I am grateful to all those who have contributed to this good debate on Report. I propose to respond to the amendments in the order in which they have been grouped.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) for his explanation of amendment 4. He and Lord Stevenson have been passionate about ensuring that digital property is protected—I congratulate them on their efforts. The hon. Gentleman raised really interesting points about the risk of cyber-attacks. We should always be vigilant in protecting against and resisting such attacks. This is a complex and, indeed, developing area, but the amendment is both unnecessary and inappropriate. It is unnecessary because we consider that article 15 of the second protocol is already capable of covering cyber-attacks in the context of an armed conflict. As clause 3 is drafted with reference to article 15, the Bill is also able to cover such attacks.
The amendment is inappropriate because the precise meaning of article 15 is a matter of international law and we should not seek to elaborate on its meaning. The amendment would risk creating a divergence in meaning between our own law and international law, and not only would that be unhelpful, but it could ultimately place us in breach of our international obligations. Clause 3 as drafted is sufficient to implement the convention effectively in the UK, so I must oppose the amendment.
Let me briefly address the other issues that the hon. Gentleman raised about digital property. The roundtable on implementation took place on 5 December with representatives from the heritage and museum sectors, and experts in cultural property protection. On the subject of the cultural emblem, we discussed its digital display, which stakeholders broadly welcome. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that digital issues will continue to be fully considered as part of the ongoing discussions about this particular aspect of the Bill.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for tabling amendment 5, not least because it allows me to highlight the tremendous work of our armed forces on cultural property protection. Our military already take the protection
of the world’s cultural heritage very seriously. Not only is respect for cultural property upheld across the UK’s armed forces and reinforced in policy and training, but the joint military cultural property protection working group provides an important focal point for progressing numerous aspects of cultural property protection.
Planning for the new military cultural property protection unit is continuing apace. The unit will ensure that cultural property is protected from damage and looting, and it will provide advice, training and support across our armed forces. I am sure that the whole House will join me in commending this important work.
Amendment 4 would extend the UK’s jurisdiction over the offences described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of article 15.1 of the second protocol. If it were passed, foreign nationals committing those offences abroad would be subject to our jurisdiction if they were serving under the military command of the UK armed forces. This issue was raised in Committee and, to be helpful, I will be more than happy to set out our position again. Before I do so, however, let me respond to the hon. Gentleman about the reply he received from the Minister for the Armed Forces regarding the number of foreign personnel embedded in UK armed forces. That is a matter for the Ministry of Defence, and I am really sorry to say that I have nothing further to add to that correspondence.
In Committee, I stated that we should not extend our jurisdiction beyond our obligations under the convention and protocols. Clause 4(3)(b) currently covers all those subject to UK service jurisdiction, regardless of nationality. Although that is not expressly required by article 16.1, it does no more than reflect the existing position under the Armed Forces Act 2006. This is quite a different matter to extending jurisdiction to all foreign nationals serving under UK military command, which would be inappropriate. It is important that we respect the service jurisdictions of our allies in relation to their personnel when they are embedded in the UK military, as we rightly expect our service jurisdiction to be respected when our own service personnel are embedded in the forces of another state.
Such arrangements are often reciprocal. If we try to impose UK jurisdiction on foreign embedded forces, other states will be less willing to allow UK forces to be embedded with them. Clearly, that would be detrimental to the operation of UK armed forces. As I explained in Committee, these arrangements are reflected in status of forces agreements or memorandums of understanding, and a foreign soldier committing a serious violation would be dismissed and returned to their sending state. It should also be remembered that, as required by the convention and protocols, jurisdiction over the acts described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of article 15.1 of the second protocol already extends to all foreign nationals committing the gravest offences abroad.
The scope of jurisdiction set out in clause 3(4) is in line with that required by the second protocol, taking into account existing provision in the 2006 Act. This ensures that all people subject to UK service jurisdiction can rightly be prosecuted on the same basis, regardless of nationality. To go any further would be to interfere needlessly with the service jurisdictions of our allies in a manner that would be at odds with standard military practices. Given that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Cardiff West will not press amendments 4 and 5 to a Division.
5.30 pm
I turn to amendments 1 to 3, which relate to clause 17. I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) and my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington (Victoria Borwick) for setting out their concerns, but I am afraid that I cannot agree to their proposals. I explained the Government’s approach when we considered clause 17 in Committee, but I am sure that it will be helpful to the House if I briefly to go through the main points again.
I stress that the Bill is about protecting a small but very special category of cultural property: that which is
“of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people”,
as defined in article 1 of the convention. The dealing offence in clause 17 applies only to this most important cultural property when it was unlawfully exported from occupied territory after 1956, when the convention and first protocol came into force, and if it has been imported into the United Kingdom after the Bill comes into force. I hope that that provides some clarity with regard to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Kensington. However, dealers should always be concerned to ensure that any objects in which they deal have good and lawful provenance. If there is any evidence to suggest that an object might have been unlawfully exported from its country of origin—wherever and whenever that export took place—dealers should not deal in that object.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kensington raised this issue by using the example of an old master. I know that art market stakeholders are concerned that claims about the provenance of an object that are made in a phone call or published on a blog shortly before a sale could stop that sale from proceeding. That might be the case on very rare occasions, but this is already an issue for the art market and it will not be solved by watering down the Bill. If new, convincing evidence is presented about an object’s provenance shortly before an auction, we already expect dealers to pause and consider whether they need to undertake further due diligence. If, however, a claim is made with no evidence to back it up, it may be perfectly legitimate for a dealer to disregard that and proceed with the sale. Such claims are unlikely to be considered a reason to suspect that an object has been unlawfully exported. When unlawfully exported cultural property is imported into the United Kingdom, it is important that we are able to protect it by deterring and, if necessary, prosecuting those who would deal in it.