I have always listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman says. He knows a lot about nuclear and deserves attention particularly on this Bill and every other nuclear subject that comes up. He accuses me of nit-picking—politely, as always—and then nit-picks about the language in my amendment, which I do hope he has read and which I will explain more about now. We do nit-pick in Parliament, though, because everyone is trying their best to get it right, and I accept that language can mean everything. I am sure that “nit-picking” is a parliamentary word, Madam Deputy Speaker. If it is not, I still fully accept it from him.
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Under the amendment in lieu, if any principal international agreements are not signed, which is everybody’s fear, and no other equivalent arrangements in respect of unsigned agreements have been made, the Secretary of State would have to ask the EU for the corresponding Euratom arrangements to continue to have effect in place of the unsigned agreements. The relevant agreements are: the voluntary offer agreement and additional protocol with the IAEA and the four priority nuclear co-operation agreements—with the USA, Canada, Japan and Australia.
The amendment in lieu provides a sensible compromise that addresses the central concerns of parliamentarians about the possibility of a cliff edge while removing the technical—we could say “nit-picking”, in honour of the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock)—issues. It addresses the valid points that he and others have made about a cliff edge. It specifically names only the agreements that the UK needs to avoid disruption to our civil nuclear trade and co-operation, whereas Lords amendment 3 refers to agreements entered into more broadly. We have prioritised putting in place bilateral NCAs with those countries that have a legal or policy requirement for an NCA to be in place for civil nuclear trade to continue. As I have said, those countries are the USA, Canada, Australia, and Japan.
The amendment in lieu creates a two-part test, in respect of international agreements and other arrangements, for existing Euratom arrangements to continue to apply after exit day. Amendment 3 was tabled before the agreement with the EU on the terms of an implementation period, whereas the amendment in lieu is capable of taking account of such a period. That implementation period, by meeting hon. Members’ wish for assurance of continuity in nuclear safeguards arrangements, would satisfy the second part of the test in this amendment in lieu.