I rise to support the rationale behind the Bill, which is of great importance to many members of the public. Its purposes are indeed to protect the public from unscrupulous fundraisers and to stop individuals who run charities abusing them. I agree that action should be taken in such cases, and I agree that the Charity Commission should have appropriate powers where misconduct is proven to have occurred.
I am pleased to note that the National Council for Voluntary Organisations has said that
“it is widely acknowledged that deliberate wrongdoing in charities is extremely rare”,
and it is important to remember that when we debate this Bill. There are many millions of people across the country who devote themselves and give selflessly of their time to charities. It is very important that we do nothing that in any way inhibits them from engaging and contributing to this important part of our civic society.
Having highlighted that motivation, I now want to highlight some of my concerns about the Bill, particularly about some of the new powers it contains. I hope that expressing my concerns is helpful and that they can be explored further in Committee. I speak with particular reference to the new measures in clauses 3 and 11, and the wide-ranging wording of the powers, which I fear could severely curb civic engagement, possibly deterring responsible people from wanting to be appointed as an officer to a charity.
I have more than 30 years’ experience of working in private practice on charity law, and the representation of charities was a particular part of that practice. I know that it has become increasingly difficult over those years to get individuals to step up to the plate, to coin a term, and to agree to an appointment in a charity. That often proves to be one of the challenges that new charities face, particularly—and interestingly—when it comes to the appointment of a treasurer.
I come to this debate, as I say, with over three decades of practical experience of working in this field. I want to ensure that we encourage and do not deter the very responsible people that the Bill is designed to support.
I note that clause 11 provides for new powers to suspend and disqualify. It has an extensive list of reasons within it, but I note that these could in future be varied by Ministers through the laying of new regulations—subject to those regulations being consulted on. We all know, however, that with the best will in the world among the Government, consultations can often reach only a few members of the public. There is the further problem of the regulations being scrutinised only by a few Members in Committee. That is why I am concerned about the excessive powers that will be granted if the Bill is passed, which if extended could come to embrace actions that might not have been fully scrutinised or intended by Members. I enter that caveat about the extension of disqualifications merely by Ministers laying new regulations.
The Bill gives immense power to the Charity Commission. Indeed, in its policy paper of May 2015, the Charity Commission acknowledged that it was gaining
“a significant new power” to disqualify people from serving as trustees or senior managers of charities. I am concerned about the wording. The Charity Commission is able under clause 1(1) to issue a warning,
“to a charity trustee or trustee for a charity who it considers has committed…misconduct or mismanagement”.
Clearly, “who it considers” is a very wide-ranging phrase. I note that clause 1(2) allows the Charity Commission to issue a warning that it can “publish”. Yes, the charity or person subject to that warning can respond, but the publication might already have occurred, so I am concerned about the damage to the reputation of the charity in general and the individual. I am worried if there is an opportunity to publish without an opportunity to respond, and I would be grateful if Minister corrected me if I am wrong on that point.
Let me deal with some of the conditions for disqualification. The Charity Commission interprets unfitness to be a trustee to mean failure of honesty and integrity, competence or credibility, the latter being defined as undermining the confidence of the public. That is what I want to highlight in the next part of my speech—how the Charity Commission could take steps to act and issue a warning solely on the one criterion of conduct that might damage public trust and undermine public confidence.
The Charity Commission says that it will use an evidence base relating to the knowledge it gains from the surveys it takes into public trust. I am rather concerned about that. Does it mean that the Charity Commission could carry out a poll, asking people with certain views whether they think the public would be more or less likely to trust an individual or charity? What if those views were very much in the minority or if the views were greatly opposed to current Government policy—views on foreign policy, for example?
That is quite a broad-ranging power, and so far as I can see there are no requirements for any independent review from the Government before the warning is issued. It seems to be based on an individual undertaking some activity or saying something that might be contrary to the views held by the majority of the public who respond to a survey. When the Bill refers to “any conduct”, does that include conduct that someone might have undertaken several years before becoming a trustee? We all know—including many of us in the House—that views can change over time. Many of us might have expressed views some years ago that have changed. How is an individual going to be protected from action taken against them, on the basis of this Bill, which could have far-reaching repercussions?
This is not a merely theoretical issue. Let me highlight how serious a problem this is. I remind Members of the challenges faced by the Plymouth Brethren in the last Parliament. Their charitable registration was threatened because of the interpretation of the words “public benefit” within the Charities Act 2006. We are fortunate now to have William Shawcross as chairman of the Charity Commission. He is an excellent head, a man who possesses wisdom and expresses his opinions, conducts his deliberations and makes his decisions very carefully and with great common sense. Following his appointment, I felt that an appropriate approach was being taken to the plight in which the Plymouth Brethren found themselves when their charitable status was challenged. The case was to go to a tribunal, the Plymouth Brethren had to engage lawyers, and more than 300 churches were affected.
