I will come to that in detail later, but the CCRC is a reactive body—it does not proactively seek cases to review—so I suggest that what my hon. Friend alludes to would not take place. However, I will cover that in more detail in a moment, if he will bear with me.
The CCRC’s long-term referral rate—the cases that, following investigation, it believes should be reheard in the Court of Appeal—is just over 3%. However, about half the applications it receives are not taken to the investigation stage, as they must first go through the regular criminal appeals process. For the cases the CCRC goes on to investigate, therefore, a referral rate of about 7% is more representative. Nevertheless, this indicates how uncommon it is to find a sufficient weight of new evidence to overturn previous convictions. That evidence must be relevant, accurate and compelling.
The House will be aware that the current working arrangements and effectiveness of the CCRC were the subject of a dedicated inquiry by the Justice Select Committee in the last Session. The impetus behind the Bill comes directly from some of its recommendations last March. I am grateful to have had the support of Members of both the previous and the current Committee in getting the Bill to this stage.
In its report, the Committee said:
“The extension of the CCRC’s section 17 powers to cover private bodies is urgently necessary and commands universal support. Successive Governments have no excuse for failing to do this and any further continuing failure is not acceptable.”
The report went on:
“It should be a matter of great urgency and priority for the next Government to bring forward legislation to implement the extension of the CCRC’s powers so that it can compel material necessary for it to carry out investigations from private bodies through an application to the courts. No new Criminal Justice Bill should be introduced without the inclusion of such a clause.”
I stand here today with just such a new criminal justice Bill and hope to put right the failure by successive Governments to which the Committee referred.
Let me turn to the new powers in the Bill and how their implementation would work in practice. The Bill would insert a new section 18A in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, which would enable the CCRC to obtain a court order requiring a private organisation or individual to disclose a document or other material in their possession. As with the current power to require material held by public bodies, the new disclosure requirements will apply notwithstanding any obligations of secrecy or other
limitations on disclosure, including statutory obligations or limitations. This will mean that companies will not be able to use excuses such as the Data Protection Act to deny the CCRC information, nor will it be possible to cite information that carries a security classification, including restricted and secret information, as a reason for non-disclosure. This could be particularly important in cases of courts martial, which the CCRC has been involved in investigating since the Armed Forces Act 2006.
Even after the enactment of the Bill, the CCRC should always attempt at first to obtain any information voluntarily before reverting to a court order. Not only would that build a better accord with the private individual or organisation concerned, it is also likely to be more expedient than an application to the court.
I should state for clarity that the provisions would extend to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, in relation to which the Northern Ireland Assembly will be invited to pass a legislative consent motion. Scotland will be unaffected because, as I said, it has its own powers.
I mentioned how low, at 7%, the referral rate was for cases that the CCRC investigates and sends back to the Court of Appeal. The shadow Cabinet Office Minister, the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David), asked in Committee—I am grateful for the opportunity to answer some of these points on Third Reading—whether this Bill, by virtue of increasing the CCRC’s powers and therefore its scope for conducting investigations, would increase the rate of referral and therefore the workload, which neatly taps into the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall). I must stress that it is not our job, nor is it the purpose of this Bill, to increase the referral rate per se. Far from it; indeed, the low rate is testament to how robust and rigorous our criminal justice system is, indicating that no evidence of a miscarriage of justice was to be found in the original case.
We must remember that not all information supplied to the CCRC will necessarily lead to an appeal. The commission’s mandate is not to secure as many referrals and overturn as many convictions as possible; it is to thoroughly investigate alleged miscarriages of justice. In some cases, privately held material might help to identify these miscarriages, and that material may lead to some convictions being referred to the Court of Appeal and subsequently quashed, in circumstances where those cases would otherwise have been turned down. In other cases, privately held material might persuade the CCRC not to refer a case for appeal where it was otherwise minded to refer.
It would be natural to anticipate that the receipt of the proposed powers should lead to an increase in referrals to the Court of Appeal, as the CCRC believes it is sure that there are miscarriages of justice that have gone unremedied because of the lack of power. However, I want Members to be clear that the referral rate is not a direct proxy for the effectiveness of the commission’s work. Increasing referrals is not to be confused with being the objective. Our job as parliamentarians is to ensure that the CCRC—and, more widely, the justice system as a whole—has all the powers and processes it needs to operate in the best way possible.
I want now to elaborate on why this change in the law is necessary, and I thank the House for its forbearance.
