I do not often disagree with my right hon. and learned Friend, but the British Red Cross has a great deal of interest because, in many ways, it is the pre-eminent body in dealing with issues of international humanitarian law. What we are doing here is ratifying The Hague convention, in which the Red Cross plays a crucial role.
I quoted Mr Michael Meyer, the head of international law at the British Red Cross, in Committee. If you will forgive me, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will repeat what I quoted because it is of direct relevance:
“However, it appears that, in practice, the clause should place no greater burden on dealers than already exists to conduct
appropriate due diligence. In other words, the threshold of ‘reason to suspect’ is not so low as to have an adverse impact on the legitimate market, while at the same time acting as a necessary and suitable deterrent for those who may be less scrupulous. The wording is somewhat similar to that used in the existing Iraq and Syria sanctions orders. There is also very similar wording found in section 17 of New Zealand’s Cultural Property (Protection in Armed Conflict) Act 2012.”
That Act followed New Zealand’s ratification of The Hague convention. What that international lawyer says is relevant because, although I respect the well-made point that this Parliament is considering how the convention is applied domestically through our courts, we are catching up on ratifying The Hague convention and setting ourselves on an equal footing from an international legal standing. I pray that in aid.
I am arguing against myself to some extent here, but I recognise that if we were dealing with a simple issue relating to another dishonesty offence being added to the criminal legal handbook, I would be joining my right hon. and learned Friend in expressing concern about the disparity on mens rea in respect of this offence and the normal panoply of dishonesty offences. However, we are dealing with a unique offence in unique circumstances.
The shadow Minister made a point about the impact assessment and the view that there will be one prosecution. That is relevant because we are talking about an exceptional prosecution in respect of an exceptional piece of property that comes through to the market in this country and how it is then dealt with. We should therefore not overstate the concern, and we need to take into account the confidence of the market. We are dealing with exceptional cases, which need to be dealt with appropriately and carefully. That is why we need to have regard for what is already in place, not least how other cases are dealt with in international practice and how we have applied other relevant legislation.
5.15 pm
The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2003 was a statutory instrument that did not have the level of scrutiny we are afforded in dealing with this Bill—that is why we are undertaking this scrutiny. It is important to look at the impact of what has been in place since 2003. That order contains the words:
“and had no reason to suppose that the item in question was illegally removed Iraqi cultural property.”
That is particularly relevant here, as it is an equivalent provision to the one in clause 17. Interestingly, the provision is more onerous, as it shifts the burden on to the defendant, with the onus on them to prove that they had no reason to suppose that the property had been illegally removed, whereas in clause 17 the onus is on the prosecution to provide the proof. I have not heard concern from the dealers’ association and others about this order and how it goes even further in shifting the onus in respect of people dealing illegally with removed Iraqi cultural property. I am not aware of any case in which an antiquities dealer has been unjustly convicted—or, indeed, even prosecuted or arrested—under that order, even though it goes a lot further than clause 17 in shifting the burden on to the defence.