One disadvantage of being called late in the debate is that I always find myself completely rewriting what I thought was an excellent speech. I feel that I must reflect on some of the earlier contributions. I noted that, in her opening remarks, the Minister said that the Financial Conduct Authority would deal with things such as sharp practices. She talked about the importance of dealing with “groupthink”. The right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) talked about the importance of re-establishing trust in the proper conduct of business. The hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) talked about his concerns about the public view of the behaviour of banks. These, and other, contributions make the case for the fundamental importance of what
we are all trying to address: an issue of culture. That issue of culture cannot be wholly satisfied through changes in structure or regulation alone.
I was intrigued to hear my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan) come up with the East Lothian answer, as I shall call it from now on, which I think bears some repetition: getting people who lead great institutions to be like captains of a ship. What was it that characterised them? They took responsibility; they acted with high ethical standards; they were equipped not only technically, but culturally to lead and accept the highest of standards. If we could reinstitute that in many of our institutions today, there would be much less demand for some of the detailed regulation and structures we find ourselves having to deal with. I would like to deal with some of the issues of culture, because many of the technical matters have been well rehearsed in the debate so far.
Like many Members on the Opposition Benches, I have been concerned about the willingness of the Government to remove the reverse burden of proof for senior managers before it has even been tested. Without it, we could—I am not saying would—perpetuate a culture of failing to accept responsibility under the cloak of a form of collective responsibility that favours the consensus of the guilty over the scrutiny of behaviour. Culture is fundamentally important to understanding the crash of 2008.
What I do mean by culture? To me, it is about the way in which groups of people solve problems and reconcile dilemmas. It involves unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs—their perceptions, thoughts and feelings that forge the values and behaviours within their organisations. It has been argued by many researchers that about 70% of all major organisational crises are a function of culture. That is why I have great sympathy with the Minister who is trying to deal with predominantly a cultural failure through mere regulation and changes to organisation alone.
I am sure many would argue with me that failures of culture were part and parcel of the failures at Enron, Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers, RBS and HBOS. In these cases, among other cultural problems they faced precisely the cultural problem the Minister mentioned in her opening remarks: the problem of groupthink at the highest levels.
One aspect of groupthink is present when groups are unwilling to listen to critical voices, preferring the easy comfort of a blind consensus born of common bonds. A classic example was, of course, found in HBOS, where it is widely recognised that the risk manager, Paul Moore, was sacked for raising concerns about the company’s strategy. He told the Treasury Committee in 2008 how he had predicted that the bank’s practices could “lead to disaster”. He informed the bank’s board of his concerns, but was sacked by Sir James Crosby, the bank’s former chief executive, deputy chairman of the Financial Services Authority and adviser to the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown. It tells us lots that someone who acted in such way should have reached such heady heights.
In his evidence, Mr Moore told MPs anyone whose eyes were not blinded by “money, power and pride” would have realised problems were mounting for HBOS and the other high street banks. Since his dismissal
Mr Moore has been shunned by the financial community, to its shame. As Professor Andrew Kakabadse has recently put it, the cultural problem occurs when
“management intimately know what is happening and even know what to do to stem an oncoming catastrophe but are too emotionally paralysed to act. And this often because the boss does not want to hear bad news.”
Perhaps it has best been most eloquently, if somewhat brutally, summed up by the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman) who has been quoted as saying in a review of Paul Moore’s recent book that he exposed
“the rottenness, deceit, and corruption of the malign gang that took over a successful British bank and drove it to ruin in a few short years. This gang has never been properly held to account or been brought to justice whilst Paul Moore...has never been compensated for his sacrifice.”
That is the rub of it: a lack of being held to account, a lack of effective external scrutiny, and to this day a lack of a fundamental inquiry into the culture and goings-on at these major institutions. That is a failure, and a failure upon which we address regulation and structural changes on shifting sands.
There have been other cultural failings, too—indeed too many to recite here—but they include sacrificing rigorous analysis for group harmony; making decisions as a cabal without any external critique; dealing with complex decisions in an overly intuitive manner with a prejudice in favour of an easy consensus; and a willingness to be led by strong directive individuals.
One of the fundamental concerns, which everybody in some way alluded to but we still remain to grapple with, is how and when we are going to fully understand the nature of the cultural crisis that afflicted our institutions. That is something we await to address.
6.36 pm