During my term in Birmingham, those at the commission explained that, in the 18 years of its existence, the powers under section 17 have been an essential tool of that body. The power extends to the information from public sector bodies, as I explained earlier, but it should also extend to public bodies held at arm’s length. The commissioners also explained that the absence of power to obtain material in the private sector has often operated to the disadvantage of applicants to the commission.
Currently, where material relevant to the CCRC’s work is held outside the public sector, the commissioners are reliant on requesting voluntary disclosure by the relevant individuals or organisations. Although voluntary disclosure is not uncommon, organisations increasingly regard themselves as being unable to assist the CCRC as a result of statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information. Even where voluntary disclosure is made, it will often be after protracted negotiations, causing lengthy—and, indeed, expensive—delays in the case review process.
Solicitors’ firms provide one such example. One would have thought that solicitors would be among the most co-operative of sources, but that is not always so. In the past, the commission has seen a good level of co-operation in respect of its requests for case files from solicitors who represented applicants at trial and/or on appeal. In part, that level of co-operation has been thanks to relevant professional codes of conduct that apply to solicitors. In more recent times, however, and perhaps as a result of increasing pressures on legally-aided defence firms, the commission has faced greater difficulties. It is often readily apparent that requests from the commission are placed at the bottom of solicitors’ lists of priorities. On occasion, the commission has been faced with protracted negotiations over who bears the cost of transferring the materials in question.
The commission tends to encounter four typical situations that, as a result of its lack of powers in relation to the private sector, operate to the applicant’s disadvantage. These are, first, the inability to obtain information from a private individual; secondly, the inability to obtain information from private sector organisations; thirdly, partial information or only a summary of information is provided, which the commission is not in a position to scrutinise or verify; and fourthly, information sources are obtained, but protracted negotiations with the private sector create lengthy delays.
Alarmingly, members of the commission told me that, in several instances, with respect to the information it seeks from an organisation, it has experienced significant and repeated difficulties. Against that background, the commission has decided that it would be fruitless to pursue the information in question and therefore does not do so. The current lack of power does not affect isolated cases alone, but can cause a systemic problem relating to a source and a repeated basis, leading to not one but potentially many miscarriages of justice incapable of being remedied.
I know that the commissioners share the view that it is highly regrettable that their inquiries into miscarriages of justice should be impeded by the refusal of a private organisation or witness to provide material. The absence of any compulsion exercised at the insistence of the CCRC may result in the victim of a miscarriage of
justice suffering continuing imprisonment, with all the continuing social consequences of having a criminal conviction. That cannot be right.
Moreover, the problem has become more acute in recent years, because much of the responsibility for the material held by public bodies when the 1995 Act was envisaged has since been entrusted to private sector bodies. The number of private organisations holding relevant information has increased dramatically, with the contracting out of public services to the private sector becoming more commonplace. Additionally, recent statutory data protection trends have reinforced the issue of confidentiality and have affected the voluntary co-operation of private bodies. There is a real risk that applicants to the CCRC will be at a significant disadvantage unless the CCRC is afforded the facility to obtain material held in the private sector.
Examples of private bodies that may now hold vital information relevant to the review of a case that may once have been in the public sector and within the CCRC’s scope but is now outside it include private health clinics, forensic experts, charities, campaigning groups, law firms, news agencies, probation services—now largely contracted out—banks, private schools, shops, department stores and public transport companies.
Let me illustrate this by using a few examples that the caseworkers from the commission shared with me where they believe the current lack of powers has led to long delays in a case review or even directly to its failure. Private companies can be a vital source of information, as we see in a case I was told about during my visit to Birmingham. The commission was looking into the case of an HGV driver who had been convicted in 2013 of serious sexual offences and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The commission wanted access to some of the data held by an employer which might have supported an alibi. Those inquiries evolved into a search for timesheets within the private company, but the company would not co-operate. It is not really clear whether it even checked its records. The commission was not able to obtain the information and proceeded without it, and the case was not referred.
I mentioned earlier the importance of the Forensic Science Service. A key aspect of the commission’s work is re-examining and re-testing material from crime scenes that was submitted as evidence in the original or earlier appeal trials. The recent closure of the nationalised FSS and its replacement with a contracted-out service has also highlighted this gap in the current law, the result of which is that the CCRC no longer has the power to compel the production of forensic material it had when the FSS was a public body. This type of material will be held by private companies and may not be available to the commission in future.
