligence, algorithms and, crucially, bulk data—was being used to identify targets.
However, that comes with enormous risks, most plainly shown by the case of Ahmad Zaidan, who was selected for targeting by the US National Security Agency based on algorithms using bulk data. Fortunately, he was not assassinated. I say “fortunately” because there had been analysis of his telephone contacts and he had talked to Osama bin Laden and all the al-Qaeda high command, but, before the drone strike was organised, it was suddenly realised that he was the Pakistan office head of Al Jazeera. The analysis had thrown up an innocent man who could have been assassinated.
That is why we must be careful about what is handed over without knowledge of the bulk data. If we give greater legal cover to officials sending bulk data to other countries, cases of bulk data being used in the commission of serious crimes abroad—even against innocent people—will happen more frequently.
4.45 pm
The powers given by the so-called “007 clause” are already too loose. Further loosening of the powers of the security and intelligence services could lead to further mistakes of execution and policy. Even slight carve-outs could lead to major problems. Under clause 27, the intelligence services or armed forces would be exempted if they are carrying out their proper function, but it is not clear what that will mean in practice. I have probably been one of the major critics in this House of torture and rendition, but I never believed that our officials were motivated by anything other than patriotic duty. I knew a large number of them, including the Ministers and senior officials involved, and they were not psychopaths. They thought that they were protecting our country and our national security. They thought that they were carrying out their proper function. However, intending to do good does not make evil right, and that is what happened. It has undermined both the liberty and the honour of our nation. In the week after Remembrance Sunday, we should remember that.
In the law, there is already a defence of acting reasonably. There is no obvious reason to go further than that. The dangers of doing so are stark; I hope that I have exemplified them. Instead, clause 27 creates an unnecessary carve-out for officials and Ministers. How can we reasonably criticise Saudi Arabia or Russia when they carry out foreign assassinations if they can point to our creating a law that allows us to do the same? For that reason, and that reason alone, I stress that I want the House to strike down the clause.
We are short on time, so I will talk only to amendment 12, which would take out clause 83. That clause will allow the courts to reduce damages paid to people who have
suffered as a result of a crime—maybe torture—carried out by us. Again, it is, along with all the reductions of damages proposals, unnecessary. I will give not my view but that of the Government’s own independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. First, he said that, given the existing legislation, why do we need anything else? Secondly, he said that the new provisions
“introduce a lower threshold than under the 2001 Act”
and that the lower threshold for final deprivation of property is “novel”—by that, he means that it is dangerous. Finally, he said that the courts will already give “appropriate respect” to the views of the Government, so why do we need to go further?
Much of the Bill is important and necessary, but it is incredibly important that we learn from our own history, and in the last 20 years that history has been tragic. We should learn not to repeat that tragedy.