I assure the House that no Minister in my position could accept amendment 1, which was proposed by the House of Lords and has been tabled by the hon. Member for North East Fife (Wendy Chamberlain).
No Government could commit to ensuring that contributions remained affordable or that scheme closures were not accelerated. We cannot be bound to ensure that all schemes that are expected to remain open are treated differently from other schemes, as open schemes in that category do not all share the same characteristics. As I have made clear, some such schemes will be maturing, just like closed schemes; the potential for abuse would open up. A closed scheme could reopen to very small numbers of new members, circumvent safeguards and pursue a riskier investment strategy that would otherwise be inappropriate. We do not want good schemes to close unnecessarily or to introduce a one-size-fits-all regime. I refer briefly to the Pensions Regulator’s comments in paragraph 475 of the consultation:
“We acknowledge that if such schemes do continue to admit new entrants and do not mature then the scheme will not actually reach significant maturity. We are content that such a scheme retains the same flexibility in its funding and investment strategies that all immature schemes have.”
Similar comments are made later, and I refer hon. Members to the statements I made at great length in Committee.
I turn now to amendments 2 to 5. I dealt briefly with the points made by the right hon. Gentleman the Chair of the Select Committee about clause 125 and the work we have done. Let me be clear that that clause will ensure that transfers will not go ahead if the conditions set out in the regulations are not met. Those conditions can relate to the destination of a transfer, so that transfers can be prevented to schemes that do not have the right authorisations or if a member has not supplied the evidence of employment or residency, for example.
Importantly, those conditions can also include other red flags, such as who else is involved in the transfer. If those red flags are apparent, the regulations will enable
trustees to refuse to transfer if the red flag is significant or to direct the member to guidance or information that they must take prior to being allowed to transfer. Trustees will also need to undertake due diligence to establish whether those conditions are met.
Clause 125 puts trustees in the driving seat in relation to permitting transfers to proceed. I make it clear that we will continue to work with the Work and Pensions Committee, the Treasury Committee, the various advisory groups and the all-party parliamentary group on pension scams, with whose members I have had detailed meetings in the past month, to ensure how we can have the best possible regulations to determine circumstances in which different conditions for transfers might apply.
I now move on to the dashboard amendments. I welcome the support in the House for the dashboard; I am particularly grateful to the various contributions that made it clear that this part of the legislation is absolutely transformational, bringing pensions information into the 21st century. I accept entirely what was made clear by the hon. Member for Wallasey: this is a huge project, involving tens of thousands of schemes that will need to be brought forward. The first dashboard will have a “find and view” capability only. At an appropriate time in the future, dashboards may act as a safe space for supporting and safeguarding financial transactions. That will be fully considered and informed by user testing and safeguards, and protections would continue to apply.
However, I resist the amendments in respect of transactions. We have discussed at great length the likelihood of the need for individuals to have a greater say on their pensions. Why would we seek to exclude consolidation going forward? Transactions are not clearly defined in the amendments; they could prevent dashboards from providing useful modelling tools that could inform people of the potential benefits of increasing their contributions. As I made clear to colleagues making the case for the amendments, the consumer association Which? has come out comprehensively against them. It states in its submission on Second Reading:
“we do not agree that the introduction of commercial dashboards should be delayed, or that the transactions should be banned.”
It then goes into more detail:
“there is a need to protect consumers from the risk of commercial dashboards…However, this must be done via the introduction of consumer protections and regulatory oversight rather than a blanket ban.”
The point is also made strongly that the Opposition amendments risk us being left with a dashboard that does not do as much as initially anticipated, resulting in consumers not being as engaged. That could represent a huge missed opportunity. It is crucial that dashboards are both safe and fully functioning to give consumers the most choice and the most exposure to innovation. Therefore, with respect, I will resist the dashboard amendments.