Another common source of evidence is CCTV. I learned of another example where an applicant, convicted and jailed for a serious armed robbery in a shop, alleged that the expert facial mapping evidence presented at the trial was flawed. The commission wished to instruct an expert to conduct further tests, but the owner of the shop in question refused to provide information about the make and specifications of the CCTV equipment. Without those details, the commission’s new expert could not consider the issues. The irony is that, had a similar incident taken place on the street in sight of a council-owned CCTV camera, the equivalent information
could have been requested under section 17 of the 1995 Act, by virtue of the fact the footage from a council-owned camera is deemed “publicly held”. Therefore, the information required to properly evaluate the appeal investigation would have been available.
Lawyers here will know that witness credibility often proves to be a vital crux of criminal prosecution or defence cases. To that end, we should consider the case where an applicant was convicted of indecently assaulting three former pupils during his employment as a housemaster at a private residential school. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. For the jury at the trial, the consideration hinged on the credibility of the complainants. The commission requested the files on each of the three complainants in order to address issues raised about their credibility. The private school declined the request and the point remains unresolved, yet a state-maintained school would have been compelled to honour the request for information and the outcome of the review investigation may have been different.
Social work or counselling records are another source of vital information to the commission. Charitable bodies such as ChildLine and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and private counsellors or doctors, often hold vital information relevant to commission reviews, particularly in cases of intra-family abuse. Such organisations may agree to assist when the consent of the individual concerned is obtained. If consent is not forthcoming, such organisations will generally decline to provide the commission with information, on the basis of confidentiality. However, the discrepancy arises in that local authority social workers’ or NHS records are deemed to be admissible by the commission when it considers a review.
I hope the House can see that the distinction between private and public organisations in cases such as these is artificial. Why should the outcome of justice depend on whether key witnesses went to a public or private school, or whether an alleged crime happened in front of a council-owned or privately-owned CCTV camera? This false divide owes itself partly to a drafting anomaly in the original legislation and partly to unforeseen rises in the amount of important evidence generated and held by private sources.
Members should bear it in mind that examples of situations where the commission has been unable to obtain potentially significant information illustrate only a part of the wider issue. At least as important is the extent to which being granted the power to obtain material from private sector sources would allow it to consider new avenues of inquiry that we currently rarely consider because our powers do not allow us to pursue them.
We are unlikely ever to be sure whether the applicants in the cases to which I have referred were truly guilty or innocent, or whether their appeals would have succeeded had the information been provided—truth is likely to be mixed across the cases. But we can be sure that the current law gives rise to question marks over this point, and that is something it is right to change.
As a final but important justification for why the Bill is necessary, it is worth considering the situation of the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. The power to obtain information from the private sector is contained in section 1941 of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997. The legislation is framed in a very similar way to the English commission’s existing power under section 17
of the 1995 Act, but it entitles the Scottish commission to apply to the High Court in Scotland for an order requiring a private individual or private sector body to produce, or allow access to, material that it is believed might assist the Scottish commission in the exercise of any of its functions.
I hope that I have established how the Bill will improve the work and thoroughness of CCRC investigations and why it is necessary. I shall now attempt to anticipate and answer some questions that the new measure is likely to raise—questions that I have indeed asked myself, and on which I have consulted both the commission and the Ministry of Justice over the past few months. Indeed, some of these points were put to me in Committee.
I want to address up front one of the largest concerns that Members are likely to have with the extension of these powers: their possible intrusion into the lives of private individuals. Although consent and privacy are to be valued, where information, even of a personal and distressing nature, could make the difference between a person’s further incarceration or their freedom, I believe that it is right that that information can be requested, subject to due process and the provision of strict safeguards. Members should know that there are significant safeguards in place to ensure that this new power is not abused.
The Bill provides that there would be judicial oversight of the process. The CCRC could only compel a private individual or organisation to provide material by order of the court. All the same safeguards that currently operate for section 17 disclosures would apply, and the commission agrees that such a process would be appropriate. The main safeguard against improper intrusion is contained in the Bill itself: namely, judicial oversight. As specified in clause 1(1), a person will be obliged to provide the CCRC with private documents or other material only if ordered to do so by a Crown court judge.
In practice, the Crown court judge may make such an order only if they are satisfied that the material may assist the CCRC in its investigation of the alleged miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, unauthorised wider disclosure of any information obtained will be an offence under section 23 of the 1995 Act. In addition, the person from whom disclosure is obtained will be able to stipulate that any information obtained is not to be disseminated further without their consent, in accordance with section 25 of the 1995 Act.