The Plymouth Brethren are a long-established denomination that exists throughout the country, but the challenge that they faced was very serious. They had to spend hundreds of thousands of pounds on legal advice. As I have said before, it was to their the credit that in the past they had done an enormous amount of voluntary work without shouting about it, but now they had to start producing documentation, and indeed they produced some excellent booklets citing the work that they had done to the public benefit. They continue to do that work, one example being disaster relief.
Some major debates were held about the case in the House. More than 40 Members of Parliament attended a debate in Westminster Hall to speak up for the Plymouth Brethren and to say that the Charity Commission’s action should never have been taken, because it had been based on a subjective interpretation of the words “public benefit”. Ultimately, as we know, the commission withdrew its action, and the charitable status of the Plymouth Brethren—and many other charities that had been standing by and waiting for the decision—was secured. However, we do not want a rerun of that case.
Some may claim that minority views undermine public confidence, but where would the suffragettes have been had all this been happening years ago? Our society contains a wide range of views and beliefs, which are often held with passion and principle. Disagreement is common, as we saw in the House only yesterday; indeed, it is a characteristic of a free society. However—and social media can be very cruel in this regard—many people despise or reject others entirely on the basis of their sincerely held but different, or minority, views. Charities are often formed for the purpose of protecting minorities, and it is important for us to ensure that genuine people with genuinely held minority views are protected from what I am sure would be the unintended consequences of the Bill.
Let me return to the subject of faith groups. Many religions in this country espouse views that are rejected by the majority, and a number of those views are very strongly rejected. Creationism, for instance, cannot be taught in schools as a scientific fact, but one would hope that it can still be expounded in RE lessons as a belief. If a charity’s work involved the promotion of creationism as a belief, would that be considered likely to undermine public confidence? There are many other examples—for example, different views on sexual ethics.
I am not, in this context, talking about minorities. A few weeks ago I spoke to a Church of England vicar—and it should be borne in mind that the Church of England is our state Church—who said that he had gone into a school and spoken about a particular view from a biblical perspective, and had gained the distinct impression that he should not come back and talk about the issue again. We must protect people with sincerely held but minority beliefs from the chilling effect that legislation can have on free speech in our society.
Let me now say something about the connection between the new powers in the Bill and the Government’s counter-extremism strategy. I understand that the Government are seeking to ensure that charities are not abused for extremist purposes. The problem is, however, that there does not currently appear to be a clear
definition of extremism. That problem affects the Bill, and I think that it could have a very negative impact. The Government’s information document on the counter-extremism strategy defines extremism as
“the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.”
That sounds fine, but previous definitions contained two or three additional words that now appear to be missing. They referred to
“mutual respect for and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs”.
That was one of our fundamental British values, alongside democracy, the rule of law and individual liberty: mutual respect and tolerance of people who held different faiths and beliefs.
In March, I said in the House:
“It is entirely right that we should respect other people, including those with other beliefs, and to respect their right to hold those beliefs”.
I added, however, that we should be careful not to conflate that
“with a requirement to respect all other beliefs, which is quite a different thing altogether.”—[Official Report, 12 March 2015; Vol. 594, c. 496.]
That is the problem with the current definition of extremism. If I say that I respect scientologists but I do not respect scientology, I mean that I respect those who hold different beliefs, but I do not respect the belief of scientology. Does that make me an extremist? We must be very careful about the way in which we define extremism, and in that connection it is interesting to note that the Government have yet to provide a statutory definition of non-violent extremism.
We all value free speech very highly in the House. A free society is based on disagreement and mutual respect, and I believe that that is strengthened, not compromised, when I respect my fellow citizens without necessarily respecting their beliefs. I mentioned the suffragettes earlier, but the issue of slavery is another example. The wording of the current definition is deeply troubling, and we need to clarify it, because otherwise we could end up contributing to the marginalisation that feeds extremism. Open dialogue with those who hold different views is essential if we are to understand each other’s views, reduce prejudice, and promote community cohesion.
The role that faith groups play in community cohesion through their involvement in the voluntary sector is staggering. Research carried out earlier in the year established that they contribute about £3 billion to social action in their communities, and that is just in monetary terms. In my view, the social cohesion that they provide is unquantifiable. Thousands of churches have run, or helped to run, charity projects for decades. It concerns me greatly that the removal—or the mere deterrence—of those who hold faith-related views that, in our present society, might not be popular, and certainly could not be considered mainstream, could deprive the charitable sector of valuable experience and expertise for decades.
Having had more than 30 years of experience in legal practice and of working with the charitable sector, I know that people are increasingly worried about falling foul of legislation and, as a result, are not becoming charity trustees. Will the Minister look again at the
powers relating to disqualification? It is interesting that he used the term “self-regulation”. I would not like to become self-disqualified. I am concerned because the powers are so wide, and we need to ensure that the thousands of experienced servant-hearted volunteers involved in the charitable sector are not deterred from being involved in our civic society. I know that that is not the Government’s intention, and I would be grateful if they looked at these concerns. I am sure that that would be an unintended consequence, but we cannot afford any further marginalisation and exclusion of people from a sector in which they play such a vital role.
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