Clause 118 of the Bill, and the FCA regulated activity, will enable the creation of both regulations and FCA rules, which could include signposting to MaPS guidance. The pensions dashboards programme usability working group will explore how best to help users understand the information presented to them and where they can get more help.
In respect of costs and charges, I raised that in great detail in Committee, but colleagues will be aware that the Government intend, and have legislated, that costs and charges should be part of dashboards in the future, just like they will be in the simpler statement. That is legislated for in clause 119(2), and it is appropriate that we proceed with that only once the dashboard delivery group has consulted in a proper way.
As to the restrictions on multiple dashboards for one year, I made the point in Committee that in creating dashboards we need to go where the consumer is rather than forcing the consumer to come to us. That surely is the essence of this issue: it will increase engagement with pensions, and we should reach people where they are. We should not seek to constrain options available but ensure that all opportunities are properly regulated, safe to use and secure.
I turn to the amendments to clause 124—the climate change clause—tabled by the Labour Front Benchers. I am afraid the reality is that Labour’s proposals would direct investment, breach fiduciary duties and lead to divestment and negative outcomes. We want the transformation of the United Kingdom economy and the retrofitting of the country to happen in a partnership with business, legislators, pension schemes and citizens, but I am afraid the amendment would negatively affect that. It would be entirely the wrong way forward.
Labour’s proposal is roundly criticised by the PLSA in a letter in which it strongly endorsed and advocated the Government’s proposals to ensure that the appropriate governance frameworks are in place to support schemes investing in a climate-aware way. It expressed deep concern about the Opposition amendment. With the PLSA’s permission, I will put its letter of 12 November in the House of Commons Library. Likewise, I will put in the Library a letter dated 13 November 2020 from the independent Association of Pension Lawyers, which also massively opposes that proposal. The reality is, the Government are already taking powers to require trustees to set targets in relation to their management of climate risk. We consulted on the use of those powers in August. Our consultation, “Taking action on climate risk”—I note, interestingly, that Labour Front Benchers did not respond to the consultation; I question whether they have even read it—sets them out in great detail.
This is the factual reality: we are already doing what is in the key parts of the amendment in clause 124 as introduced in the House of Lords. In the space of two years, the DWP has made regulations on environmental, social and governance criteria, on stewardship investment and now, in clause 124, on mandatory climate change governance and reporting. We need to allow our proposed policy measures to take effect before reviewing their impact and contemplating further measures. Of the 50 large pension schemes I wrote to last year, 70% are going well beyond the minimum legal requirements. Many have gone considerably further in the past 12 months, as nudged and persuaded by the Government. Fiduciaries do not need such a blunt measure in order to act, so we strongly reject the amendment.
I will turn now to the new clauses, and I will address them in some detail to the best of my ability. I will, if I may, deal with the relatively easy ones. I entirely endorse the view that this Government must bring forward legislation in respect of superfunds in the fullness of
time. The hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde (Jonathan Reynolds) will understand that that would be a substantial piece of legislation—certainly a 50-clause Bill and possibly more. I entirely accept that further work must be done in this Parliament on automatic enrolment, but I cannot accept new clause 3 or new clause 6.
8.45 pm
In respect of the submissions in relation to plumbers’ pensions, I have met a number of the individuals concerned and I completely understand and sympathise with the difficulty that they have been through. New clause 4 is a proposal not to collect debt below the 0.5% threshold. It would mean that every time it was applied, the employer covenant would be weakened, potentially—I accept the word is potentially—increasing the risk that thousands of members would not get their benefits in full.
However, the crucial point is surely this: the current legislation already provides a discretion for trustees not to pursue employers’ debts if they decide that it would be too costly or too lengthy to seek a recovery. Trustees also have the flexibility to collect reduced employer debts without compromising their Pension Protection Fund backing if they are funded above a section 179 basis, but, with no disrespect to the proponents of these measures, this is a decision ultimately for the trustees to take and it is the trustees who need to look at themselves to consider whether they wished to pursue this debt—