As with its current practice when preserving public body material under section 17, the CCRC would not seek to exercise its functions in an unreasonable or disproportionate way, and it would remain mindful of the right to a private and family life under article 8 of the European convention on human rights when selecting those cases where an application for a court order appeared justified.
Even so, if there are privacy implications, I believe that any interference by the new measures with that right would be legally justified. The material will only be sought pursuant to a review into an alleged miscarriage of justice, which is a serious matter. Therefore, arguments regarding intrusion into private life must be viewed in the context of the human rights implications of continued wrongful imprisonment, which is itself a breach of article 5.
The hon. Member for Caerphilly asked me in Committee what provisions were in the Bill to bring about any sanctions for private bodies or individuals failing to
comply with the court order once issued. I undertook to investigate that point and report back to him. In the intervening period I have made inquiries with the Ministry of Justice, the staff at the CCRC itself and also some hon. and learned Friends in the House, and I am pleased to report back to him. It is true that the Select Committee’s report, which paved the way for this Bill, included an additional recommendation for a new measure for timely compliance, to apply to public and private sources.
The Ministry of Justice considered that possibility and how it could be practically applied. It concluded that the evidence that this is needed, or that its implementation would make a significant difference to the timing of reviews by the CCRC, was weak and that it could not consider “sanctions” to be appropriate for the CCRC to apply if bodies failed to comply with the disclosure. Moreover, however, on reflection, the lawyers whom I spoke to and the CCRC considered that there were no such provisions in the Bill because they were unnecessary. That is because the power to demand disclosure is subject to a judge’s agreement, and the existing rules on contempt of court would provide sufficient protection. If a private body refused to provide material to the CCRC after a request for voluntary disclosure, there would clearly be no penalty. However, if the CCRC has sought and obtained a Crown court order under the new provision, then non-disclosure by the private body would be a breach of that court order, and would place the body in contempt of court.
The hon. Member for Caerphilly also raised a foreseeable objection: that of cost. The Bill has no financial implications and will not impose a financial cost or charges directly on the CCRC or private bodies. However, Members may be asking themselves whether the new power could place an unjustified financial burden on private companies that would be obliged to retrieve material for the CCRC. I suggest that the best answer to the question is to look at where the equivalent powers have been in operation for a long time—namely, the Scottish CCRC, which has not reported such issues.
I wish to recap the main reasons why I believe the Bill deserves the support of the House. First, the important power to request privately held information is currently lacking, and that is hampering the work of the CCRC. The limits placed on the CCRC by its governing statute have occasionally hindered its work and limited its ability to help victims who may be innocent. Richard Foster, the chairman of the CCRC, has said he is confident that miscarriages of justice have gone unremedied because the commission lacks that power. It is impossible to tell in retrospect whether the outcomes of any cases would have been different had additional information been available, but I hope I have made it clear how the problem is fixed by the Bill.
Additionally, the power has been wanted for a long time. The CCRC has long complained of this weakness, and after a thorough inquiry the Justice Committee has said that there has been a failure of successive Governments to right the situation. I tell the House that the time has now come. Crucially, we must also remember that the Scottish CCRC has enjoyed the powers for 18 years. Not only would the Bill fix a discrepancy between the
two legal systems—as a staunch Unionist, I believe that is surely a good thing—but we already have a working example of how the powers work. There is no record of abuse or invasion of privacy; the Scottish system is largely voluntary and complied with. Given that the commission has the legal recourse should it need it and that information is provided without great cost, only rarely would a court order be contested.
The House will be pleased to know that I have come to my final point. We must consider the human aspect of this debate. Although the British system of justice works well in the vast majority of cases, mistakes occasionally happen. Prisons are not nice places, and they are not supposed to be—that is why we use them as a deterrent. However, what about somebody who has been convicted of a crime and sent to prison when they know that they are innocent, that the system has made errors against them and that the key evidence that could prove their innocence has been withheld? Imagine how their experience is compounded. Those people are victims.
There are countless cases of people wrongly convicted who, due to psychological pressures resulting from their experience, end up taking their own lives still protesting their innocence and still, sometimes, locked up in prison. We have a moral duty to help those people to ensure that such incidents are minimised and that mistakes are swiftly and thoroughly investigated without hindrance, so that justice can be served. That is the ideal that the Bill will bring us a little closer to realising. I hope that the House will give the Bill its full support.
12.34 pm