I have responded to the latter point on the judgment that we have made in relation to this regime and how we believe that deep retrospective oversight is the right approach. This is distinct from phones or cameras. The use of CHIS requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal qualities of that CHIS, which then enables very precise and safe tasking. There are different elements to how this operates, and the experience and highly trained nature of the authorising officer in some ways informs the relevant authorising level that is specified within the guidance. Robust retrospective oversight is provided equally by the commissioner himself, to give further assurance.
If I may, I shall turn to a separate point about specific public authorities’ ability to grant a criminal conduct authorisation. The RIPA already lists a range of public authorities that use CHIS for general investigative purposes. Far fewer public authorities will be able to grant a criminal conduct authorisation. Only those public authorities that have demonstrated a clear operational need for the tactic are able to use the power. These are the intelligence agencies, the police, the National Crime Agency, the armed forces, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and 10 other public authorities. Pausing momentarily on this list, I want to highlight the role that these wider public authorities also have in investigating and preventing serious criminal activity. The Environment Agency, for example, investigates the illegal dumping of toxic waste that can permanently harm our environment. The Serious Fraud Office investigates complex fraud cases that risk costing the public millions of pounds. The Food Standards Agency investigates deliberate mislabelling and the sale of unsafe food to the public. HMRC tackles the money laundering and trafficking of illicit goods that would risk significant damage to the economy.
We expect the wider public authorities to have only limited use of this power, because a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted only where it is necessary and proportionate to the criminality it is seeking to frustrate. There will, however, be occasions where CHIS will be critical in providing the intelligence to prevent, detect and prosecute serious crimes. This is increasingly important as organised crime groups expand into areas overseen by these public authorities.
This is an important and necessary Bill—